Marks v. Harriet Cotton Mills
| Decision Date | 03 May 1904 |
| Citation | 47 S.E. 432,135 N.C. 287 |
| Parties | MARKS v. HARRIET COTTON MILLS. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Durham County; O. H. Allen, Judge.
Action by W. H. Marks against the Harriet Cotton Mills. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
In an action for injuries to a servant whose hand was caught in open cogwheels, testimony that the cogwheels should have been covered was incompetent, as invading the province of the jury.
Winston & Bryant, for appellant.
Guthrie & Guthrie, for appellee.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence. He alleges that the defendant employed him to operate one of the machines in its cotton mill, called a ""speeder," and that he was ordered by the boss or foreman to clean the machine while it was running that the cogwheels of the speeder were not boxed or cased, as they should have been, and that, owing to its condition, it was dangerous to run the machine at a great speed, as was done by the defendant while the plaintiff was cleaning it, all of which was unknown to him, as he was an inexperienced hand, and had not been warned of the danger or instructed how to avoid it. The excessive speed and the exposed condition of the cogs caused the plaintiff's hand to be caught in the wheels and severely injured.
In order to prove the unsafe condition of the machine, the plaintiff introduced as a witness Ola Woodlief, who was permitted to testify, notwithstanding the defendant's objection, that the cogwheels should have been covered or encased. Similar testimony was permitted to be given by other witnesses. It is only necessary that we should consider the competency of this testimony, as our opinion in regard to it is adverse to the plaintiff, who recovered the judgment below, and the other matters may not be presented at the next trial, if there is one. The defendant's motion to nonsuit, which was denied by the court, and to which ruling exception was taken, presents a question which calls for a most careful consideration. As the facts may be varied if the case is tried again, we refrain from expressing any opinion upon that ruling, lest one or the other of the parties may be thereby prejudiced.
It may be stated as a rule, which is, of course, subject to exceptions, though this case is not within any of them, that a witness can testify only to facts, and it is left to the court and the jury to draw inferences and conclusions and to form opinions from the facts to which the witness testifies. He should not be permitted to express his opinion upon the very question to be determined by the jury under instructions from the court. This case furnishes a striking illustration of the wisdom of the rule. If the witness is allowed to testify that the cogwheels should have been covered, it will be seen that what he says is the full equivalent of an opinion that the defendant was guilty of negligence. It was in substance, the same as if he had testified that the accident would not have occurred if the cogs had been encased, and that the defendant therefore did not do what, under the circumstances, it should have done. If this is not a substantial declaration by the witness that the defendant was negligent, it is barely one degree removed from it. The witness, in our judgment, was permitted to invade the province of the court and the jury in thus testifying. A witness should state facts, the jury should find the facts, and the court should declare and explain the law. The functions of the three, within their several spheres, are clearly defined, and should always be kept separate and distinct. Whether the speeder was so constructed as that its operation was safe to the defendant's employés was the very question upon which the parties were at issue, and which the jury were impaneled to decide. The witness' opinion upon that question was incompetent, and the plaintiff's objection to it should have been sustained. Authorities in support of this ruling are abundant. We need cite only a few of them: Tillett v. Railroad, 118 N.C. 1031, 24 S.E. 111; Wolf v. Arthur, 112 N.C. 691, 16 S.E. 843; Smith v. Smith, 117 N.C. 328, 23 S.E. 270; Summerlin v. Railroad, 133 N.C. 550, 45 S.E. 898; Burwell v. Sneed, 104 N.C. 118, 10 S.E. 152; Cogdell v. Railroad, 130 N.C. 313, 41 S.E. 541; Cogdell v. Railroad, 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E. 618; Harley v. B. C. M. Co., 142 N.Y. 31, 36 N.E. 813.
The witness Roberson, who also testified that the machine "should have been boxed," was permitted in addition to say, after objection by the defendant, that "he had seen an intermediate frame with these cogs boxed up." This was also incompetent. The employer does not guaranty the safety of his employés. He is not bound to furnish them an absolutely safe place to work in, but is required simply to use reasonable care and prudence in providing such a place. He is not bound to furnish the best known machinery implements, and appliances, but only such as are reasonably fit and safe, and as are in general use. He meets the requirements of the law if in the selection of machinery and appliances he uses that degree of care which a man of ordinary prudence would use, having regard to his own safety, if he were supplying them for his own personal use. It is culpable negligence which makes the employer liable, not a mere error of judgment. We believe this is substantially the rule which has been recognized as the correct one, and recommended for our guide in all such cases. It measures accurately the duty of the employer, and fixes the limit of his responsibility to his employés. Harley v. B. C. M. Co., supra. This court has said that all machinery is to some extent dangerous, but the fact that it is dangerous does not of itself make the owner liable in damages. It is the negligence of the employer in not providing for his employés safe machinery, and a reasonably safe place in which to work, that renders him liable for any resulting injury to them, and this negligence consists in his failure to adopt and use all approved appliances which are in general use and necessary to the safety of the employés in the performance of their duties; and this rule applies, it is said, even as between carrier and passenger. Witsell v. Railroad, 120 N.C. 557, 27 S.E. 125; Dorsett v. Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 254, 42 S.E. 612. If the employer is required to adopt every new appliance as soon as it is known and...
To continue reading
Request your trial