Margruder v. Hall of Records Com'n, 63

• Decision Date: 20 November 1959
• Docket Number: No. 63,63
• Parties: Louise E. MAGRUDER v. HALL OF RECORDS COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 1

221 Md. 1

155 A.2d 899

Louise E. MAGRUDER v. HALL OF RECORDS COMMISSION et al.

No. 63.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 20, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 1959.

Eugene M. Childs, Annapolis (Childs & Bald, Annapolis, on the brief), for appellant.

Stedman Prescott, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellees.

Before HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

HORNEY, Judge.

This is an appeal by Louise E. Magruder (the plaintiff), a professional genealogist, from the order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County dismissing her bill for an injunction against the Hall of Records Commission (Records Commission), the Board of Public Works (Works Board or the Board) and the Commissioner of the Land Office (Land Office) to forestall the removal of the Land Office and its records from the Hall of Records to quarters in the new State Office Building. Collectively, the Records Commission, Works Board and Land Office are sometimes herein referred to as 'the defendants.'

In 1931, by Chapter 487 [now codified as amended as Code (1957), Art. 41, § 182], often herein called the 'hall of records' statute, the Legislature, as an incident to the commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the founding of Maryland, authorized the Works Board to acquire a lot in Annapolis and erect thereon a Memorial Hall of Records 'in which shall be gathered, placed and preserved all ancient public and private records of the Province and State of Maryland from the beginning of the Province to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, together with such others of like character * * * [as may be deposited therein] * * * for the use of * * * all persons desiring to examine and use such records * * *; the said building, in addition to the special purposes * * * set forth, may be used for such other purposes as the Board of Public Works may determine not in conflict with said special purposes.'

In enacting the original hall of records statute the Legislature made no provisions for locating the Land Office in the Hall of Records. Chapter 487, supra, was amended by Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1933, but again no provision was made respecting the location of the Land Office. In 1935, however, by Section 87B of Chapter 18 [now codified as § 172 of Art. 41, supra], it was provided, inter alia, that the Hall of Records which had then been erected on a site donated by St. John's College, should be placed under the supervision and control of the Records Commission. By a part of Section 87B [now § 172], supra, often herein called the 'land office' statute, it was further provided 'that the [Records] Commission shall allot and designate a portion of the [Hall of Records] building for the use of the Land Office.'

Thereafter, in 1939, by Section 6 subd. 3, of Chapter 64 [now codified as Art. 78A, § 8], often herein called the 'location of agencies' statute, it was provided, inter alia, that the Works Board 'shall have power to designate the location of any State agency.' Section 8 of Chapter 64, supra, also provided that all public general laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of that act were 'repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.'

As stated, this proceeding was filed to forestall the removal of the records of the Land Office from the Hall of Records to the new State Office Building, but, as matters now stand, in the absence of an agreement between the parties or prohibitory injunctive relief, the removal of the records to the new location is a fait accompli, with the result that some of the 'ancient' records are located in one place and some in another. It is conceded by the defendants that the present arrangements are not as convenient to the researcher as was the former arrangement.

The chancellor found that the land office statute was mandatory, but that such provision was repealed by the location of agencies statute, and, therefore, that the power of the Works Board to change the location of the Land Office and its records was discretionary.

In effect the plaintiff-appellant claims that when the Land Office was required to move from its prior location to its present location it was not required to take and should not have taken with it the ancient records of which it was the custodian. Specifically, the plaintiff contends (i) that the enactment of the location of agencies statute did not necessarily repeal the land office statute in that there is no inconsistency between the two statutes when read together; (ii) that there was no implied repeal of the land office statute by the location of agencies statute in that the hall of records statute with respect to all ancient records is still in full force and effect; and, in the alternative, (iii) that the location of agencies statute is unconstitutional. On the other hand, the defendants, in addition to defending the constitutionality of the location of agencies statute, insists (iv) that the Works Board had complete authority to order the removal of the Land Office and its records from the old location to the new.

(i), (ii) and (iv)

We are not persuaded by the plaintiff's arguments that the several statutes in question should be construed as she contends. It is true, of...