Marquardt v. Papenfuse

Decision Date01 September 1991
Docket NumberNo. 1468,1468
Citation610 A.2d 325,92 Md.App. 683
PartiesFrank R. MARQUARDT, et ux., v. Edward C. PAPENFUSE, et al. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Frank R. Marquardt, Alexandria, Va., for appellants.

Richard E. Israel, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the brief), Annapolis, for appellee, Papenfuse.

Sharon K. Tucker (Council, Baradel, Kosmerl & Nolan, P.A., on the brief), Annapolis, for appellees, Cape Leonard Waterfront Owners.

Russell A. Arlotta and Kramer & Gorney, Chartered, on the brief, Oxon Hill, for appellees, Gallagher, Glenn and Carol Shiplet.

Thomas A. McManus and Sasscer, Clagett & Bucher, on the brief, Upper Marlboro, for appellees, Creason, Connell, Garcia, Murray, Elder, and Wilbur.

Mary M. Krug, Warren J. Krug and Handen and Krug, P.A., on the brief, for appellees, Prince Frederick, Walters and Ferguson.

Argued before BLOOM, WENNER and CATHELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Chief Judge Wilner, in our recent case of Baker v. State, 89 Md.App. 564, 566-67, 598 A.2d 851 (1991), in describing the complaint forming the substance of that action, stated:

The English language, blending and building upon the vocabulary of its Latin and Germanic roots, is a marvelous and omnificent language, offering a rich variety of words and expressions to describe or explain a single thought. And so, in characterizing the complaint made in this appeal by Mr. David Bruce Baker, we have much to choose from--ludicrous, preposterous, silly, asinine, ridiculous, absurd, nonsensical, frivolous, outrageous, unreasonable, laughable, foolish, unsound, and incongruous come to mind, but there may be others. Meritless and erroneous are partly descriptive, but somehow they don't seem to capture the full flavor of the thought. In other words, we propose to affirm.

Our initial thought in resolving the instant appeal was to cite the above passage as authority and simply affirm. On reflection, that action would be inappropriate as the above quoted material does not adequately convey the egregiousness of what appellants have done in the case sub judice in attempting to utilize the legal process to appropriate 1 property belonging to others.

This is the third occasion since 1987 on which we have been called upon to address the Marquardts', appellants', claims that trial courts have erred in determining that they are not the owners of the property at issue. 2 By per curiam opinion, we affirmed the Circuit Court for Calvert County's opinion that the appellee there, irrespective of the fact that she and her predecessors had record title, had held the property at issue by adverse possession dating back to at least 1882. Marquardt v. Walters [No. 220, 1987 Term, filed Oct. 26, 1987]. In our decision, we chose not to address the matter of record title because the trial court's adverse possession finding was being affirmed.

Thereafter, in utter disregard of our above decision, when the property described therein was being probated as a part of the estate of Evelyn Parron Mackall, appellants again claimed the property by challenging its inclusion in that estate asserting, in the orphans' court, that the prior decisions of the circuit court and of this Court were erroneous. 3 When the orphans' court made its determination, which was consistent with our prior ruling, appellant then appealed to us. We said, in affirming the orphans' court, that the actions of appellants were "not only a vexatious harassment of appellee, but [constitute] a pattern of contemptuous harassment of the judicial authorities of this State." Marquardt v. Walters [No. 912, 1990 Term, per curiam, filed April 25, 1991], slip op. at 11, cert. denied, 323 Md. 186, 592 A.2d 178 (1991). We there held that that action was filed and maintained in bad faith and was "totally and completely lacking in any justification or legal basis," and we imposed sanctions. Id. at 12. 4

Appellants' briefs and arguments in this case are virtually incomprehensible, as was true of the briefs in the appeals preceding this one. Additionally, the appeal is untimely as to the major issue, i.e., the affirmance of the Land Commissioner's decision. Nevertheless, we shall address it for three reasons: (1) should we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal, we have no doubt that the appellants would not recognize it as a final decision on the merits and additional suits would follow leading to further harassment of the appellees; (2) in this appeal, appellants attempt to base their ownership on patents and repatents of land, and, even though their claims are equally frivolous, the patent claims have not heretofore been addressed; and (3) in this appeal, the appellee, Commissioner Edward C. Papenfuse, has rendered an opinion that is absolutely clear in its findings and conclusively determines that appellants' claim to title is completely spurious.

