Marine v. State

• Decision Date: 19 June 1990
• Citation: 624 A.2d 1181
• Parties: Frederick M. MARINE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Originally Submitted Following Oral Argument:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1181

624 A.2d 1181

Frederick M. MARINE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Originally Submitted Following

Oral Argument: June 19, 1990.

Rehearing En Banc: Oct. 3, 1990.

Resubmitted Following Supplemental

Briefing: Oct. 29, 1991.

Decision En Banc (Remanded)

(Marine I): May 15, 1992.

Resubmitted Following Oral

Argument on Return from

Remand: Jan. 12, 1993.

Decided: April 14, 1993.

Order Denying Reargument May 14, 1993.

Upon return from remand to Superior Court. Affirmed and Remanded.

Bernard J. O'Donnell (argued), and Brian J. Bartley, Asst. Public Defenders, Wilmington, for appellant.

Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Chief of Appeals Div. (argued), and Stephen M. Walther, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for appellee.

Before HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., and ALLEN, Chancellor, ¹ constituting the Court En Banc.

HORSEY, Justice:

This case is again before us on return from remand to Superior Court, following this Court's decision and mandate in Marine v. State, Del.Supr., 607 A.2d 1185 (1992) (hereafter "Marine I ".) In Marine I, decided May 15, 1992, we vacated the judgment of the Superior Court for the purpose of remanding the case to Superior Court to grant Marine "the reverse amenability hearing he was entitled to" and had not received in 1988. Id. at 1212. Because we found Superior Court to have "erred in its application of 10 Del.C. § 939(b), we [did] not reach the correctness of its result" in declining to find Marine amenable to the processes of Family Court. Id. ²

On remand, Superior Court, in September 1992, reconsidered the record evidence presented at the original reverse amenability hearing ³ and applying the law to the facts concluded that Marine's application in 1988 for transfer of the case to the Family Court should have been granted. Superior Court, in a 14-page unreported memorandum opinion dated September 29, 1992, held:

After a careful review of the evidence and all of the circumstances surrounding the acts charged, the Court concludes that the State did not have a fair likelihood of convicting Marine of Murder in the First Degree. Because a prima facie case on that charge has not been established, the Court determines and reports to the Supreme Court that Marine's application for transfer of this case to the Family Court should have been granted.

State v. Marine, Del.Super., No. IK87-12-0847, slip op. at 1, 1992 WL 301993 Ridgely, P.J. (Sept. 29, 1992) (herein "Marine Mem. Op.").

I

Following return of the case to this Court, the parties, by stipulation and order of this Court, agreed that the issues remaining to be determined on appeal are:

A. Did the Superior Court apply the correct legal standard in evaluating the three factors to be considered by the Court as required by 10 Del.C. § 939(b)(1) through (3)?

B. Does the record support the fact finding of the Superior Court?

(Stipulation and Order of this Court dated October 19, 1992). This is the Court's decision on those issues following supplemental briefing of the parties and oral argument. The pertinent facts of the case, the prior proceedings in this extended litigation and the previous rulings of this Court are found in Marine I and will not be repeated or summarized.

The parties assert that the two issues framed for decision raise mixed questions of fact and law. With regard to issue B, in Marine I we stated that, on return of this case from remand, "we will review Superior Court's exercise of its discretion following an appropriate reverse amenability hearing and [we will] determine whether to reinstate Marine's conviction and sentence or to transfer Marine to the Family Court...." Id. at 1212; 10 Del.C. §§ 937 & 939(b). If Superior Court had found, on remand, that the State did have a fair likelihood of convicting Marine of murder in the first degree, our ultimate standard of review would have been for abuse of discretion. That is because Superior Court, after addressing the first of the statutory factors enumerated in section 939(b), ⁴ would have been required to consider the two remaining statutory factors of section 939(b) and then balance or weigh its respective findings in reaching its ultimate decision on the application to transfer. However, since the court reached a contrary finding under subsection (1) of section 939(b), essentially a finding of fact, our standard of review on issue B involves solely a question of fact. Only if a trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and justice requires their overturn are we free to make contradictory findings. Levitt v. Bouvier, Del.Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972). Issue A, however, raises a question of law; that is, whether Superior Court properly construed and applied section 939(b). As to that issue, our standard of review is to determine whether Superior Court erred in formulating or applying legal precepts. Moses v. Board of Education, Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 61, 63 (1991) (quoting Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers, Inc. v. Ayers, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1077, 1081 (1986)). As to an issue of law, our scope of review is plenary. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927, 936 (1982).

