Maria T. v. Jeremy S.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. S-17-925.,S-17-925. |
| Parties | MARIA T., appellant, v. JEREMY S. and Jamie S., appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
David V. Chipman, of Monzon, Guerra & Associates, Lincoln, for appellant.
Steffanie J. Garner Kotik, of Kotik & McClure Law, Lincoln, for appellees.
The district court dismissed on the pleadings a biological mother’s petition for habeas corpus challenging the adoptive parents' custody over the child. The mother alleged in the petition that her relinquishment of parental rights to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and consent to adoption had been obtained through coercion, false pretenses, or fraud. She attached a communication and consent agreement to the petition and alleged that the biological parents had failed to allow her to have contact with the child. The district court concluded the petition did not state a claim, because Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-164 (Reissue 2016) provides that failure to comply with a court-approved communication or contact agreement shall not be grounds for setting aside or revoking the relinquishment, the consent to adoption, or the adoption decree. We affirm.
Maria T. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 2, 2017, naming Jeremy S. and Jamie S. as respondents. She alleged that she was the biological mother of a minor child, born in 2012, who was unlawfully restrained by Jeremy and Jamie.
In paragraph IV, Maria alleged that the restraint was illegal, because her "consent to adoption and/or voluntary relinquishment was obtained through coercion and/or false pretenses and/or fraud, which invalidates such relinquishment and/or consent."
In paragraph V, Maria alleged that her relinquishment was conditioned upon the retention of some "parental rights and any relinquishment or consent given by [Maria] is therefore invalid." In this paragraph, she stated that she was attaching a " ‘Communication and Contact Agreement’ " signed by the parties.
In paragraph VI, Maria alleged that Jeremy and Jamie had failed to allow her to have contact with the child after having made promises and representations that they would.
Maria asked that the court find the relinquishment was invalid and revoked. She asked that the court take custody of the child and determine whether the child’s best interests would be served by returning the child to Maria.
The relinquishment was not attached to the petition, but Maria did attach the agreement signed by Maria, Jeremy, and Jamie.
Though the petition did not set forth whether the child was in the custody of DHHS at the time of the relinquishment, the agreement set forth that Jeremy and Jamie were the child’s foster parents and that they would be entering into a foster parent adoption after Maria relinquished her parental rights to DHHS.
The agreement set forth that Jeremy and Jamie were to communicate with Maria regarding the child’s welfare and allow periodic contact between Maria and the child. However, the agreement also set forth that the parties understood that "this agreement is subject to the approval of the court having jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings."
Instead, according to the agreement, any order pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-163 (Reissue 2016) could be enforced by civil litigation.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-106.01 (Reissue 2016) provides:
When a child shall have been relinquished by written instrument, as provided by sections 43-104 and 43-106, to [DHHS] or to a licensed child placement agency and the agency has, in writing, accepted full responsibility for the child, the person so relinquishing shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and all responsibilities for such child and have no rights over such child. Nothing contained in this section shall impair the right of such child to inherit.
The petition did not specifically allege whether the court having jurisdiction over the child’s adoption had approved the communication and contact agreement.
Jeremy and Jamie moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Their motion is not in the record. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Jeremy and Jamie offered three exhibits into evidence. Maria objected on the ground that it was a hearing on a motion to dismiss "and you're not supposed to consider matters outside the pleading, otherwise it becomes a summary judgment." She did not challenge the authenticity of the documents in the exhibits or object on any other grounds. Jeremy and Jamie’s attorney responded that she believed the evidence was appropriately offered in support of her motion to dismiss, because the exhibits contained documents recited in Maria’s petition.
The court asked Maria if she would "like a time to submit evidence in this matter." Maria said she would not. But the court did not explicitly state it had changed the status of the motion. The parties proceeded with argument without the court’s ruling on the offer of exhibits and apparently under the assumption that the court was considering a motion to dismiss.
Jeremy and Jamie’s attorney indicated her understanding that the allegations in Maria’s petition were based on Jeremy and Jamie’s alleged failure to comply with the agreement. At no point did Maria’s attorney respond that her allegations of "coercion and/or false pretenses and/or fraud" were based on anything other than Jeremy and Jamie’s failure to comply with the agreement. Maria’s attorney did not ask the court for leave to amend the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court received the exhibits into evidence. Exhibit 1 consists of Maria’s relinquishment to DHHS, her consent form, and DHHS' acceptance of her relinquishment. Exhibit 1 reflects that Maria voluntarily relinquished to DHHS her parental rights over the child on June 12, 2015. Exhibit 2 is the agreement that was attached to the petition. Exhibit 3 is the bill of exceptions for the adoption hearing. The bill of exceptions reflects that on May 13, 2016, the separate juvenile court approved the adoption of the child by Jeremy and Jamie, but explicitly did not approve the communication and contact agreement for the reason that it was not in the child’s best interests.
The district court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim and alternatively addressed granting summary judgment in favor of Jeremy and Jamie.
In the court’s analysis on the motion to dismiss, the court stated that it did not consider any of the exhibits. But the court considered the attached agreement as part of the allegations of the petition. The agreement, the court said, confirmed that the child was adopted by way of a foster parent adoption wherein Maria unconditionally relinquished her parental rights to DHHS.
The court concluded that Maria had failed to state a claim, because she had failed to allege that the agreement had been approved by the court. Alternatively, after citing to both § 43-164 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-166(6) (Reissue 2016), the court concluded that "neither the statutes in effect at the time, nor the case law, afford [Maria] the opportunity to allege fraud, duress or coercion on the basis of the Communication and Contact Agreement entered into between the parties."
Next, the court set forth an analysis regarding "if this Court were to treat [Jeremy and Jamie’s] motion as a motion for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss." The court found no genuine issue as to the fact that the court never approved the agreement. Therefore, the court reasoned, the agreement could not provide any basis for Maria’s allegation that the relinquishment was procured through fraud, duress, and coercion. Even if the agreement had been approved, the court stated that as a matter of law, Jeremy and Jamie’s failure to comply with the agreement’s terms could not be used as a basis for invalidating the relinquishment and setting aside the adoption.
In its conclusion, the court set forth in the order that it was sustaining Jeremy and Jamie’s motion to dismiss. The court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. Maria appeals.
Maria assigns that the district court erred in (1) granting Jeremy and Jamie’s motion to dismiss and (2) finding in the alternative that Jeremy and Jamie were entitled to summary judgment.
A decision in a habeas corpus case involving custody of a child is reviewed by an appellate court de novo on the record.1
Whether the allegations in an application for a writ of habeas corpus are sufficient to warrant discharge is a matter of law that an appellate court reviews de novo.2
As a threshold matter, we clarify the procedural rules applicable to an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a child custody matter. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court and the parties did not follow the correct procedure for a habeas proceeding. Nevertheless, the court did not err in its ultimate determination that Maria failed to allege facts that would establish that Jeremy and Jamie were not entitled to sole custody of Maria’s biological child.
The writ of habeas corpus derives from common law3 and is guaranteed by the Nebraska Constitution in article I, § 8, which provides that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended." Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2801 through...
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