Markevitch v. Van Harren, 83-549
| Decision Date | 30 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-549,83-549 |
| Citation | 429 So.2d 1255 |
| Parties | Inaky MARKEVITCH and Serena Markevitch, Appellants, v. Frances VAN HARREN, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Mallory H. Horton, Miami, for appellants.
Spear & Hoffman and L. Joseph Hoffman, Miami, for appellee.
Before BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We granted the appellants' motion for rehearing to reconsider our earlier dismissal of their appeal. Upon reconsideration, we conclude that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and adhere to our ruling dismissing the appeal.
The facts are these. The trial court entered final judgment against the plaintiffs-appellants on November 1, 1982. On November 15, 1982, they filed a timely motion for rehearing. On November 19, 1982, the appellants, through new counsel, filed a second motion for rehearing. Three days later, on November 22, 1982, the trial court entered an "Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Rehearing." On December 15, 1982, the trial court entered an order granting the appellants' motion for rehearing and set the cause to be reheard in January 1983. On February 1, 1983, the trial court entered its second order denying rehearing. On March 3, 1983, within thirty days of this last order, the appellants filed their notice of appeal.
It is obvious to us that the trial court lost jurisdiction of this cause on November 22, 1982, when it entered its order denying plaintiffs' motion for rehearing, Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970); Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So.2d 193 (Fla.1965), and only a timely appeal from that order would vest jurisdiction in this court. Assuming, as the appellants argue, that their second motion for rehearing merely amended the first and was a permissible pleading, see Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.530(b) (); Adkins v. Burdeshaw, 220 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), then the contentions contained therein, along with the contentions made in the initial motion for rehearing, were ruled upon when the trial court denied rehearing on November 22, 1982. Assuming, on the other hand, that the second motion for rehearing was not an amendment to the first, but had a life of its own [a highly questionable proposition in light of there being no provision authorizing...
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... ... attempt to go further.” (footnote omitted)); ... Markevitch v. Van Harren , 429 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla ... 3d DCA 1983) (per curium) (“It is obvious to ... ...
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Fla. Organic Aquaculture, LLC v. Advent Envtl. Sys., LLC
...beyond those allowed by Rule 1.530 (citing Capital Bank v. Knuck, 537 So.2d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ) ); Markevitch v. Van Harren, 429 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (noting that the rules of civil procedure do not authorize a second motion for rehearing). An order, judgment, or de......
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Capital Bank v. Knuck, 88-2534
...either to permit the filing of any further motion for rehearing beyond the one authorized by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530, Markevitch v. Van Harren, 429 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), appeal after remand, 447 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 456 So.2d 1182 (Fla......
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Estate of Godley, 87-0498
...Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970); Florida National Bank v. Domanska, 486 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Markevitch v. Van Harren, 429 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), appeal after remand, 447 So.2d 332, rev. denied, 456 So.2d 1182 We therefore quash the order of November 25, 1986. DOWN......