Marker v. Grimm, 91-1672
| Decision Date | 25 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1672,91-1672 |
| Citation | 65 Ohio St.3d 139,601 N.E.2d 496 |
| Parties | MARKER, Appellee, v. GRIMM, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. A child support computation worksheet, required to be used by a trial court in calculating the amount of an obligor's child support obligation in accordance with R.C. 3113.215, must actually be completed and made a part of the trial court's record.
2. The terms of R.C. 3113.215 are mandatory in nature and must be followed literally and technically in all material respects.
3. Any court-ordered deviation from the applicable worksheet and the basic child support schedule must be entered by the court in its journal and must include findings of fact to support such determination.
Appellant, David E. Grimm, and appellee, Teresa A. Marker, formerly Teresa A. Grimm, were married in 1977. In July 1983, appellant and appellee filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, a petition for dissolution of marriage and a written separation agreement. On August 29, 1983, the common pleas court dissolved the marriage and incorporated the separation agreement into the decree of dissolution. The agreement and, thus, the decree, provided that appellant pay $150 per month in child support for the parties' minor child, Zachary W. Grimm, who was to remain in appellee's sole custody.
On July 11, 1990, appellee filed a motion in the common pleas court, requesting an increase in child support. On July 30, 1990, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.
The transcript of the July 30 hearing indicates that during the marriage, appellant attended school on a full-time basis and received an undergraduate degree in psychology. Since the dissolution, appellant has received a master's degree in liberal arts studies and has remained unemployed or underemployed while further pursuing his academic goals. Appellee is remarried and has had a second child.
At the hearing, appellant testified that he continues to pursue his academic endeavors and that his only job prospect was a university research position paying not less than $5,200 for the 1990/1991 academic year. Appellant indicated that he might be able to earn $30,000 per year if he were fully employed as a professional in his field. Appellant and appellee were both unemployed at the time of the hearing.
In an entry dated July 31, 1990, the trial court granted appellee's motion for an increase in child support. The court ordered appellant to seek employment commensurate with his qualifications and degrees and that effective October 28, 1990, appellant was to begin paying $300 per month in child support. The trial court's reasons for ordering that amount of support do not appear in the entry, and the record in this case does not contain a completed child support computation worksheet. However, during the July 30 hearing, the trial court did refer to the R.C. 3113.215 child support "guidelines" and indicated that appellant was being treated very considerately by the court " * * * because the [g]uidelines for one child under the $30,000 would be $380 a month."
On appeal to the court of appeals, appellant argued that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 3113.215 in ordering the increase in child support. The court of appeals rejected appellant's arguments and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Ohio State Legal Services Ass'n and Michael R. Smalz, Columbus, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services and Gary M. Smith, Akron, for appellant.
Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc. and William H. Fraser, Toledo, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ass'n for Children and the Enforcement of Support.
Today, we consider R.C. 3113.215, a comprehensive enactment governing the procedures a court must follow in calculating and awarding child support. 1 Upon reviewing the requirements of the statute and measuring those requirements against the procedure followed by the trial court in this case, we find that the trial court failed to comply with a number of the statutory mandates in ordering the increase in support.
R.C. 3113.215(B)(1) requires that a calculation of the amount of an obligor's child support obligation must be made "in accordance with" the basic child support schedule set forth in R.C. 3113.215(D), the applicable worksheet in R.C. 3113.215(E) or (F), and other requirements of the law. R.C. 3113.215(E) and (F) both provide a sample or "model" worksheet and each provision directs the court to "use a worksheet that is identical in content and form" to the applicable model provided. R.C. 3113.215(B)(1) further provides that the amount calculated using the schedule and worksheet (through line 18 of the worksheet) is "rebuttably presumed" to be the correct amount of child support due and that that amount must be ordered to be paid unless both of the following apply:
Thus, the acceptable procedure for ordering an amount of child support which deviates from the amount "rebuttably presumed" to be the correct amount due is for the court to fully comply with the requirements of R.C. 3113.215(B)(1)(a) and (b). The importance of strict compliance with these deviation procedures becomes all the more apparent upon a reading of R.C. 3113.215(B)(2)(c) and, specifically, R.C. 3113.215(B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii), which repeat, verbatim, the requirements of R.C. 3113.215(B)(1)(a) and (b).
It is obvious from the statutory scheme of R.C. 3113.215 that the overriding concern of the law is "the best interest of the child" for whom support is being awarded. This fact is evident from R.C. 3113.215, where the phrase "best interest of the child[ren]" is used thirteen times. To ensure the best interest of children, the General Assembly enacted comprehensive legislation outlining the specific procedures to be followed to meet this overriding interest of the law. The statute is written in terms which are mandatory in nature, and when the standard provision for support as provided in the statute is not specifically followed by the trial court, the law requires any such deviation to be explicitly explained after following specific procedures.
With the foregoing discussion and the requirements of R.C. 3113.215 in mind, we turn to the procedures followed by the trial court in this case in ordering appellant to pay $300 per month in child support.
As a threshold matter, we note that the record before us does not contain a completed child support computation worksheet. In this regard, a review of R.C. 3113.215 leads us to the conclusion that the statute mandates that a court "use" a worksheet identical in content and form to the R.C. 3113.215(E) or (F) model worksheet, and that the amount of an obligor's child support obligation must be calculated "in accordance with," and "pursuant to," the basic child support schedule and appropriate worksheet. In our judgment, these mandates very clearly indicate that a worksheet must actually be completed for the order or modification of support to be made. The responsibility to ensure that the calculation is made using the schedule and worksheet rests with the trial court. R.C. 3113.215(B)(1) provides that the court, in performing its duties under the statute, is not required to...
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