Marine Midland Trust Co. of Mohawk Valley v. Penberthy, DeIorio and Rayhill

• Decision Date: 20 May 1969
• Parties: MARINE MIDLAND TRUST COMPANY OF the MOHAWK VALLEY, Plaintiff, v. PENBERTHY, DeIORIO & RAYHILL, Formerly Penberthy & DeIorio, and Francisco Penberthy and Vincent DeIorio, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 221

301 N.Y.S.2d 221

60 Misc.2d 11

MARINE MIDLAND TRUST COMPANY OF the MOHAWK VALLEY, Plaintiff, v. PENBERTHY, DeIORIO & RAYHILL, Formerly Penberthy & DeIorio and Francisco Penberthy and Vincent DeIorio, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term for Motions, Oneida County.

May 20, 1969.

Ferris, Hughes, Dorrance & Groben, Utica, for plaintiff.

O'Shea, Griffin, Jones & McLaughlin, Rome, for defendants.

DECISION

JOHN R. TENNEY, Justice.

Defendants seek an order dismissing the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(5) because the causes of action are barred by CPLR 214 Subdv. 6.

Plaintiff as Executor of the Estate of Caren Crouse Phelps was surcharged by the Surrogate of Oneida County because it voluntarily paid certain taxes which could not be collected because the Statute of Limitations barred the claim. In October of 1959, the plaintiff employed and retained the defendants as their attorneys in connection with the Phelps Estate.

Plaintiff alleges that the barred payment was made in September, 1965, upon the advice of the defendant Francisco Penberthy, a partner in the law firm of Penberthy & DeIorio. The surcharge did not occur until the time of the final account, September 29, 1966. (See Matter of Phelps, 55 Misc.2d 290, 285 N.Y.S.2d 194, affd. 28 A.D.2d 1206, 286 N.Y.S.2d 224, Nov. 30, 1967). On February 21, 1968, the application to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Matter of Phelps, 21 N.Y.2d 644, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 235 N.E.2d 926.

Did plaintiff's right of action accrue when the defendant advised plaintiff as Executor to make the payment or at some later date? The defendant continued to represent the plaintiff up until the time he was denied leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. (The last bill for services was dated April 22, 1968.) At any time up to that date, there was still a question regarding the existence of a cause of action. If the Appellate Court had reversed the Surrogate, then, of course, there would have been no surcharge and thus, no cause of action. There was sufficient doubt in the defendant's mind regarding the legality of the surcharge that he pursued the matter to the Court of Appeals.

During this course of time, plaintiff would have been in an extremely embarrassing position if it had instituted a suit and would have seriously disrupted the attorney-client relationship. The relationship between an attorney and client 'is marked by trust and confidence * * * and * * * the recipient of the service is necessarily at a disadvantage to question the reason for the tactics employed or the manner in which the tactics are executed.' Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834. The negligence which the 'Plaintiffs assert could not come to light until the conclusion of the litigation.' Siegel v. Kranis, supra, p. 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d p. 835. To apply the rule that the cause of action accrued in September of 1965 would enable the attorney 'to chart the strategy to avoid the liability for his own negligence. Otherwise, negligence could be disguised by the device of delay, and an attorney rewarded by immunity from the consequence of his negligence.' Siegel v. Kranis, supra, p. 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d p. 835.

To find that plaintiff's action accrued at the time the advice was given in this particular case would be inconsistent with the responsibilities of an attorney to his client. The only correct interpretation is to apply the 'continuous treatment' docrine, Siegel v. Kranis, supra; Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777; and thus...