Marman v. Levi
Decision Date | 07 June 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 20160217,20160217 |
Citation | 896 N.W.2d 241 |
Parties | Matthew MARMAN, Appellant v. Grant LEVI, Director of the North Dakota Department of Transportation, Appellee |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Thomas F. Murtha IV, Dickinson, ND, for appellant.
Douglas B. Anderson, Office of the Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for appellee.
[¶ 1] Matthew Marman appealed the district court's judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's suspension of his driving privileges for 180 days. Because Marman failed to rebut the prima facie evidence of the Report and Notice, we affirm.
[¶ 2] Matthew Marman was the driver in a single vehicle crash in the early morning hours of September 17, 2015. Officer Cody Nuenthel of the North Dakota State Patrol responded to the scene of the accident to assist. When he arrived at the scene, Officer Nuenthel was advised by Deputy Thomas that he had arrested Marman for failing to perform an onsite screening test. Officer Nuenthel took custody of Marman and transported him to the local law enforcement center. At the center, Marman again refused to submit to a chemical test. Officer Nuenthel did not inform Marman of his ability to remedy his refusal of the onsite screening test by successfully completing the chemical test. Because Marman refused the onsite screening test, the Department suspended his driving privileges for 180 days.
[¶ 3] At the administrative hearing, Officer Nuenthel testified; Deputy Thomas did not testify. Officer Nuenthel testified to what he observed at the scene and also Deputy Thomas's observations which he relayed to Officer Nuenthel. Marman objected to the testimony, arguing it was hearsay. The hearing officer overruled the challenge and allowed the testimony. Following the hearing, the hearing officer concluded Officer Nuenthel had reason to believe Marman had driven while he was under the influence of alcohol and he refused the onsite screening test.
[¶ 4] Marman petitioned the hearing officer for reconsideration. The hearing officer upheld the suspension of Marman's driving privileges. Marman appealed to the district court, which affirmed Marman's suspension.
[¶ 5] On appeal, Marman argues four points: (1) law enforcement must advise individuals of their right to cure a test refusal in order for their license to be revoked; (2) the hearing officer erred in admitting hearsay testimony; (3) Officer Nuenthel did not have reasonable suspicion that Marman was under the influence of alcohol; and (4) North Dakota's implied consent and refusal statutes are unconstitutional because they allow unreasonable searches and seizures, deny substantive due process, and penalize the exercise of a constitutional right.
[¶ 6] North Dakota Century Code ch. 28–32, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, governs our review of the Department's administrative decision to suspend or revoke a driver's license. Potratz v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2014 ND 48, ¶ 7, 843 N.W.2d 305. Under N.D.C.C. § 28–32–46, this Court must affirm the agency's decision unless:
[¶ 7] In Deeth v. Dir., N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2014 ND 232, ¶ 10, 857 N.W.2d 86, we explained:
It is well established that we must afford "great deference" to the factual determinations made by an agency when reviewing the agency's findings of fact. Rather than making independent findings of fact, or substituting our judgment for that of the agency, our review is confined to determining whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. Although this Court's review is limited to the record before the administrative agency, the district court's analysis is entitled to respect if its reasoning is sound. An agency's conclusions on questions of law are subject to full review.
(internal citations and quotations omitted). "Whether the facts meet the legal standard, rising to the level of probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion, is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal." Aamodt v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2004 ND 134, ¶ 12, 682 N.W.2d 308 (quoting Dettler v. Sprynczynatyk , 2004 ND 54, ¶ 10, 676 N.W.2d 799 ).
[¶ 8] Marman argues the officers were required to tell him he had the right to remedy his refusal before the Department could suspend his license for 180 days. Marman formulates his argument under N.D.C.C. § 39–08–01(2)(b), which requires law enforcement to inform individuals of the opportunity to remedy their refusal in order to be charged with a criminal refusal. Marman argues the language which requires officers to advise of the ability to cure in § 39–08–01(2)(b) should be transposed into § 39–20–14(3).
[¶ 9] In Castillo v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , we held officers do not have to inform individuals of their right to remedy their refusal in order for the Department to suspend their license. 2016 ND 253, 888 N.W.2d 190. Therefore, we affirm.
[¶ 10] Marman argues the hearing officer improperly admitted hearsay evidence and, without the inadmissible evidence, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to request an onsite screening test. At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer overruled Marman's objection to Officer Nuenthel testifying to Deputy Thomas's observations. We need not address whether the district court erred in admitting Officer Nuenthel's testimony. The Department's Report and Notice form was admitted without an objection on hearsay grounds and provides sufficient evidence to support the request for an onsite screening test.
[¶ 11] Section 39–20–14(1), N.D.C.C., authorizes law enforcement to request an onsite screening test if the officer "has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer's observations, formulated an opinion that the individual's body contains alcohol."
[¶ 12] In our recent decision in Barrios–Flores v. Levi , the majority of this Court upheld State v. Baxter , 2015 ND 107, 863 N.W.2d 208, and construed:
N.D.C.C. § 39–20–14(1) to require reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence before a law enforcement officer may request a driver to submit to a pre-arrest warrantless onsite screening test of an individual's breath and a driver's license may be revoked for refusing a test based upon the officer's reasonable suspicion the person was driving under the influence.
2017 ND 117, ¶ 17, ––– N.W.2d ––––.
[¶ 13] "The Department's Report and Notice form is admissible as prima facie evidence of its contents once it is forwarded to the director of the Department." Dawson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2013 ND 62, ¶ 23, 830 N.W.2d 221. Marman has "the burden to rebut the prima facie evidence contained in the report and notice form." Gillmore v. Levi , 2016 ND 77, ¶ 12, 877 N.W.2d 801.
[¶ 14] On the Report and Notice form, Officer Nuenthel checked the boxes indicating "crash," "odor of alcoholic beverage," and "poor balance," and explained it was a single vehicle crash, there was an odor present, and an open container. Marman's involvement as the driver in a single vehicle crash meets the first requirement under § 39–20–14(1). With the presence of an odor of an alcoholic beverage, poor balance, and open containers of alcohol, it was reasonable for law enforcement to formulate an opinion that Marman's body contained alcohol. Because the Report and Notice form provides sufficient evidence, which Marman does not rebut, that law enforcement observed signs of impairment and had some reason to believe the impairment was due to alcohol consumption, it was proper for Deputy Thomas to request an onsite screening test. Therefore, the hearing officer's determination to suspend Marman's license was in accordance with the law.
[¶ 15] Lastly, Marman argues North Dakota's test refusal statute, N.D.C.C. § 39–08–01(1)(e), and implied consent law, N.D.C.C. ch. 39–20, violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, deny substantive due process, and penalize the exercise of a constitutional right to withhold consent to a warrantless search or withdraw consent once given.
[¶ 16] This Court has addressed and rejected all of Marman's constitutional challenges in prior decisions. All of Marman's constitutional claims were raised...
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