Marines v. State

• Decision Date: 28 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 14-06-00738-CR.,14-06-00738-CR.
• Citation: 292 S.W.3d 103
• Parties: Juan Carlos MARINES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

292 S.W.3d 103

Juan Carlos MARINES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 14-06-00738-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

February 28, 2008.

Discretionary Review Refused June 25, 2008.

Cristobal Miguel Galindo, Timothy A. Hootman, Houston, for appellant.

Jessica Akins McDonald, Houston, for appellee.

Panel consists of Justices FOWLER, FROST, and SEYMORE.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WANDA McKEE FOWLER, Justice.

Appellant, Juan Carlos Marines, was indicted on the offense of murder. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced appellant to forty-five years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and a $10,000 fine. Appellant then filed a motion for a new trial based on "newly-discovered evidence," which the trial court denied. In three issues, appellant appeals his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial, as the evidence discovered and presented in his motion was not known at the time of trial. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On April 30, 2005, shortly after 2:00 a.m., a fight broke out in the parking lot of Slick Willie's, a pool hall located just south of downtown Houston. Involved in this fight were numerous individuals, including, among others, appellant and Alejandro German, the complainant. Sometime during the fight, at least two individuals in a dark-colored Ford F-150 truck drove across the parking lot of the pool hall, and multiple shots were fired from its passenger-side window. The complainant was struck three times, and died at the scene.

Officer J.C. Bonaby, an investigator with the Houston Police Department homicide division, was assigned to investigate the incident. Witnesses at the scene made conflicting statements to Bonaby and other investigating officers: several reported that the shooter was a Hispanic male with dark hair, while another indicated that there were two shooters. Still another reported that, while he was unsure, there may have been four individuals in the F-150. At least three witnesses told Bonaby that they had seen the shooters, but none could provide a complete physical description of the suspects or the license plate number of the F-150.

During his investigation, Bonaby received several anonymous tips, and one from a law enforcement officer. The tips informed Bonaby of the general location of the shooter's residence, as well as his name, address, and that he drove a black Ford pickup truck. Using this information, Bonaby discovered that appellant and his father were the registered owners of a black Ford F-150 truck. Bonaby then created a photo array using appellant's Texas driver's license photograph, and showed the array to two individuals who witnessed the shooting: Raphael Reyes, a brother of the complainant who was also involved in the fight, and Crystal Rocha, the girlfriend of another of Reyes' brothers. According to Bonaby, Reyes identified appellant in the photo array without hesitation in less than two minutes' time. Rocha selected another photo from the array as that of the shooter. Bonaby then obtained an arrest warrant, and arrested appellant. The weapon used to shoot the complainant was never recovered.

Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of murder. On August 10, 2006, the jury found him guilty as charged. The jury assessed punishment at forty-five years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and a $10,000 fine. The trial court sentenced appellant and entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, and appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. Appellant later filed a motion for a new trial based upon "newly-discovered evidence." The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

Analysis of Appellant's Issues

I. The Evidence is Legally Sufficient to Support Appellant's Conviction.

In his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. According to him, the evidence indicates that he was not the driver of the F-150 the night of the shooting, and that he was not the shooter. He argues that "newly-discovered" evidence presented in his motion for a new trial¹ demonstrates that Danny Rosales, the passenger in the light blue Dodge truck driven by appellant the night of the shooting, was the shooter, and therefore appellant can only be found guilty under the law of parties,² which was neither alleged in the indictment, nor contained in the charge. Appellant argues that no rational jury could have possibly convicted him of being the shooter, and thus the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law.

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). We consider all the evidence that sustains conviction, whether properly or improperly admitted or whether introduced by the prosecution or the defense. Simpson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 855, 860 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim.App.2001)). The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given to testimony, and it is also the exclusive reconciler of conflicts in the evidence. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and we must defer to that resolution. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.App.2007). If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. Simpson, 227 S.W.3d at 860-61 (citing McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)).

B. Application of Law to the Facts.

To obtain a conviction for murder in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the complainant; or (2) intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of the complainant. See TEX. PEN.CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2). Appellant contends that the evidence failed to demonstrate that he was the driver of the F-150 in the Slick Willie's parking lot the night of the shooting, and that he was the shooter. Instead, appellant argues that the evidence shows that the passenger of the light blue Dodge truck driven that night by appellant was the shooter, and therefore appellant cannot be held liable as the principal to the offense.

However, Officer Bonaby testified that witnesses at the scene described the shooter as a Hispanic male with dark hair, driving in a black Ford truck. Bonaby further testified that the multiple tips he received all led him to appellant, and that appellant was the registered owner of a black Ford truck matching the vehicle description from the scene. Moreover, two eyewitnesses, Reyes and Carmello Salinas, Reyes' half-brother, identified appellant as the individual shooting from the passenger side of the black Ford truck in the parking lot of Slick Willie's. Although appellant presented evidence that his father sold the black Ford F-150 truck approximately one month before the date of the shooting, that he had borrowed his brother's light blue Dodge truck that night, and that he was running to that truck when the shooting began, other evidence indicated that the F-150 was still registered in appellant's and his father's name at the time of trial, and two eyewitnesses identified appellant as the shooter. It was the jury's duty to reconcile conflicts in the evidence, and here the jury apparently did so in favor of the prosecution. See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Therefore, in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say the jury was irrational in finding appellant guilty of murder as charged. We therefore overrule appellant's first issue.

II. The Evidence is Factually Sufficient to Support Appellant's Conviction.

In his second issue, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction. He argues that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts a finding of guilt in this case. Appellant further urges this Court to find that the factual insufficiency "rises to such a degree of fundamental unfairness that to refuse to consider the error denies him constitutional due process."

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law.

When conducting a factual— sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light. Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). We may set the verdict aside if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex.Crim. App.2006) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)). However, while we may disagree with the jury's conclusions, we must exercise appropriate deference to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the jury, particularly in matters of credibility. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); see also Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414 (stating that a court should not reverse a verdict it...