Marines v. Goblet

• Decision Date: 25 June 1889
• Citation: 31 S.C. 163,9 S.E. 803
• Parties: Marines et al. v. Goblet et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

9 S.E. 803

(31 S.C. 163)

Marines et al.

v.Goblet et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 25, 1889.

Estoppel.

In an action to recover land, involving the statute of limitation, if plaintiff deliberately stands by for years, without offering any objection, and sees defendant buying the land and making improvements on it, under the supposition that he has a good title, he will be estopped to set up a claim as against defendant.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Berkeley county; Wallace, Judge.

Smythe & Lee, for appellants. W. St. Julian Jervey, for respondents.

Simpson, C. J. The action below was brought to recover a lot of land located in Christ Church parish, alleged to belong to the plaintiffs, and in the possession of the defendants. The defendants "denied that the plaintiffs, their ancestors, predecessors, or grantors, had been seised or possessed of the premises in question, or of any part thereof, within ten years before the commencement of the action, and alleged that they, their ancestors, predecessors, and grantors, had held and possessed the said premises adversely to the title of the plaintiffs for ten years, at least, past before the commencement of said action, under a claim of title in fee, exclusive of any other right." At the trial the defendants requested his honor to charge "that if the jury find that the plain tiffs deliberately stood by for years, and without objection saw Goblet or others buying the land in dispute, and making improvements thereon, under the supposition that they had a good title, then the plaintiffs will now be estopped to set up their claim against them." This his honor declined to charge, saying: "That does not state sufficient facts to raise the rule of estoppel, "—referring to the case of Phinney v. Johnson, 13 S. C. 28, as containing the law upon this subject. From this refusal of his honor to charge as requested the case is now before us on appeal. It will be seen from the statement made above that the question before us is not whether the facts testified to on the trial were sufficient to constitute an estoppel, but whether the facts stated in the request to charge, if found by the jury as facts of the case, would amount as matter of law to an estoppel. The first question was a question of fact involving the sufficiency of the evidence introduced, and was alone for the jury, but the second raised a question of law, upon which it was proper for the judge to charge, and upon which he did charge; and therefore the correctness of his charge is the only question in the case. There are several kinds of estoppel, and among them is the estoppel in pais, to-wit, estoppel by conduct, etc., to which class this case belongs. That class, therefore, is the only class which need be considered here. Without going into an elaborate discussion of this character of...