Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe
| Citation | 756 P.2d 1193,104 Nev. 307 |
| Decision Date | 28 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 18439,18439 |
| Parties | MARINE MIDLAND BANK, Appellant, v. Kimberly MONROE, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nevada |
This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing appellant Marine Midland Bank's complaint against respondent Kimberly Monroe with prejudice.
Kimberly Monroe and Gifford Sheppard, as husband and wife, were joint debtors on a Visa credit card account with appellant bank. As part of a divorce decree, Sheppard was ordered to pay the community debt due on the Visa account. When Sheppard later failed to pay this debt, the bank commenced suit against Sheppard and Monroe. Monroe moved the district court to dismiss the complaint against her on the ground that the bank was collaterally estopped by the divorce decree from enforcing the debt against her. The district court agreed, and dismissed the bank's complaint against Monroe with prejudice for failure to state a claim. See NRCP 12(b)(5). The bank later obtained a default judgment against Sheppard, and this appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in concluding that a third-party creditor could be bound by a divorce decree between joint debtors where the creditor was not a party to, or in privity with any party to, the divorce proceedings. We agree.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to preclude the parties or their privies from relitigating issues previously litigated and actually determined in the prior proceeding." Landex, Inc. v. State ex rel. List, 94 Nev. 469, 476, 582 P.2d 786, 790 (1978). See Paradise Palms v. Paradise Homes, 89 Nev. 27, 505 P.2d 596, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 129, 38 L.Ed.2d 117 (1973). The party invoking collateral estoppel must show first that the issue was actually litigated in the first proceeding and necessarily determined, and second, that the parties in the second proceeding are the same or in privity with those in the first proceeding. See Brennan v. EMDE Medical Research, Inc., 652 F.Supp. 255 (D.Nev.1986); In re Shuman, 68 Bankr. 290 (Bankr.D.Nev.1986); State v. Kallio, 92 Nev. 665, 557 P.2d 705 (1976); Markoff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 92 Nev. 268, 549 P.2d 330 (1976).
The issues relevant to the bank's claim against Monroe based on their credit agreement were neither litigated nor determined in the divorce proceedings. Further, the bank was not a party to the divorce action, nor was it in privity with any party to the divorce action. Thus, the divorce decree could not operate to divest the bank of its right to seek to collect its debt from Monroe. Because none of the criteria for establishing a defense of collateral estoppel were satisfied, the district court erred in granting Monroe's motion to dismiss the bank's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Finally, in response to Monroe's motion to dismiss the bank's complaint, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas
...was the winner of the Tokyo bout, subsequent bouts would be subject to negotiation of a higher purse. 6 See Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev.1988); Paradise Palms Community Ass'n v. Paradise Homes, 89 Nev. 27, 505 P.2d 596, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 129, 38......
-
Haupt v. Dillard
...that the parties in the second proceeding are the same or in privity with those in the first proceeding. See Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (Nev.1988); Paradise Palms Community Association v. Paradise Homes, 89 Nev. 27, 505 P.2d 596, 599 Based on the above requir......
-
Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 41148.
...System, 116 Nev. 415, 419, 997 P.2d 130, 133 (2000) (footnote omitted). 8. Id. at 420, 997 P.2d at 133; Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 308, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (1988). 9. LaForge, 116 Nev. at 419, 997 P.2d at 133 (quoting Executive Mgmt. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, ......
-
Bower v. Harrah's Laughlin
...demonstrating that either Ramirez or appellants knew of each other's cases or had any relationship. See Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 307-08, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (1988) (holding a creditor of a husband and wife was not bound by divorce decree assigning debt to husband because......