For the reasons which follow, we conclude that both issues A and B must be answered in the affirmative. We find Superior Court to have correctly construed and applied 10 Del.C. § 939(b) under the "law of the case" of Marine I. We also find that the record fully supports Superior Court's findings that the State did not have a fair likelihood of convicting Marine of murder in the first degree. This ruling is tantamount to a finding by the court that the evidence presented in the hearing, viewed in its totality, is insufficient to establish, prima facie, the likelihood of a conviction of Marine of murder in the first degree. Marine I, 607 A.2d at 1209, 1212. These findings divest Superior Court of original or continuing jurisdiction over Marine. Since he never should have been tried in Superior Court as an adult, we may not reinstate Marine's previous conviction and sentence by Superior Court, the judgment of which we vacated in Marine I. Id. at 1212. This ruling of Superior Court, if made previously, would have subjected Marine to the jurisdiction and processes of Family Court; but Marine is now over nineteen years of age, beyond the statutory jurisdiction of that court. This leaves us with no alternative but to direct Superior Court to vacate Marine's conviction and sentence and to order Marine to be released forthwith by the Department of Corrections.

Marine's release from further incarceration as an adult is necessary as a result of Superior Court's finding in its 1992 reverse amenability hearing that "a prima facie case [of murder in the first degree] has not been established...." Marine Mem. Op. at 1. This judicial finding may not be demeaned or fairly characterized as a "hypertechnical" finding. It is of constitutional dimension. A section 939 reverse amenability hearing properly conducted in accordance with legislative intent is of critical importance. This is self-evident from the fact that had Marine, after being originally charged by the arresting officers with murder in the second degree, been later indicted for murder in the second degree, rather than murder in the first degree, Family Court would have had, without question, exclusive jurisdiction over Marine to proceed against him as a delinquent.

II

On appeal, Marine contends that Superior Court, in construing and applying 10 Del.C. § 939(b), has applied the correct legal standards in the exercise of its discretion conferred by 10 Del.C. § 939(b). Marine also contends that Superior Court has complied with the directives of this Court in Marine I, which Marine asserts, and we agree, constitute the "law of the case" in our review of the 1992 reverse amenability hearing. ⁵ Hence, Marine contends there is no merit to the State's claim that Superior Court committed error of law with respect to issue A. Addressing issue B, Marine contends that we must affirm because Superior Court's ultimate finding, that the State did not have a "fair likelihood" of convicting defendant of the offense of murder in the first degree, is supported by substantial and legally sufficient evidence. Marine argues that this Court may neither substitute its judgment for that of the trial court nor set aside the court's findings of fact which are supported by competent evidence. Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 754 (1990); Albury v. State, Del.Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 60 (1988).

The State takes a different position on appeal from that taken below with respect to the question of law posed by issue A. The State contends that Superior Court: (1) applied an erroneous standard of review in finding the State's evidence of murder in the first degree to be legally insufficient under section 939(b)(1); (2) committed legal or factual error in its construction and application of 10 Del.C. § 939; and (3) committed reversible error in its evidentiary rulings admitting certain expert testimony. We take up these arguments seriatim.

A.

We first address the State's contention that Superior Court committed legal error by applying the wrong legal standard in its analysis of subsection (1) of section 939(b). ⁶ The State argues that Superior Court, in considering the first of the section 939(b) statutory factors, that is "the nature of the present offense" factor, applied an erroneous legal standard in determining the sufficiency of the State's evidence that Marine had committed murder in the first degree. The State reiterates its contention below that Superior Court should apply Superior Court Criminal Rule 29 ⁷ in determining the sufficiency of the State's evidence. Applying a Rule 29 standard, the State argues that the State's evidence satisfied subsection (1) of section 939(b), stating:

... that there are objective facts before this...