Maricopa County v. Black

• Decision Date: 22 February 1973
• Docket Number: CA-CIV,No. 1,1
• Citation: 19 Ariz.App. 239,506 P.2d 279
• Parties: MARICOPA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, et al., Appellants, v. Earl D. BLACK et al., Appellees. 1919.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 279

506 P.2d 279

19 Ariz.App. 239

MARICOPA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, et al., Appellants, v. Earl D. BLACK et al., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CIV 1919.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

Feb. 22, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1973.

Review Denied April 24, 1973.

Kelly & Corbin by Robert K. Corbin, Phoenix, for appellants.

Ward & Contreras by A. D. Ward and Joe W. Contreras, Phoenix, for appellees.

HAIRE, Judge.

The only question presented in this appeal is whether the appellant county may lawfully require as a condition of employment that the appellees (certain employees of the county) participate in a group health and life insurance program established by the county, and whether, against the wishes of appellees, the county may withhold from their wages sums of money for payment of one-half of the premiums for the insurance.

The appellees as plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the trial court. After the issues were joined, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. There were no disputed issues of fact, and in granting the motion for summary judgment and issuing its injunction, the trial judge stated:

'This permanent injunction is hereby issued for the reason that there is no statutory authority authorizing Defendants to require Plaintiffs to participate in said program as a term and condition of employment or to deduct or withhold from said Plaintiffs' wages sums of money for payment of premiums for group health and life insurance. It is the opinion of the Court that such statutory authority is necessary.'

The facts as presented in the trial court show that in 1969 the state legislature enacted A.R.S. § 11--263 permitting counties to expend public funds for the purpose of procuring health, accident and life insurance for its officers, agents and employees, as follows:

' § 11--263. Authority to procure health, accident and life insurance for officers, agents and employees; limitation

'Counties may expend public funds, in amounts not exceeding fifty per cent of the total cost, to procure health, accident and life insurance for their officers, agents and employees.'

After passage of the legislation the county decided to require that persons employed after October 1, 1969, enroll and participate in a specified group insurance program as a condition of employment. County employees who had been employed prior to October 1, 1969, were given the option to participate in the insurance program, but once having elected to do so, were not permitted to withdraw.

The plaintiffs in this action are both pre-October 1, 1969 employees and post-October 1, 1969 employees, and they have, without success, made written demands on the county that any and all deductions from their wages in connection with the group insurance program be discontinued. Despite their demands, the county continued to require the employees to participate in the insurance program as a term and condition of employment, and further required that the employees pay fifty per cent of the premium payment by deduction from their wages.

On appeal the county contends first, that the enactment of A.R.S. § 11--263 in 1969 ended previous uncertainty existing in the State of Arizona as to whether a county might properly expend public funds for a group health and life insurance program for its employees, and second, that there is no constitutional or statutory provision prohibiting the county from requiring future employees to consent to a deduction from their wages for one-half of the premium cost for such mandatory insurance coverage.

As to the appellant county's first contention, there can be little dispute. The evidence shows that the county had desired to adopt a group health and life insurance program for its employees for some time. However, such a program had not been adopted because of the questionable authority for the Board of Supervisors to expend public funds for such a program. In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328 (1933), the Arizona Supreme Court had held that counties lacked express or implied authority to expend public funds to purchase public liability insurance for the protection of county employees using county-owned motor vehicle. See also, 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporation, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, § 244 (1971). The enactment of A.R.S. § 11--263 in 1969 cured this lack of authority to the extent expressly set forth in its terms--under that enactment public funds could be expended to procure such insurance 'in amounts not exceeding fifty per cent of the total cost'. However, it does not necessarily follow that by reason of the enactment of § 11--263, the county may require that new employees consent to a deduction from their wages for fifty per cent of the cost of the insurance. Section 11--263 as enacted in 1969, has been previously quoted herein in its entirety. ¹ It contains no language which can be interpreted to expressly or impliedly authorize such mandatory deductions. In our opinion the county's second contention--that there is no constitutional or statutory provision prohibiting the counties from requiring that future employees consent to such deductions--is based upon a faulty premise. In Arizona, counties are not inherently omnipotent. By their very nature and placement in the governmental scheme, the powers of counties are quite limited, generally even more limited than the powers of cities and towns. As stated by Justice Lockwood in Hartford, Supra:

'Most of the adjudicated cases distinguish between the powers and liabilities of counties and ordinary municipal corporations such as towns or cities. The reason generally...