Marcoux v. Farm Service and Supplies, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02 CIV. 5299(WCC).,02 CIV. 5299(WCC).
• Citation: 283 F.Supp.2d 901
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Parties: Patricia A. MARCOUX, Plaintiff, v. FARM SERVICE AND SUPPLIES, INC., Hribar Truck & Equipment Corp. and Bradley Jones, Defendants.

283 F.Supp.2d 901

Patricia A. MARCOUX, Plaintiff, v. FARM SERVICE AND SUPPLIES, INC., Hribar Truck & Equipment Corp. and Bradley Jones, Defendants.

No. 02 CIV. 5299(WCC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 12, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

MacCartney, MacCartney, Kerrigan & MacCartney, Nyack, NY (Harold Y. MacCartney, Jr., Of Counsel), for plaintiff.

Law Offices of John C. Lane, New York City (John C. Lane, Of Counsel), for Farm Service and Supplies, Inc. and Bradley Jones, defendants.

McElfish & Associates, LLC, New York City (Suzanne M. Billig, Of Counsel), for Hribar Truck & Equipment Corp., defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Patricia Marcoux brings this action against defendants Farm Service and Supplies, Inc. ("Farm Service"), Hribar Truck & Equipment Corp. ("Hribar") and Bradley J. Jones ("Jones").¹ In her first claim for relief, she alleges that Jones, an employee of Farm Service, negligently operated a tractor-trailer truck, the trailer of which was owned by Hribar and leased to Farm Service, thereby causing a motor vehicle accident in which she was injured. In her second claim for relief, plaintiff alleges that defendants' actions were "wanton, reckless and malicious," and demands punitive damages. Defendants have moved pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) for partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's second claim for relief. For the reasons set forth herein, we grant defendants' motions for partial summary judgment.

BACKGROUND²

On the rainy day of June 6, 2002, at approximately 4:50 p.m., a motor vehicle accident occurred on Route 100 near Seven Bridges Road in Yorktown, New York, between plaintiff, who was driving northbound in her 1998 Honda sedan, and Jones,³ who was driving a tractor trailer in the southbound lane. Jones was driving a 1996 International semi-tractor, owned by Farm Service, that was connected to an unloaded flatbed trailer owned by Hribar and leased to Farm Service. At the location of the accident, Route 100 is a two-lane roadway with a double yellow line that separates northbound from southbound traffic. In addition, although Route 100 is generally a north-south highway, at the scene of the accident, the roadway runs east-west; it curves generally to the right for westbound traffic and to the left for castbound traffic. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1-5; Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1-5.) At the time of the accident, the roadway was wet because it was raining. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7.)

Immediately before the accident occurred, plaintiff had been proceeding northbound and Jones had been proceeding southbound. Jones drove the truck around the curve towards the intersection with Seven Bridges Road, thus changing his course of travel to westbound. Approaching the intersection,⁴ he applied the truck's brakes, but was unable to stop in time on the wet pavement. Jones steered the truck to the right and struck the right-side guardrail with the tractor. The trailer swung out slightly into the opposing traffic lane, and its rear wheels struck plaintiff's car. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) The tractor came to rest after the accident a few hundred feet from the intersection with Seven Bridges Road. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident.

Thereafter, Yorktown Police Officers Richard Finn⁵ and Timothy Tausz⁶ investigated the accident.⁷ They did not interview any person who claimed to have witnessed the accident. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10; Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10.) The investigating officers also did not observe any skid marks at the scene of the accident. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13.) While at the scene, Finn inspected the tractor-trailer. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15.) He found that the trailer itself was over the double yellow line, and that it had been operated at an unreasonable speed because its driver was unable to control it on the wet road surface. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 19.) Subsequently, Finn issued five traffic tickets to Jones, two of which were for unsafe trailer tires.⁸

With respect to the trailer's tires, the tickets were issued for excessive wear and tear on the right-outer tire on the fourth axle and the right-outer tire on the fifth axle. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21, 25.) Finn based his determination that the tires were unsafe on a visual assessment of the tires, and their wear and tear, but he did not actually measure the tread depth of the tires.⁹ (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 22-23; Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 26.) In his post-accident investigation, Tausz determined that three or four of the trailer's eight tires were unsafe, and that the tire tread on those tires was less than 1/32" at the point of measurement, although he does not recall which specific tires were unsafe other than those two that were the subject of the citations issued by Finn. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 22-24; Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 42.) Tausz also determined that the truck was traveling at an unreasonable speed based on road and weather conditions, as well as the fact that the trailer entered the oncoming lane; he did not, however, actually calculate the speed of either vehicle or the "critical curve speed"¹⁰ as part of his investigation. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 45.) Tausz concluded that adequate tread depth is necessary on all of the trailer's tires in order to maintain traction and prevent skidding, and that the inadequate tread depth combined with the unreasonable speed to cause the trailer's skid into the oncoming lane and the resulting accident.¹¹ (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 45.)

The trailer was owned by Hribar, who leased it to Farm Service.¹² (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 47.) Farm Service maintains all of its tractors and trailers regularly, whether owned or leased. (Id. ¶ 64.) It relies on its head mechanic Bryant Griffin, an experienced truck mechanic who is certified by the United States Department of Transportation, to perform federally-mandated inspections of tractors and trailers. (Id. ¶ 63.) Each trailer, including the one at issue in this case, is returned to the Farm Service terminal yard in Marengo, Illinois every two weeks for inspection and maintenance by Griffin. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 65; Def. Farm Service Affm., Ex. 13 ¶¶ 3-4.) Griffin stated that he personally inspects, inter alia, each vehicle's tires, brakes, lights and air suspensions.¹³ (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 65; Def Farm Service Affm., Ex. 13 ¶¶ 3-4.) Indeed, Griffin last inspected the trailer at issue in the instant case, including its tires, on May 28, 2002, less than two weeks prior to the accident. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 66; Def. Farm Service Affm., Ex. 13 ¶ 5.) He "aired up" the tires, but did not find them in need of replacement at that time. (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 65; Def. Farm Service Affm., Ex. 13 ¶¶ 12-13.) Moreover, Griffin performed a full federal inspection of the trailer on April 8, 2002, completed the required report and certified that it, including the tires, passed inspection in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 396.¹⁴ (Def. Farm Service Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 65; Def. Farm Service Affm., Ex. 13 ¶ 12.) After the accident, Hribar repaired the trailer and leased it to another customer, although we note that the record remains unclear as to whether the tires at issue were changed prior to the subsequent lease. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11; Pl. Affm., Ex. O at 22-36, 52.)

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56, summary judgment may be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The burden rests on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine factual issue exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all permissible factual inferences against the movant. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court's role at this stage of the litigation is not to decide issues of material fact, but to discern whether any exist. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

II. New York Law Re: Punitive Damages

We conclude that, even resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible inferences in her favor, under well established principles of New York law,¹⁵ plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to sustain a reasonable jury verdict awarding her punitive damages. Indeed, "[t]he standard for an award of punitive damages in New York is a demanding one. Plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct to be `so reckless or wantonly negligent as to be the equivalent of a conscious disregard of the rights of others' and that the conduct demonstrates a `high degree of moral culpability.'"' West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 973 F.Supp. 385, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Rinaldo v. Mashayekhi, 185 A.D.2d 435, 585 N.Y.S.2d 615 (3d Dep't 1992)). Indeed, "New York courts have used a variety of phrases to describe the `moral culpability' that will support punitive damages for nonintentional torts including `utter recklessness,' Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N.Y. 282, 296 (1872); `reckless and of a criminal nature,...