We do not believe it would be useful, even if it were possible, to restate the caption of appellants' argument in more comprehensible terms. We thus include it as stated in their brief.

1. THE COMMISSIONER OF LAND PATENTS DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO DENY A STATE OF MARYLAND PATENT WHERE THE LAND, WET AND/OR DRY, FOR THE PATENT REQUESTED OF THE STATE, WAS ENCLOSED BY BOUNDARIES OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF SURVEY, THAT WAS PATENTED TO AN INHABITANT OF MARYLAND BY CHARLES CALVERT, ESQUIRE, CAPTAIN GENERAL & CHIEF GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, WHERE THE LANDS HAVE NOT ESCHEAT, AND THE APPLICANTS FOR THE PATENT ARE PROVEN SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST TO THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFIED PLAT THEREOF. THE FOREGOING IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WHERE THE STATE OF MARYLAND DOES NOT ADD ANY SURPLUS LAND TO THE PATENT.

We presume that appellants' primary complaint is an assertion that the decision of the Commissioner of Patents was in error. Thus, we shall address that opinion. Before doing so, however, we shall include here that portion of the Commissioner's opinion in which he discusses the history of the patent process and that process itself. 5

Land Patents are the first link in the chain of title of ownership of land in Maryland. Maryland began in 1632 as the private and exclusive property of the head of one family, the Calverts, Irish Barons of Baltimore. When the King granted Maryland to Lord Baltimore on June 20, 1632, making him the Lord Proprietor of Maryland, he did so absolutely and without qualification with regard to the right to grant and, as in this case, regrant land. That power has passed undisturbed to the Commissioner acting on behalf of the State.

The language of the Charter of Maryland is archaic but clear with regard to Lord Baltimore's right to grant and regrant land as he saw fit[.]

* * * * * *

Prior to 1776, the only serious challenge to Lord Baltimore's rights with regard to the issuance of land patents came in 1689 in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution when Maryland became a Royal Colony. At that time Lord Baltimore's political power, such as the right to appoint the Governor of Maryland, was taken away, but not his power to grant Land Patents. In 1692, after one Royal Governor attempted to usurp Lord Baltimore's right to grant lands by forcefully removing all of his records, the Solicitor General of England, Thomas Trevor, argued persuasively that the governor had no right to do so:

I think it may be just & reasonable that [the records] should be restored to his Lo[rdship] again, and I do not see any prejudice can thereby happen to the parties by whom such Bills or Bonds [for land] were given, though they have not Executed their Warrants, nor had Certificates [of survey] return'd, for ye bonds canot be put in Suit till the Ld Baltimore hath p[er]formed the Condition on his p[art] [to grant the lands for which the bonds had been given and the warrants issued].

Between 1776 and 1781, the political powers of Lord Baltimore, which had been restored in 1715, and all of his rights relating to land in Maryland, were taken over by the State. The heirs of the last Lord Baltimore (among whom was the wife of the last Proprietary governor, Sir Robert Eden) attempted to wrest compensation for their losses from the State after the American Revolution, but without success. From 1781 onward the powers over land matters that were once held by Lord Baltimore were vested in the judges of the Land Office, a position that today is titled Commissioner of Land Patents.

As John Kilty amply demonstrates in The Landholder's Assistant by asking the Commissioner of Land Patents for a warrant of resurvey and pursuing the patent process to its conclusion, the Applicants, like all applicants before them, are in effect vacating any claim to a title they may have and placing that claim in the hands of the Commissioner for adjudication. The process is not unlike that experienced by a Gaelic chief of Ireland in the 16th century who was induced to sign an "indenture to recognize the king as his liege lord, [and then had] to apply for a crown grant of his lands.... This indenture comprised the first stage of what historians have called the policy of surrender and regrant."

Once an application for a resurvey Patent is made to the Commissioner, it is then up to the Commissioner to determine the validity of the claim and to sanction the issuance of a new patent if he should find the claim meritorious. If the applicants should disagree with the decision of the Commissioner, their only recourse is to appeal the decision in accord with the provisions set forth in the Real Property Article. The Applicants openly and under oath acknowledged the risk they were taking. That they did not take that risk lightly is evidenced by their eleven-year delay (1978-1989) in seeking the opinion of the Commissioner. [Footnotes omitted, bracketed material in original.]

The early Maryland case of Cunningham v. Browning, 1 Bland 299, 310-12 (1827), described the various...

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