Maroko v. Werner Enterprises Inc., Civ. No. 10–63 (RHK/JJG).
| Decision Date | 14 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 10–63 (RHK/JJG). |
| Citation | 112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 136,778 F.Supp.2d 993 |
| Parties | Yabesh MAROKO, Plaintiff,v.WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen A. Melcher, Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, Khanh Ngoc Nguyen, Philip F. Fishman, Fishman Binsfield & Bachmeier, PA, Bloomington, MN, for Plaintiff.Laura J. McKnight, Mark R. Bradford, Bassford Remele, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Yabesh Maroko is a Seventh–Day Adventist. His religious beliefs prevent him from working on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. He was employed by Defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc. (“Werner”) as a delivery-truck driver in 2006, but Werner terminated his employment after he refused Sabbath work; he later commenced the instant action, alleging discrimination. Werner now moves for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny its Motion.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Maroko, see Graves v. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 229 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir.2000), the relevant facts are as follows. Maroko is a Kenya native who emigrated to Minnesota in 1999. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 2.) He is a devout Seventh–Day Adventist. ( Id. ¶ 3.) A fundamental tenet of his religion is that work on the Sabbath is prohibited. ( Id.)
In 2006, on the recommendation of a friend, Maroko enrolled in school in Eagan, Minnesota, to become a truck driver. (Maroko Dep. at 24–25, 69–70.) While there, a Werner recruiter visited the school to speak to students about working for the company when their schooling ended. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 4.) 1 Maroko was interested, so he informed the recruiter about his inability to work on the Sabbath—the recruiter assured him it would not present a problem and could be accommodated. ( Id.)
Maroko completed his schooling in July 2006 and received a commercial driver's license. (Maroko Dep. at 24, 69–70.) A short time later, Werner hired him as a “student driver.” ( Id. at 73–74; Maroko Aff. ¶ 5.) The first step in his training was to spend three days at Werner's Nebraska headquarters learning the “Qualcomm system,” which was a GPS-based communication and logging system in each of Werner's trucks. ( Id.) There, he informed two managers of his Sabbath-work restriction. The restriction was documented in an August 10, 2006, notation in his employment file: “religion requires that he worship on [S]aturdays ( [F]riday at sunset to [S]aturday at sunset) prefers to be out of truck.” The managers in Nebraska assured Maroko that his religious beliefs could be accommodated. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 5; Maroko Dep. at 66–69.)
After completing the Qualcomm training, Maroko participated in three months of driving training. (Maroko Dep. at 75.) That training was directed from Werner's Tomah, Wisconsin distribution center, which provided dedicated delivery services to Wal–Mart across eight Midwestern states and was the account to which Maroko ultimately would be assigned (the “Tomah Account”). (Kriutzfeld Dep. at 9; McKeel Dep. at 7, 30–31; Maroko Dep. at 75, 85; McKeel Decl. ¶ 3.) During those three months, Maroko was paired with another driver, a “trainer,” and together they made deliveries to various Wal–Mart locations, at all hours of the day. (Maroko Dep. at 75, 83.) Lance McKeel, the “dedicated manager” on the Tomah Account, was able to accommodate Maroko's Sabbath restriction during this training period because he was paired with a trainer—McKeel arranged for any deliveries on the Sabbath to be made by the trainer rather than Maroko. (Maroko Dep. at 75–76; McKeel Decl. ¶ 5.) 2
Shortly before his training ended, Maroko spoke with McKeel in Tomah. In that conversation, McKeel informed him that Werner could not accommodate him on the Tomah Account, because Friday night and Saturday were the busiest times of the week for Wal–Mart deliveries, which meant that all drivers had to be working. (Maroko Dep. at 79–81; Maroko Aff. ¶ 8; McKeel Dep. at 53–54; McKeel Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6.) Maroko was “shock[ed],” as Werner “had previously assured [him] that [his] Sabbath restriction would be accommodated.” (Maroko Aff. ¶ 8.)
Maroko successfully completed Werner's training program and “qualified” as a truck driver shortly thereafter. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 9.) He then returned to Nebraska for additional Qualcomm training and once again asked his manager there whether he would be accommodated on the Tomah Account; he received assurance that he would. ( Id. ¶ 10; Maroko Dep. at 86, 98.) Werner then gave him a truck, and he drove to his home in Minnesota to await delivery assignments from Tomah. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 11; Maroko Dep. at 86; McKeel Decl. ¶ 6.)
After returning to Minnesota, Maroko called the fleet managers in Tomah numerous times between November 5 and November 8, 2006, in order to receive his delivery assignments. (Maroko Dep. at 86–87; Maroko Aff. ¶¶ 11–13.) A manager named “Robert” advised that Werner had assigned him no deliveries because it could not accommodate his Sabbath-work restriction and reiterated that he needed to work Saturdays on the Tomah Account. (Maroko Dep. at 87, 91–92, 95; Maroko Aff. ¶¶ 11, 13.) 3 As a result, on November 9, 2006, Maroko faxed a letter to Werner's headquarters, asking to be told in writing
that you don't have anything for me whereby I can keep the Sabbath (from sunset Friday—Saturday sunset) as you have always said to me. Robert fleet manager—Tomah told me on [the] phone that he talked to supervisor Lance McKeel and told him that they cannot allow me [to] keep the Sabbath. He received no response. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 14; Maroko Dep. at 90–93.) On November 15, 2006, Maroko faxed Werner a second letter, reiterating that he could not “change [his] mind by working [his] day of rest from sunset Friday to Saturday sunset” and inquiring how to proceed. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 15 & Ex. B.) Once again, Werner did not respond. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 15; Maroko Dep. at 95–96.)
Five days later, Maroko faxed Werner a third letter. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 16 & Ex. C.) He again informed the company that he was “ready to work with you if you'll give me my day of rest sunset Friday to sunset Saturday.” (Maroko Aff. Ex. C.) He further informed Werner that he had moved the truck to a local Sam's Club parking lot, because the police had ordered him to remove it from his driveway. ( Id.; Maroko Dep. at 87; Maroko Aff. ¶ 16.) He asked Werner what he should do with the truck if it did not plan to accommodate his Sabbath-work restriction. (Maroko Aff. Ex. C.) Werner did not respond. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 16.)
On November 20, 2006, Maroko went to the Sam's club parking lot and discovered that the truck was gone. ( Id. ¶ 17; Maroko Dep. at 98–99.) He called police, fearing the truck had been stolen, and then contacted the Tomah distribution center. (Maroko Aff. ¶ 17; Maroko Dep. at 99.) He was informed that Werner had retrieved the truck, having concluded that he had “voluntarily quit” his position. (Maroko Dep. at 99–101; Hoffman Dec. ¶ 9; McKeel Decl. ¶ 12.) Maroko had no further contact with Werner after November 20, 2006. (Maroko Dep. at 100.)
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Maroko commenced this action against Werner in January 2010, alleging that it had failed to accommodate his religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Minn.Stat. § 363A.01 et seq. He later amended his Complaint, asserting the same claims but adding (with leave of Court) a request for punitive damages. ( See Doc. No. 51.) With discovery now complete, Werner moves for summary judgment.4
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir.2000). The Court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Graves, 229 F.3d at 723; Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir.1997). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Krenik v. Cnty. of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). “Religion” includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice,” unless an employer “demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate ... an employee's ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the ... employer's business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). In this “awkward” way, the statute makes it unlawful for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations for an employee's religious practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 & n. 1, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).5
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