Marquez-Ramos v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
| Decision Date | 02 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11-1547 (SEC) |
| Parties | AIDA W. MARQUEZ-RAMOS Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Before the Court are defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket # 29), and plaintiff's opposition thereto (Docket # 37). After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In this federal question action, Aida W. Marquez-Ramos' ("Marquez" or "Plaintiff") brought suit against defendants, her former employer and supervisors, claiming discrimination based on her medical disability and religious beliefs. Seeking pecuniary damages and injunctive relief, she grounds her claims on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), as well as other analogous state law statutes.1
Because the Court is ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), it will relate Marquez's well-pleaded facts as alleged in her amended complaint. Feliciano-Hernandezv. Pereira-Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 529 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the facts are as follows.
Plaintiff, a practicing Adventist who suffers from Fibromyalgia, is a former employee of co-defendant the Family Department of Puerto Rico's (the "Family Department") Specialized Investigations Unit (the "Unit). Docket # 24, ¶ 24.2 The other co-defendants are the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Pedro J. Rodriguez-Rosado ("Rodriguez"), the Regional Director of the Unit; the Unit's "Social Work Supervisor II" and plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Veronica Torres-Sanchez ("Torres"); and Alexandri Bernier-Pagan ("Bernier"), the Unit's Associate Director.3
Although Marquez had worked for the Family Department since June 2008, what matters is that she commenced working in April 2009 for the Unit as a "Social Work Supervisor I."Docket # 24, ¶¶ 23-25. She had not always suffered from fibromyalgia: it was in September 2009 that Marquez was diagnosed with this medical condition. Id., ¶ 26. A few days later, on September 14, 2009, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Rodriguez, requesting reasonable accommodation due to her condition. Id., ¶ 30. According to Marquez's doctor diagnosis, having rotating shifts and periods without rest harmed her health. And, per her physician's recommendation, Marquez requested a fixed shift schedule. Id.
Three days later, Rodriguez wrote back to Marquez and granted her request, establishing a fixed schedule, which, in pertinent part, included Friday and Saturday as her days off. Id., ¶ 31. The complaint states that Torres seemed less than thrilled about Marquez's fixed schedule. For instance, she allegedly stated—in a hostile tone—that Marquez's reasonable accommodations would "aggravate and anger" the Unit's other fellow supervisors. Id., ¶ 32. Nevertheless, during the period that Marquez enjoyed this reasonable accommodation, her health and work performance improved. Id., ¶ 34.
But things soon took an awry turn. At a staff meeting held on November 10, 2009, an "on call" cell phone policy (the "Policy") was instituted. According to the complaint, the Policy obligated Marquez to attend consultations outside of her prescribed work schedule—that is, during Fridays and Saturdays. Id., ¶ 35. Although she initially accepted to follow the Policy, on December 2, 2009, Marquez apparently changed her mind.
In a letter to Rodriguez and Bernier, plaintiff 'informed" them that she could no longer continue abiding by the Policy, because such irregular work schedule "interfered" with her medical treatment and aggravated her condition. Id., ¶ 36. In her December 2, 2009 letter, Marquez also requested that Torres, be "informed again" regarding her reasonable accommodation rights, and that "action must be taken as to [Torres'] hostile attitude" and comments made in connection with her condition and reasonable accommodation request. Id.,¶ 37. According to the complaint, Torres told Marquez that her reasonable accommodation request "[w]as causing too [many] problem[s]." Id., ¶ 38. Torres allegedly "[w]ould thrust [Marquez] with documents containing her work assignments, as well as yell at [Marquez] in front of [her] subordinates and falsely state that she was lazy or was slacking off work." Id.
The next day, Marquez received a letter from Rodriguez indicating that they were unable to evaluate her "new" request for reasonable accommodation (i.e., being exempted from the Policy on Fridays and Saturdays). Rodriguez also stated that the reasonable accommodation in place (the fixed schedule) was being revoked forthright Id., ¶ 40.
Then, on December 17, 2009, Marquez informed Torres that she was a practicing Seventh Day Adventist. Id., ¶ 58. As such, she had a religious obligation to abstain from work on Saturdays. She thus requested an accommodation in her work schedule by being allowed to take Saturdays off. Id., ¶ 59. The complaint states that defendants outright ignored and denied her religious accommodation request. Id., ¶¶ 60-62.
