Marcelus v. Corrections Corp. of America
Decision Date | 31 March 2008 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 07-0721 (RJL). |
Parties | Wisler MARCELUS, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA/CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT FACILITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Sharon Ingrid Theodore-Lewis, Patrick Henry, LLP, Lanham, MD, for Plaintiff.
Alison N. Davis, Ford & Harrison LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiff, Wisler Marcelus ("plaintiff" or "Marcelus"), brought this lawsuit against his former employer, Correctional Corporation of America/Correctional Treatment Facility1("defendant" or "CCA"), alleging claims for discrimination, retaliation and breach of contract in connection with his termination by the defendant as a correctional officer at the DC Jail. Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for retaliation and breach of contract. After consideration of the parties' pleadings, the relevant law and the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.
On September 3, 2004, Marcelus was escorting an inmate out of the cell block when another inmate escaped from his cell and attacked the inmate Marcelus was escorting. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.) Marcelus had allegedly notified the shift supervisor earlier that day that the cell from which the inmate escaped was unlocked and completed an incident report detailing the assault. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 21-22.)
On September 30, 2004, Marcelus met with CTF/CCA Warden Figuerora (the "Warden"), who accused plaintiff of filing a false report and failing to ensure the safety of the inmate he was escorting. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Warden told Marcelus that he was fired and asked him to leave the premises. (Id. ¶ 23.) Thereafter, CCA sent Marcelus a letter dated October 12, 2004, informing him that his termination was effective October 11, 2004.2 (Id. ¶ 26.) Marcelus alleges, however, that CCA did not follow certain pre-termination procedures required by the collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") between CCA and the National Professional Corrections Employees Union ("NPCEU"). In particular, he alleges that it failed to provide him with a minimum of three days advance written notice of the issues and an opportunity to meet with the Assistant Warden or his designee. (Compl. ¶¶ 45, 32-33; Def. Mot., Ex. B, Art. 11.) As a result, Marcelus filed a grievance after receiving the letter, which CCA rejected as untimely. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.)
In response, Marcelus filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge ("EEOC Charge" or "the Charge") on November 30, 2004, claiming "age" and "national origin" discrimination. In his textual description, he explained that he believed his termination was nothing more than a "cover" to provide a defense for the prison officials for any future victim-inmate's litigation. Marcelus further claimed that younger employees, of other national origins, had been suspended, not terminated, in similar circumstances. (Id.) After the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, Marcelus initiated this lawsuit. CCA filed its Answer and has moved to dismiss plaintiffs claims for retaliation and breach of contract.3
Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, due to plaintiffs failure to exhaust. Since motions to dismiss for exhaustion, however, are more appropriately addressed as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),4 the Court will treat defendant's motion accordingly. See Alfred v. Scribner Hall & Thompson, LLP, 473 F.Supp.2d 6, 8 (D.D.C.2007) (Leon, J.) ( ); Potts v. Howard Univ., 240 F.R.D. 14, 18-19 (D.D.C.2007) (, )rev'd on other grounds, 2007 WL 4561147 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 7, 2007). The outcome in this case, nonetheless, is the same under either standard.5
Rule 12(b)(6) permits courts to dismiss claims if it appears that a plaintiff cannot establish "any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Of course, the court must assume the alleged facts to be true and draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor. See id. Bell AU. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court need not Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276.
Title VII requires a plaintiff to file an administrative charge with the EEOC prior to filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Park v Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir. 1995). The theories of discrimination in plaintiff's lawsuit are limited to the theories contained in the EEOC Charge he filed. Any other theories are barred unless the claim is "like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations." Park, 71 F.3d at 907 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Here, plaintiff claims he was terminated, in part, due to "retaliation" .for "complain[ing] about discrimination and fil[ing] incident reports against co-workers and supervisors." (See Compl. ¶ 42.) The only theories mentioned in his EEOC Charge, however, were age and national origin. Indeed, nothing in the EEOC Charge even referenced him making past complaints about discrimination, or filing prior incident reports against co-workers and supervisors. Absent an indication of this theory, plaintiffs retaliation claim here is not "like or reasonably related to" the allegations in his EEOC Charge. See, e.g., Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 532 F.Supp.2d 6, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2008) ( ).
Marcelus seeks to excuse this failure to exhaust on the grounds that at an unspecified point in time, an EEOC investigator told Marcelus that his claims of retaliation were included in his EEOC Charge. (Pl. Opp'n 2.) However, because a plaintiff has an opportunity to review his charge prior to signing it, courts are reluctant to excuse exhaustion on the grounds that the EEOC investigator failed to include certain information in the charge. See Novitsky v. Am. Consulting Engineers, L.L.C., 196 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 1999) ( ); cf. Park, 71 F.3d at 908-09 ( ). Thus, to the extent Marcelus provided this information to the investigator prior to signing his charge, he cannot claim the benefit of this omission. Furthermore, Marcelus has failed to offer any reason for not seeking to amend his charge at a later time. See Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1997) ( ). For all these reasons, plaintiff's claim for retaliation in Count II cannot survive defendant's motion to dismiss and must be dismissed.
As to plaintiff's breach of contract claim, an employee must similarly exhaust any grievance and arbitration procedures provided for by the collective bargaining agreement prior to bringing suit for breach of contract. See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426, 428, 434 (D.C.Cir.1994) ( ). Courts will, however, excuse an employee's failure to exhaust where the employer has repudiated the grievance procedures, the union has wrongfully refused to pursue the grievance, or it would be futile for the employee to pursue an administrative remedy. See Potts v. Howard Univ., 240 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.D.C.2007), rev'd on other grounds, 2007 WL 4561147 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 7, 2007); cf. Univ. of D.C. Faculty Ass'n/NEA v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 624 (D.C.Cir.1998). None of these occurred here.
Indeed, Marcelus does not dispute that the CBA contains a grievance and arbitration procedure or that arbitration is the "method of resolving grievances." (Compl. ¶ 28 ().) While he filed a grievance which CCA rejected as untimely, he does not even allege that he pursued the grievance to a final determination. Even if he had, however, a failure to pursue a grievance to final determination does not constitute exhaustion. See Summers v. Howard Univ., 127 F.Supp.2d 27, 30 (D.D.C.2000) ( ).
Moreover, Marcelus has not alleged that his pursuit of the grievance was thwarted by CCA or his union, or was otherwise futile. Cf. UDC Chairs Chapter v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of the...
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