Maris Distributing Company v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., ANHEUSER-BUSC

• Decision Date: 20 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-4697,INC,ANHEUSER-BUSC,97-4697
• Citation: 710 So.2d 1022
• Parties: 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1279 MARIS DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Petitioner, v., Charles Cindric, individually, and Thomas Caddick, individually, Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1022

710 So.2d 1022

23 Fla. L. Weekly D1279

MARIS DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Petitioner, v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC., Charles Cindric, individually, and Thomas Caddick, individually, Respondents.

No. 97-4697.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

May 20, 1998.

John Beranek of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee; Bernard H. Dempsey, Jr., Barbara B. Smithers, and Peter F. Carr of Dempsey & Sasso, Orlando; and Manuel Socias, Orlando, for Petitioner.

Peter E. Moll and Brian D. Wallach of Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C.; and John F. Roscow, III, and Stan Cushman of Scruggs & Carmichael, P.A., Gainesville, for Respondents.

JOANOS, Judge.

Maris Distributing Company (Maris) seeks review by common law certiorari of an interlocutory order separating three counts of Maris's amended complaint for trial, and taking under advisement respondent's motion to dismiss as to the remaining counts of the complaint. Maris also asserts error in the trial court's stay of discovery as to Counts II through XIII. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

Maris filed its initial complaint in January 1997. The general allegations of the complaint indicate that for twenty-nine years Maris had been the exclusive distributor of Anheuser-Busch products in the Gainesville and Ocala areas. In 1982, Maris entered into the most recent Equity Agreement with Anheuser-Busch. In its complaint, Maris alleged that in exchange for primary territorial rights, Maris paid substantial consideration, and invested millions of dollars in the business relationship. Maris further alleged that in the spring of 1995, Anheuser-Busch commenced an attack against Maris in an effort to terminate the business relationship, and to deteriorate the relationship between Maris and its accounts.

The case was removed to federal court for a period of time, then remanded back to state court. In July 1997, Maris filed the amended complaint which is the subject of this petition for certiorari review. Among other things, Maris alleged that on March 20, 1997, Anheuser-Busch terminated the distributorship. The amended complaint further alleged causes of action for breach of contract, injunctive relief, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with Maris and its accounts, tortious interference with Maris and its employees, violation of statutory duty, fraudulent inducement, defamation, civil remedies for criminal practices, Florida deceptive and unfair trade practices act, conversion, unjust enrichment, and Florida RICO violations. Anheuser-Busch filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the amended complaint, except the counts alleging breach of contract (Count I), entitlement to injunctive relief (Count II), and unjust enrichment (Count XII). When Anheuser-Busch did not file an answer to the counts not included within its motion to dismiss, Maris moved for an order to compel Anheuser-Busch to comply with the trial court's earlier order directing it to respond to the amended complaint.

In September 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on all pending motions. At the hearing, Anheuser-Busch was critical of the length of the amended complaint, as well as of the number of exhibits attached thereto. Anheuser-Busch also opposed discovery relating to its litigation with other Anheuser-Busch distributors in other parts of the country. On September 30, 1997, the trial court entered an order denying Maris's motion to compel Anheuser-Busch to respond to the amended complaint.

On November 10, 1997, the trial court entered an order captioned "Order Separating the Causes of Action for the Orderly Progress of the Case." The order was entered "upon the Court's own motion." The trial court found the time and expense involved in resolving the twelve collateral counts to be "grossly disproportionate to what will likely be needed to resolve the main count, Count 1 for breach of contract." The court further found that since a determination of the issues critical to the breach of contract count, "are likely to simplify or even obviate the need for resolution of the collateral claims," it was in the best interests of the parties to resolve those issues first. The order states in part:

While the Court realizes that the separation of the action in this manner is a rather unusual case management procedure, this is a rather unusual case. Pursuant to the duties prescribed by Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.085, the Court finds that the orderly administration of justice and the best interests of the parties require that these critical issues be resolved first.

Based on these findings, the court ordered that Anheuser-Busch's motion to dismiss Counts III through XI and XIII was taken under advisement until further order of the court. Anheuser-Busch was ordered to answer Count I within 20 days of the order. Paragraph three of the decretal portion of the order states:

3. All discovery is stayed as to Counts 2-13 until further order of this Court. Discovery may be allowed upon showing by a party that discovery is necessary for the preservation of evidence.

Anheuser-Busch filed an answer only as to Count I of the amended complaint, maintaining that pursuant to the November 10, 1997, order, it was not required to answer the remaining allegations of the amended complaint. Anheuser-Busch also raised fourteen affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim.

"A non-final order for which no appeal is provided by Rule 9.130 is reviewable by petition for certiorari only in limited circumstances." See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987); Charlotte County v. General Development Utilities, Inc., 653 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). To qualify for certiorari review, the order (1) must depart from the essential requirements of law, and (2) cause material injury to the petitioner, leaving no adequate remedy on appeal. See Savage, 509 So.2d at 1099.

In appropriate circumstances, the trial court has discretion to order a separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party claim. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.270(b). ¹ "The general rule, ... is that a trial judge's exercise of discretion on a severance question will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse." See Hardee Mfg. Co. v. Josey, 535 So.2d 655, 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Although the matter of separation of the issues to be tried rests in the trial court's discretion, "a single trial generally tends to lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned, and the courts have emphasized that separate trial should not be ordered unless such disposition is clearly necessary, and then only in the furtherance of justice." See Vander Car v. Pitts, 166 So.2d 837, 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). It is improper to sever a counterclaim and affirmative defenses from the plaintiff's claim, when the facts underlying the claims of the respective parties are inextricably interwoven. See Plantation Village Ltd. v. Aycock, 617 So.2d 729, 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Dykes v. Trustbank Savings, F.S.B., 567 So.2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), review denied, 577 So.2d 1330 (Fla.1991).

Although severance of issues in dissolution of marriage proceedings is generally disfavored, such separation of issues was approved in O'Keeffe v. O'Keeffe, 522 So.2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The different result in O'Keeffe...