In the same time frame, Marquez alleges that she received "numerous reprimands" from defendants for asserting her rights. She specifically points to an instance where, notwithstanding her protestations to Torres that the Policy aggravated her medical condition, Plaintiff received an "insubordination" letter from Torres on December 21, 2009 Id., ¶ 42. Torres' letter censured Marquez's refusal to follow the Policy during the previous weekend. Id. And, without addressing or mentioning Marquez's alleged health concerns with the Policy, Torres stated that Marquez had averred that her noncompliance with the Policy was solely for religious reasons. Id. Another reprimand ensued in May 2010, when both Rodriguez and Torres sent a letter to Plaintiff, scolding her for missing work on the days foreclosed by her religion. Id., ¶ 64. Marquez alleges that these, as well as other verbal reprimands, culminated in a significant deduction of her vacation time and other fringe benefits. Id., ¶¶ 67-68.
Further, the complaint states that the removal of Marquez's fixed schedule "[a]ffected her psychological well being and exacerbated her physical condition," to the point that she suffered a panic attack and was subsequently hospitalized. Id., ¶ 44. She also alleges that the loss of her fixed schedule caused a decrease in her work performance. Ultimately, and because of defendants allegedly continuous discriminatory and retaliatory acts, in January 2011, Marquez was "forced" to resign. On September 22, 2010, she filed a charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). Docket # 8-1, p. 3. A right-to-sue letter was issued on March 14, 2011. Docket # 8-2. And this suit followed four months later. Docket # 1.
On November 28, 2011, defendants moved to dismiss (Docket # 37) Plaintiff's second amended complaint. They raise a myriad of defenses, namely that (1) the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Family Department are entitled to sovereign immunity; (2) her Title VII religious discrimination claim is time barred; (3) there is no individual liability under ADA, Title VII, and Puerto Rico Laws 44 and 100; (4) plaintiff failed to state a plausible retaliation claim under ADA and Title VII; and (5) the individual defendants have qualified immunity. Id.
Marquez opposes every contention. Docket # 37. She also reiterates that defendants violated her rights by discriminating and retaliating against her, and by ignoring her reasonable accommodations requests in connection with her fibromyalgia and religious beliefs.
Although both parties vehemently press the sovereign immunity issue, before addressing this "nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine," Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring), the Court must first ascertain whether Plaintiff's complaint pleads a plausible entitlement for relief. This course of action—bypassing the Eleventh Amendment issue—stems from the First Circuit's recently instituted protocol for deciding sovereign immunity issues arising under Title II of the ADA. See Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 172 (1st Cir. 2006).
As a threshold matter, the complaint and the parties' motions do not specify the title of the ADA under which this suit was brought. It most likely arises under Title I, for that is the chapter proscribing employment discrimination in both the private and public sector. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-1227; Velazquez-Torruella v. Dep't of Educ., No. 08-1485, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30838, at *19. (D.P.R. Apr. 9, 2009) (concluding that ADA discrimination claim against public employer failure to grant reasonable accommodation, fell under Title I). Since the Family Department is evidently a public entity, however, it is plausible that her ADA claim may be also forthcoming under Title II, U.S.C, §§ 12131-12165, which "[a]ddresses discrimination by governmental entities in the operation of public services, programs, and activities, including transportation." Buchanan, 469 F.3d at 170; cf. Diaz-Fonseca, 451 F.3d at 34 ("[W]e have 'assume[d] without deciding that the Department of Education is properly considered the alter ego of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for purposes of [E]leventh [A]mendment analysis.'" (quoting Marin-Piazza v. Aponte-Roque, 873 F.2d 432, 437 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (brackets in original)). The First Circuit has recognized but not decided, the disagreement among courts as to whether employment discrimination suits by public employees are cognizable under Title II of the ADA. Currie v. Group Ins. Comm'n, 290 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) ().
This distinction is significant in the sovereign immunity context, see Torres-Alamo v. Puerto Rico, 502 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007); Bd. of Trustees of the...
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