Marchesi v. Bd. of Selectmen of The Town of Lyme

• Citation: 28 A.3d 994,131 Conn.App. 24
• Decision Date: 30 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 29999.,29999.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Rhonda M. MARCHESIv.BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF the TOWN OF LYME et al.

131 Conn.App. 24

28 A.3d 994

Rhonda M. MARCHESI

v.BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF the TOWN OF LYME et al.

No. 29999.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 17, 2010.Decided Aug. 30, 2011.

Kenneth M. McKeever, town attorney, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).Harry B. Heller, Uncasville, for the appellee (plaintiff).HARPER, LAVINE and MIHALAKOS, Js.HARPER, J.

The defendants in this administrative appeal, the board of selectmen of the town of Lyme (board) and the town of Lyme (town),¹ appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Rhonda M. Marchesi. The defendants claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that the parties were entitled to a trial de novo, (2) concluded that the board had exceeded its authority by determining that a highway existed on the plaintiff's property, (3) determined that there were no issues of material fact to preclude the granting of summary judgment and (4) made a finding of fact unsupported by the evidence.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. Brockway Ferry Road ³ is a highway located near the shore of the Connecticut River in Lyme. The plaintiff owns real property, improved with a single family residence, on Brockway Ferry Road. In 2006, several other proprietors of real property abutting Brockway Ferry Road filed a petition, pursuant to General Statutes § 13a–39, requesting that the board define the boundaries of Brockway Ferry Road, particularly at its western end, in the area of the plaintiff's property. The board considered documentary and testimonial evidence and held hearings related to the petition. In October, 2006, the board published notice of its memorandum of decision in which it “made a determination of the boundary and terminus of Brockway Ferry Road at its western end as it runs along and into the Connecticut River.” Essentially, the board concluded that Brockway Ferry Road extended through and across the plaintiff's property, past the then existing western terminus of the highway.

Thereafter, the plaintiff brought an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 13a–40, in the Superior Court. The plaintiff asserted that the board's decision introduced a public highway through and across her property, lessened the value of her property and negatively affected her use and enjoyment of her property. The plaintiff raised several claims related to the board's jurisdiction. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the board had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion. The gist of the complaint was that, rather than defining the width of an existing public highway, the board extended the length of said highway at its western terminus.

In June, 2007, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed the motion arguing, in part, that the plaintiff was not entitled to move for summary judgment in an administrative appeal. In its May 20, 2008 memorandum of decision, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that it was entitled to consider the appeal in a trial de novo and, therefore, that the motion for summary judgment procedurally was appropriate. Thereafter, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because the board exceeded the scope of its statutory authority by determining the length of Brockway Ferry Road, rather than its width. This appeal followed.

I

First, the defendants claim that, in concluding that summary judgment procedurally was proper in this case, the court improperly determined that the parties were entitled to a trial de novo. We disagree.

The defendants argued before the trial court that the plaintiff was not entitled to a trial de novo but, rather, the court was limited to determining whether substantial evidence supported the board's decision. The court's determination rests, to a large extent, on its interpretation of § 13a–40. “[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.... When construing a statute [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.R., 123 Conn.App. 336, 339, 1 A.3d 1184 (2010).

Section 13a–40 provides in relevant part: “Any person aggrieved by [the decision of town selectmen in defining highway bounds pursuant to § 13a–39] may appeal to the superior court for the judicial district where such highway is situated within ten days after notice of such decision has been given, which appeal shall be in writing, containing a brief statement of the facts and reasons of appeal.... Said court may review the doings of such selectmen, examine the questions in issue by itself or by a committee, confirm, change or set aside the doings of such selectmen, and make such orders in the premises, including orders as to costs, as it finds to be equitable. The clerk of said court shall cause a certified copy of the final decree of said court to be recorded in the records of the town in which such highway is located, and, if such decree changes the bounds defined and established by the decision of such selectmen, the bounds defined and established by such decree shall be the bounds of such highway.” (Emphasis added.)

Nothing in the plain language of the statute governing an appeal from the decision of the board limits the authority of the Superior Court in its review of the board's determination. Rather, the language of the statute unambiguously states that the court, examining the issues by itself, may change or set aside the decision of the board and make such orders in the premises as it finds to be equitable. Unlike the defendants, we do not interpret the statute in such a manner that it precludes the court from conducting a trial de novo. Furthermore, the defendants have not presented this court with persuasive authority to the contrary. Subsequent to the filing of an administrative appeal in which the parties are entitled to a judgment de novo, the appeal shall “follow the same course of pleading as that followed in ordinary civil actions.” Practice Book § 14–7(d)(5). This course of pleading encompasses the motion for summary judgment. See Practice Book § 17–44.

II

Second, the defendants claim that the court improperly concluded that the board had exceeded its authority by determining that a highway existed on the plaintiff's property. We disagree.

A determination of the board's authority requires that we interpret § 13a–39. In part I of this opinion, we set forth the principles guiding our review. Section 13a–39 provides in relevant part: “Whenever the boundaries of any highway have been lost or become uncertain, the selectmen of any town in which such highway is located, upon the written application of any of the proprietors of land adjoining such highway, may cause to be made a map of such highway, showing the fences and bounds as actually existing, and the bounds as claimed by adjoining proprietors, and shall also cause to be placed on such map such lines as in their jurisdiction coincide with the lines of the highway as originally laid down.... Such selectmen ... upon reaching a decision, shall cause the same to be published ... and a notice of the same to be sent to all known adjoining proprietors. Such decision shall specifically define the line of such highway and the bounds thereof and shall be recorded in the records of the town in which such highway is located, and the lines and bounds so defined and established shall be the bounds of such highway unless changed by the Superior Court upon appeal from such decision of the selectmen.”

The defendants argue that the legislature conferred authority on the board to “determine the line of the highway and the bounds thereof which, by definition and common sense, include both the width and the length of Brockway Ferry Road.” They argue that “ § 13a–39 sets forth the legislature's enumerated due process procedures for the public to know the width and length of all or a portion of a highway where the lines and bounds have become lost or uncertain. It ... requires the board to establish the lines of the highway and the bounds thereof, that is, its boundary, border or limits and the courses and distances to its terminus.”

We begin our analysis with the text of the statute. It provides that proprietors of land adjoining a highway may apply to the board for a determination “[w]henever the boundaries of [the] highway have been lost or become uncertain....” General Statutes § 13a–39. The statute confers the authority to define “the line of [a] highway and the bounds thereof....” General Statutes § 13a–39. Although the legislature did not define the key terms in the statute, we may look to the ordinary usage of the language in affording it its plain meaning. See Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 200–201, 3 A.3d 56 (2010) (noting that words and phrases not defined in statutes should be construed according to their commonly...