Marcoux v. Hannifin
| Decision Date | 06 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action CV-03-444 |
| Parties | Christine Marcoux, Plaintiff v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division, Defendant |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
Before this court is Defendant Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Division (Nichols) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56.
Christine Marcoux (Plaintiff) receives worker's compensation benefits for personal injuries suffered on August 9, 1999 when she slipped and fell at Defendant Nichols' workplace in Portland, Maine. At the time, the Plaintiff worked for Kelly Services, a staffing company that contracts to recruit screen, hire, place and oversee temporary employees for its customers, including Nichols. Plaintiff was a full-time Service Manager for Kelly, serving, with her assistant, as an on-site coordinator at Nichols, meeting with Nichols' personnel to determine Nichols' need for temporary employees, and placing and managing those employees through Nichols supervisors. Plaintiff's duties kept her at the Nichols' location three to four days a week, where she had her own desk and phone extension.
On the day she fell, Plaintiff was walking to the Nichols' production floor, down an aisle that ran past production machines. She chose her path to avoid a green stain on the floor by one of the machines. Plaintiff lost her footing and went down on her right knee, rotating and twisting her back. There were no known witnesses to her fall. Plaintiff filed a First Report of Injury for a Workers' Compensation claim on or about September 30, 1999 with Kelly Services, who notified Nichols of the accident. Kelly Services secured the payment of Workers' Compensation benefits for the Plaintiff.
On August 11, 2003, Plaintiff brought an action in Negligence against Nichols for her injuries, which Nichols denied. On May 13, 2004, Nichols filed this Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the Maine Workers' Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S.A. § 104, providing employers with statutory immunity from the tort actions of employees of a "temporary help service" such as Kelly Services. Nichols also maintains the Plaintiff offers no evidence of the causation elements of her negligence claim.
The Plaintiff argues that, at the time of the accident, she was an employee of Kelly Services and an independent contractor with Nichols as defined in Maine Workers' Compensation Act, § 102 (13). Because Nichols was not Plaintiff's employer, the Plaintiff maintains Nichols is not immune from Plaintiff's suit under the statute extending employer immunity to clients of temporary help services. Plaintiff also argues there is ample evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude Nichols negligently left fluid on its production floor, negligently failed to warn Plaintiff of the hazard, and negligently caused Plaintiff's injuries.
In a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party asserts that no issue of material fact exists, and that judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. The court will find:
summary judgment is warranted when the statement of material facts and pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, cited in the statement of material facts establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that a party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Darling's v. Ford Motor Co.. 2003 ME 21 ¶4, 825 A.2d 344, 345.
The parties dispute how to characterize Plaintiff's status at Nichols. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's job falls squarely within the statutory definition of a "temporary help services" employee under the Workers' Compensation Act, and that Plaintiff's tort action against Nichols is barred by that statute. Plaintiff maintains she was at all times a full-time employee of Kelly Services; although her work was to provide Nichols with temporary workers, she herself was not under the direction and control of Nichols, and was an "independent contractor" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Under Maine's Workers' Compensation Act, "an employer that uses a private employment agency for temporary help services is entitled to the same immunity from civil actions by employees of the temporary help service as is granted with respect to the employer's own employees .. . 39-A M.R.S.A. § 104 (2001). This law was passed in 1995 to close a "loophole" in the Workers' Compensation statutes that permitted employees hired through temp agencies and injured on the job, both to receive workers' compensation benefits and to sue their third party employers. The result was workplaces where side-by-side employees had very different legal rights respecting their employer.[1] In supporting the bill, insurers argued there should be no distinction made for purposes of employer immunity between a worker who "technically" is employed by a temporary agency but who "actually" is employed by the business utilizing the agency.
The immunity statute defines a "temporary help service" as:
a service where an agency assigns its own employees to a 3rd party to work under the direction and control of the 3rd party to support or supplement the 3rd party's work force in work situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal work load conditions and special assignments and projects.
39-A M.R.S.A. § 104 (2001) (emphasis added). The phrase "to work under the direction and control of the 3rd party" was added by amendment before the statute was enacted, to avoid confusion over which employees fell under the rule.[2] Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 121, No. H-401 (117th Legis. 1995). The committee stated the amendment clarified that "immunity only applies when the loaned employee is under the direction and control of the 3rd party." Id.
The Law Court has found that "[t]he issue of employment status under the Workers' Compensation Act to be a mixed question of fact and law."[3] Stone v. Thorbjornson, 656 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Me. 1995). The First Circuit, for example, held that a painter was an independent contractor under Maine's Workers' Compensation Act as a matter of law by weighing the statutory factors, and, alternatively found a disputed issue of fact as to whether the defendant exercised "essential control or superintendence, " over the painter. Wood v. U.S. 115 F.Supp.2d (D.Me. 2000). Disputes as to employment status, particularly for purposes of immunity and compensation, frequently take the form of distinguishing employees from independent contractors.[4] A. LARSON, Larson's Worker's Compensation Law, § 60.02 (2000). Because independent contractors are expressly excluded from the definition of employee, employer immunity from personal injury liability expressly does not extend to suits brought by independent contractors. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 906 (2001).
Maine's Workers' Compensation Act defines an independent contractor as "a person who performs services for another under contract, but who is not under the essential control or superintendence of the other person while performing those services." 39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(13) (2001). The statute provides eight factors to be weighed by the fact finder[5] when determining whether an independent contractor relationship exists:
39-A M.R.S.A. § 102(13) (2001). Thus a "lumper" who unloaded and sorted fish from a fishing vessel was held to be an employee of the fishing vessel when he worked without a contract, his work was an integral part of the employer's regular business, he did not work for other employers, he was paid by the hour, he did not supply his own equipment, he did not hold himself out to be an independent contractor, and he had no control over his hours of employment. Stone v. Thorbjornson, 656 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Me. 1995).[7] The First Circuit refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant U.S. Navy, finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether the Navy or a painting contractor exercised "essential control or superintendence" over an injured painter for purposes of employer immunity under Maine's Workers Compensation Act. Wood v. U.S., 115 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D. Me. 2000).
Here the parties vigorously dispute whether Plaintiff was a temporary services employee of Nichols, subject to the statute granting immunity to employers, or was an independent contractor with Nichols and an employee of Kelly. Defendant Nichols argues there is no distinction between the direction and control Nichols exercised over the Plaintiff as Kelly's on-site coordinator, and the direction and control they exercised over the scores of workers that Kelly Services...
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