Marchesi v. Bd. of Selectmen of the Town of Lyme

• Decision Date: 06 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18890.,18890.
• Citation: 72 A.3d 394,309 Conn. 608
• Parties: Rhonda M. MARCHESI v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF the TOWN OF LYME et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

309 Conn. 608

72 A.3d 394

Rhonda M. MARCHESI

v.BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF the TOWN OF LYME et al.

No. 18890.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 20, 2013.

Decided Aug. 6, 2013.

Kenneth M. McKeever, Niantic, with whom was Brendan P. McKeever, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Harry B. Heller, Uncasville, for the appellee (plaintiff).

NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

In this certified appeal, the defendants the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Lyme (board) and the town of Lyme (town),¹ appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, which rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Rhonda M. Marchesi. Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 131 Conn.App. 24, 28 A.3d 994 (2011). On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) the trial court correctly determined that parties in an appeal taken pursuant to General Statutes § 13a–40² are entitled to a trial de novo in the Superior Court; and (2) General Statutes § 13a–39³ authorizes the selectmen of a town to determine the width of the existing highway, but not its length.⁴ Although we agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court properly concluded that parties appealing pursuant to § 13a–40 are entitled to a trial de novo, we disagree with the Appellate Court's conclusion that § 13a–39 authorizes the selectmen of a town to determine the width of the existing highway, but not its length. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings to determine the width and length of the existing highway.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “Brockway Ferry Road ⁵ is a highway located near the shore of the Connecticut River in [the town]. The plaintiff owns real property, improved with a single family residence, on [the highway]. In 2006, several other proprietors of real property abutting [the highway] filed a petition, pursuant to ... § 13a–39, requesting that the board define the boundaries of [the highway], particularly at its western end, in the area of the plaintiff's property. The board considered documentary and testimonial evidence and held hearings related to the petition. In October, 2006, the board published notice of its memorandum of decision in which it ‘made a determination of the boundary and terminus of [the highway] at its western end as it runs along and into the Connecticut River.’ Essentially, the board concluded that [the highway] extended through and across the plaintiff's property, past the then existing western terminus of the highway.

“Thereafter, the plaintiff brought an administrative appeal, pursuant to ... § 13a–40, in the Superior Court. The plaintiff asserted that the board's decision introduced a public highway through and across her property, lessened the value of her property and negatively affected her use and enjoyment of her property. The plaintiff raised several claims related to the board's jurisdiction. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the board had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion. The gist of the complaint was that, rather than defining the width of an existing public highway, the board extended the length of said highway at its western terminus.

“In June, 2007, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed the motion arguing, in part, that the plaintiff was not entitled to move for summary judgment in an administrative appeal. In its May 20, 2008 memorandum of decision, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that it was entitled to consider the appeal in a trial de novo and, therefore, that the motion for summary judgment procedurally was appropriate. Thereafter, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because the board exceeded the scope of its statutory authority by determining the length of [the highway] rather than its width.” Id., at 26–28, 28 A.3d 994.

Thereafter, the defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendants claimed that the trial court “improperly (1) concluded that the parties were entitled to a trial de novo, [and] (2) concluded that the board had exceeded its authority by determining that a highway existed on the plaintiff's property....” ⁶Id., at 26. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court properly determined that the parties were entitled to a trial de novo pursuant to § 13a–40 and that the board had exceeded its authority under § 13a–39 because that statute only allows the selectmen of a town to settle the uncertain width of a highway. Id., at 28, 30, 28 A.3d 994. Judge Lavine authored an opinion dissenting in part from the judgment of the Appellate Court in which he concluded that the trial court improperly determined that § 13a–39 authorized the board to determine only the width and not the length of the highway. Id., at 35, 28 A.3d 994. This appeal followed.⁷

I

The defendants first claim that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court properly determined that the parties were entitled to a trial de novo pursuant to § 13a–40 and, therefore, properly considered the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 14–7(d)(5). The defendants assert that, in an appeal pursuant to § 13a–40, the Superior Court should treat the action as an administrative appeal and apply a substantial evidence standard. In support of this claim, the defendants cite the procedures provided under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4–183 et seq., and cases involving appeals from municipal planning and zoning commissions and state agencies. In response, the plaintiff claims that the statutory language authorizing appeals from the decisions of municipal land use agencies and state agencies is distinguishable from § 13a–40 and that the language of that statute expressly authorizes the trial court to conduct a trial de novo. We agree with the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's claim raises a question of statutory interpretation. “[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 379, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whetherthe language actually does apply.... Picco v. Voluntown, 295 Conn. 141, 147, 989 A.2d 593 (2010). General Statutes § 1–2z⁸ directs this court to first consider the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes to determine its meaning. If, after such consideration, the meaning is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, we shall not consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute. General Statutes § 1–2z; see also Saunders v. Firtel, 293 Conn. 515, 525, 978 A.2d 487 (2009). Only if we determine that the statute is not plain and unambiguous or yields absurd or unworkable results may we consider extratextual evidence of its meaning such as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment ... the legislative policy it was designed to implement ... its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Thomas v. Dept. of Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 399, 999 A.2d 682 (2010). The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289 Conn. 769, 779, 961 A.2d 349 (2008). We presume that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... [S]tatutes must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.... Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 303, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).” (Footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tine v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 308 Conn. 300, 305–306, 63 A.3d 910 (2013).

Furthermore, “[i]n the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.” General Statutes § 1–1(a). “If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ugrin v. Cheshire, supra, 307 Conn. at 380, 54 A.3d 532.

We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory provision. Section 13a–40 provides: “Any person aggrieved by such decision may appeal to the superior court for the judicial district where such highway is situated within ten days after notice of such decision has been given, which appeal shall be in writing, containing a brief statement of the facts and reasons of appeal and a citation to such selectmen and all adjoining proprietors on such highway to appear before said court, and said court, or any judge thereof, may direct the time of appearance and the manner of service. Said court may review the doings of such selectmen, examine the questions in issue by itself or by a committee, confirm, change or set aside the doings of such selectmen, and make such orders in the premises, including...