Marquez v. Pompeo
| Decision Date | 05 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-cv-3225 (TSC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | ALICIA MARIA MARQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL R. POMPEO, Secretary, U.S Department of State, in his official capacity, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Alicia Maria Marquez brings this action against now-former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, alleging that Defendant and the United States Department of State (“State”) unlawfully denied her passport application in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's lawsuit. ECF No. 11, Def. Mot. For the reasons explained below, the court will GRANT Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff alleges that she was born on July 7, 1980, in San Angelo Texas, but did not receive a U.S. birth certificate at that time because shortly after her birth she and her parents returned to Mexico, where they registered her birth and obtained a Mexican birth certificate. ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9. In 1982, Plaintiff and her family returned to the United States, at which point they recorded her birth in the United States and Plaintiff obtained a U.S. birth certificate. Id. ¶ 11. It is unclear how long Plaintiff resided in the United States between 1982 and 1999 but she claims that she at least periodically traveled to the United States during that time to receive vaccinations, her First Holy Communion, and to attend elementary school. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that more recently, since 1999, she has lived in San Antonio, Texas. ECF No. 13, Pl. Opp'n at 5. She asserts that in 2006 she learned that it is unlawful to have two birth certificates, and consequently filed a civil complaint in Mexico to have her Mexican birth certificate annulled. Compl. ¶ 15.
On January 9, 2009, Plaintiff applied for a U.S. passport. Id. ¶ 17; Def. Mot. at 2. In support of her application, she submitted a copy of her U.S. birth certificate issued by the Texas Bureau of Vital Statistics, which states that Plaintiff was born in 1980, in San Angelo, Texas. Def. Mot., Ex. 1. On June 22, 2009, State responded that it suspected the birth attendant who filed Plaintiff's birth certificate in 1982 of submitting false birth records, and asked Plaintiff to provide supplemental documentation in support of her application. Id. On September 16, 2009, Plaintiff provided supplemental information, but State found the additional documentation insufficient to show by a preponderance of evidence that Plaintiff was born in the United States. Id. State further noted that Plaintiff's birth record was flagged as having been filed fraudulently. Id. Consequently, it denied Plaintiff's application, but informed her that she could submit additional documentation to support her application and request re-adjudication within 60 days of receiving the denial. Plaintiff subsequently submitted additional evidence and requested re-adjudication of her application, and in March 2010, State affirmed its denial decision. Id., Ex. 2.
On August 24, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a second passport application. Compl. ¶ 18; Def. Mot., Ex. 3. State again asked Plaintiff to submit supplemental evidence in support of her application, which she did on January 13, February 22, and March 3, 2017. Def. Mot., Ex. 3. She also participated in telephone interviews with State officials on February 27 and June 29, 2017. Id. In 2018, State denied Plaintiff's second application, again noting that her birth record was flagged as fraudulently filed and that she had not provided sufficient evidence to otherwise show that she was born in the United States. Id.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration from the court that she is a U.S. citizen and that State wrongly denied her passport application using procedures that violated her constitutional rights. See Compl. at 10. Defendant has moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's APA claim is precluded because 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) provides her with an adequate alternative remedy, that her APA claim is time-barred, that she fails to state a valid Fifth Amendment claim for relief, and that this court is not the proper venue for this lawsuit. Defendant asks the court to dismiss this action in full or, in the alternative, transfer any valid claims to the Western District of Texas.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and those limits are especially important in the agency review context, where “Congress is free to choose the court in which judicial review of agency decisions may occur.” Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The law presumes that “a cause lies outside [the court's] limited jurisdiction” unless the party asserting jurisdiction establishes otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1), a court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”' Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). And “a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The court must “grant dismissal if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction” because it is both an Article III and statutory requirement. Xia v. Pompeo, No. 1:14-cv-57-RCL, 2019 WL 6311912, *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2019) (citing Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when a plaintiff has failed to “exhaust their administrative remedies before the agency.” Id.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint should state a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face by alleging facts that, if assumed to be true, would allow the court to draw “reasonable inference[s] that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The court presumes the truth of a plaintiff's factual allegations, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged, ” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Rule 12(b)(3), a court may dismiss or transfer a case if the venue is improper or inconvenient. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). Venue is proper: (1) in a district where “any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located;” (2) in a district in which “a substantial part” of the events giving rise to the suit occurred; or (3) if venue would not be proper in any district for either of those reasons, wherever the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). “ King v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 210 F.Supp.3d 130, 133-34 (D.D.C. 2016) (alteration removed) (quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 50 (2013)). Whether to transfer or dismiss the case is within the “sound discretion of the district court.” Hamilton v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 118 F.Supp.3d 328, 333 (D.D.C. 2015).
The APA permits judicial review of agency actions when a plaintiff suffers a “legal wrong because of agency action” or when they are “adversely affected or aggrieved” by that action. 5 U.S.C. § 702. But Congress did not intend this “general grant of review . . . to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action, ” or “provide additional judicial remedies in situations where . . . Congress has provided special and adequate review procedures.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). When an alternative remedy exists, a court may not review agency action under the APA or exercise its authority to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). If a plaintiff fails to exhaust their administrative remedies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Xia, 2019 WL 6311912, at *11.
In assessing whether there is an adequate, alternative remedy courts “look for clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent to create a special alternative remedy.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. United States DOJ, 846 F.3d 1235, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). An adequate...
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