Mark H. v. Lemahieu

Decision Date26 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. CV00-282-MLR.,CV00-282-MLR.
Citation372 F.Supp.2d 591
PartiesMARK H. and Rie H., Individually and as Guardians Ad Litem for Michelle H. and Natalie H., minors, Plaintiffs, v. Paul LEMAHIEU, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Hawaii Public Schools; Elsie Tanaka, in her official capacity as Principal of Kipapa Elementary School; Judith Saranchock, in her official capacity as Principal of Ala Wai Elementary School; Peter Chun, in his official capacity as Principal of Hokulani Elementary School; Haroldeen Wakida, in her official capacity as Principal of Ali'iolani Elementary School; and Department of Education, State of Hawaii, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

Michael K. Livingston, Stanley E. Levin, Davis Levin Livingston Grande, Keith H.S. Peck, Peck & Assoc., Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiffs.

John T. Komeiji, Randall Y. Yamamoto, Watanabe Ing Kawashima & Komeiji, George S.S. Home, Holly T.M. Shikada, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.

OPINION

REAL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Mark H. and Rie H. brought this action on behalf of themselves and their two minor children, Michelle H. and Natalie H., to recover money damages for alleged failures within the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). The sole remaining question is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to money damages under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) for the denial of a "free appropriate public education" under the IDEA.

The Court, after studying the briefs filed by the lawyers, hearing the arguments of counsel, and researching the legislative history of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, now grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court finds that there are no rights, procedures, or remedies available under § 504 for violations of the IDEA's affirmative obligations, and that even if § 504 was available, Defendants would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I. BACKGROUND

Michelle H. and Natalie H. are the children of Mark H. and Rie H. Michelle H. was born on February 15, 1991, and Natalie H. was born on August 3, 1992.

In 1994, Michelle and Natalie, then ages three and two respectively, were diagnosed as autistic. Both girls were certified as eligible under the IDEA due to their diagnoses. As a result of their IDEA certification, both girls were placed in special education programs.

On June 6, 1994, an Individual Family Service Plan was developed for Natalie as a counterpart to her Individual Education Program (IEP), and as part of the IDEA program to provide a free appropriate public education. On July 11, 1994, an IEP was developed for Michelle. As the girls progressed in their education, further IEPs were prepared to monitor the girls' educational progress.

Michelle was initially placed in a fully self-contained special education class at Kipapa Elementary School. Natalie was placed in the Department of Health's "Zero to Three" program. In 1995, Natalie joined her sister at the Kipapa School, and stayed until the family moved in 1996.

In 1996, Michelle was placed at Ali'iolani School with Nadine Chen, a special education teacher with experience and training in teaching children with autism. During this time at Ali'iolani School, Ms. Chen was assisted by Cynthia Makins. Ms. Makins had approximately 25 years of experience in elementary education and was completing a RISE program to qualify her to teach special education. Ms. Makins attended several workshops on autism and worked closely with Ms. Chen.

At the same time, from 1996 through 1998, Natalie was placed in special education classes at Ala Wai Elementary School and Hokulani Elementary School. Natalie's teachers were not specifically trained to work with children suffering from autism. Later, at the suggestion of Dr. Daniel LeGoff, Natalie was placed in the same classroom with Michelle at Ali'iolani School.

Although Plaintiffs never claimed discrimination on account of their children's disabilities at the IEP meetings, disputes arose as to the provision of mental health and educational services under the IDEA. On December 16, 1999, the parents filed a request for an administrative hearing pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415, alleging that their children had been denied a free appropriate public education.

At the January 2000 administrative hearing, the hearings officer found that:

Through the years [the State of Hawaii, Department of Health] has authorized many services for the girls, but a significant problem has been the delivery of services. Although they may have been authorized there has been up to the present, irregular delivery. No IEP to the present time includes all of the mental health services that were authorized or agreed upon by the IEP team. Mental health "inserts" have been controversial. Coordination of services between [the State of Hawaii, Department of Health and the State of Hawaii, Department of Education] has been erratic.

Ultimately, the hearings officer found that the students were not provided a free appropriate public education in accordance with the IDEA. The officer based this determination upon defects in the IEPs, and procedural errors. Accordingly, the hearings officer issued an order requiring the Defendant Department of Education to take certain actions to ensure that Michelle and Natalie receive a free appropriate public education. The Defendants have taken actions to implement the hearings officer's order, and currently spend approximately $250,000 per year on each student for their educational needs.

Despite the remedial award provided by the IDEA administrative hearing, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court on April 14, 2000, claiming an entitlement to retrospective tort-like damages under the IDEA and Section 504.1 Plaintiffs' claims are based entirely upon the failures within the IDEA, previously addressed by the administrative hearing.

On July 24, 2001, Chief Judge David Alan Ezra, granted summary judgment on the IDEA claims. Thus, the sole remaining claims in this motion for summary judgment are Section 504 claims for emotional distress and punitive damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment where, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is mandated when, after adequate discovery, the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir.1987). If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

As mentioned above, Plaintiffs merely recast their IDEA claim as a damages claim under the Rehabilitation Act, contending that a denial of a free appropriate public education under the IDEA constitutes discrimination within § 504. Plaintiffs' assertion of rights, procedures, or remedies under § 504, however, is incompatible with the Congressional intent evidenced by the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA.

A.

The IDEA is a comprehensive State grant program, within the Education Code, aimed at assisting state and local educational agencies in educating disabled children. The Act provides that State and local educational agencies receiving assistance under the IDEA "shall establish and maintain procedures ... to ensure children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education by such agencies." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).

The IDEA then proceeds to provide comprehensive procedural safeguards for disabled children and their parents to guarantee the child receives a free appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq. The required procedures include an opportunity for "(1) examination of all relevant records pertaining to evaluation and educational placement of their child; (2) prior written notice whenever the responsible educational agency proposes, or refuses, to change the child's placement; (3) an opportunity to present complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency's provision of a free appropriate public education; and (4) an opportunity for an `impartial due process hearing' with respect to any such complaints." Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. # 403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.2002). Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made in the impartial due process hearing may obtain additional administrative review, and ultimately judicial review. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) and (i).

The principal purpose of the IDEA is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs ... [and] to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). It is apparent that the IDEA provides the comprehensive...

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    .... . [Section 504] regulations are not enforceable through a private right of action." (emphasis added)); see also Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (D. Haw. 2005), rev'd, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Plaintiffs seek to enforce the § 504 regulations which adopt IDEA's req......

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