Marrero v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc.

• Docket Number: AC 45471
• Decision Date: 25 July 2023
• Parties: JANETTA MARRERO v. HOFFMANOF SIMSBURY, INC.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

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JANETTA MARRERO v. HOFFMANOF SIMSBURY, INC.

No. AC 45471

Court of Appeals of Connecticut

July 25, 2023

Argued May 11, 2023

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Sicilian J., granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

James V. Sabatini, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Carolyn A. Trotta, with whom was David R. Golder, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Seeley, Js.

OPINION

BRIGHT, C. J.

In this employment discrimination action, the plaintiff, Janetta Marrero, claims on appeal that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., her former employer, on her complaint sounding in pregnancy discrimination and gender discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and procedural history. The plaintiff, who is a woman, began working for the defendant in September, 2010, as a service advisor at Hoffman Honda, one of the defendant's car dealerships. Sometime in 2014, the plaintiff was transferred to Hoffman Ford, another dealership owned by the defendant. In or around May, 2015, the plaintiff was transferred back to Hoffman Honda. Although the plaintiff had strong sales numbers and was a good salesperson in many respects, throughout her tenure with the defendant she demonstrated what colleagues and customers described as a "poor attitude" and rudeness. Each of the plaintiffs four supervisors documented ongoing concerns regarding her attitude and conduct. The plaintiff received six separate written warnings over the course of her employment with the defendant, each documenting an incident or incidents in which the plaintiff demonstrated a bad attitude, bad conduct, or insubordination. For example, in 2017, the plaintiff was suspended for three days for "[substandard work," "[c]onduct," "[a]ttitude," and "[c]arelessness" after her supervisor, Jim Berube, received complaints from two customers regarding the plaintiffs rude conduct while interacting with them. On April 27, 2018, Berube came into the dealership and walked into the plaintiffs office to discuss a Yelp review. He noticed the plaintiff was writing an email to him and asked her what was the subject of the email. The plaintiff informed Berube that the email was "for a goodwill request." Berube then noticed a waiting customer and asked the plaintiff whether the customer was being helped. In response, the plaintiff told Berube that he "should not tell her how to do her job" and should not look at her computer as it could display personal information. As a result, the plaintiff received a written warning informing her that she faced termination of her employment if she continued to behave in such an insubordinate manner.

On October 18, 2018, Berube called the plaintiff into his office to discuss two work-related issues-her sales numbers and her customer service. The plaintiff responded by telling Berube that her sales numbers and customer service ratings were the highest of the defendant's service advisors. The plaintiff then asked Berube, "[W]hat is this really about?" She then told him, "You have nothing on me." The plaintiff also criticized Berube's management of the department, telling him that he did not "have things in place . . . ." Berube responded by telling the plaintiff, "This is getting too hostile." The plaintiff then asked Berube if he brought her into his office and raised these issues because she was pregnant or because she had not informed Berube that she was pregnant. In response, Berube asked the plaintiff if she was pregnant, to which she replied, "That's none of your business." Berube then told the plaintiff that she had to leave the office before the conversation became hostile. The plaintiff refused to leave Berube's office for approximately one hour until another employee, Meri Robert, spoke with her and agreed to be a witness to the fact that the plaintiff did not quit her job. The defendant fired the plaintiff the next day for insubordination and for creating a hostile work environment. At that time, the plaintiff was six weeks pregnant.

Approximately four months later, on February 18, 2019, the defendant promoted another employee, who also was female, to replace the plaintiff. At the time that he promoted the plaintiffs replacement, Berube did not believe that she was pregnant. Other than Berube's belief, the record is silent as to whether the plaintiff's replacement actually was pregnant, planning to become pregnant, or of childbearing age when she was promoted.

On or about January 7, 2019, the plaintiff initiated a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), which issued a release of jurisdiction letter on March 27, 2020. The plaintiff then commenced an action in the Superior Court. In her complaint, the plaintiff asserted one count each of pregnancy discrimination and gender discrimination. On August 27, 2020, the defendant filed its answer and special defenses to the plaintiff's complaint. On November 17, 2021, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching to its accompanying memorandum of law various documents in support thereof, including portions of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff; Berube; Daniel Covalli, one of the plaintiffs coworkers; and Dwight Dery, the plaintiffs first supervisor. The documents also consisted of several performance reviews and written warnings the plaintiff received during her tenure with the defendant and affidavits from Robert and Berube.

The defendant argued that, on the basis of the plaintiffs deposition testimony and other evidence, there was no genuine issue of material fact that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs discrimination claims because (1) the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case for pregnancy or gender discrimination,^[1] (2) her employment was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason-her bad attitude and insubordination-and (3) the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext for discrimination.

On February 2, 2022, the plaintiff filed her objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, including several exhibits, and argued that she had established a prima facie case of discrimination and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs dismissal was motivated by discrimination. On February 15, 2022, the defendant filed its reply.

The court heard argument on the defendant's motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2022, and it issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendant's motion on April 14, 2022. At the outset of its decision, the court set forth the standard of review governing summary judgment motions and properly determined that the plaintiffs claims fell under the burden shifting framework adapted from the United States Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas), pursuant to which "the employee must first make a prima facie case of discrimination. . . . The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision in question. . . . The employee then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rossova v. Charter Communications, LLC, 211 Conn.App. 676, 684-85, 273 A.3d 697 (2022). "In order for the employee to first make a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., 316 Conn. 65, 73, 111 A.3d453 (2015).

With regard to the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim the court concluded that, although the plaintiff established the first three elements of a prima facie case, she had failed to show that her dismissal occurred under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. The court reasoned that, because Berube hired a female to replace the plaintiff, an inference against discrimination was appropriate. See Fleming v. MaxMara USA, Inc., 371 Fed.Appx. 115, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant employer in racial discrimination case because no inference of discrimination could be drawn when Black female plaintiff was replaced by Black female); Rodriguez v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., United States District Court, Docket No. 14 Civ. 4960 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. September 8, 2015) ("[i]t is extremely difficult, if not practically impossible to establish discrimination where, as here, plaintiff was passed over so an employer can hire another member of plaintiffs same protected class" (internal quotation marks omitted)).^[2] In addition, the court was unpersuaded by the plaintiffs argument that evidence that Berube and other male service advisors routinely went out for drinks after work on Fridays, and that the plaintiff was never invited,...