Marrero v. State
| Decision Date | 05 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. SC09-2390,SC09-2390 |
| Parties | LEONARDO MARRERO, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Leonardo Marrero (Marrero) seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Marrero v. State, 22 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), asserting that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal in T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), S.P. v. State, 884 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), A.D. v. State, 866 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), Wingfield v. State, 751 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), remanded, 799 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2001), Clark v. State, 746 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved, 783 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2001), and Miller v. State, 667 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), along with decisions of this Court in Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), and Carnley v. State, 89 So. 808 (Fla. 1921). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Marrero drove his Ford F150 pickup truck through the entrance of the Miccosukee Casino building located in Miami-Dade County. The entrance consisted of four impact-resistant glass doors, each of them sixteen or seventeen feet tall, each framed in special aluminum materials, and one of which was equipped with a handicap accessible automatic entry system. The crash required each of the four doors to be replaced and resulted in the injury of one casino patron. The State charged Marrero, as relevant here, with felony criminal mischief.
The State attempted to introduce costs associated with the temporary repair of the damaged property, but defense counsel, relying on R.C.R. v. State, 916 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), objected to the introduction of evidence of temporary repair costs because such costs may be rendered inadmissible if the permanent repair costs are also introduced, as the sum of these costs may exceed the fair market value of the doors. The trial court sustained the objection. Thereafter, the State failed to present any evidence of the repair or replacement costs of the damaged property. The State did present a surveillance videotape of Marrero's truck crashing through the doors. The State also presented the testimony of thefacilities director of the casino, but when asked questions concerning the cost of the damaged property he had no knowledge of the cost or dollar amount of damage.
At the conclusion of the State's case, Marrero requested a judgment of acquittal on the charge of felony criminal mischief. In support of the motion for judgment of acquittal, defense counsel argued, in part, that the State "failed to establish a prima facie case that the damage was one thousand dollars or more," the threshold amount for the felony charge. The judge ultimately reserved ruling on Marrero's motion for judgment of acquittal, and after the defense declared that it would not offer additional evidence, defense counsel again requested the entry of a judgment of acquittal. The judge, despite saying, "I am concerned about the lack of evidence of value," again reserved ruling on the motion.
During closing arguments, the State did not discuss the monetary amount of damage to the property. The defense, however, argued at great length that the State had failed to prove that the amount of damage resulting from the crash exceeded $1,000. At the conclusion of the closing arguments, the trial court provided, in part, the following instruction concerning criminal mischief:
During deliberations, the jury asked the following two-part question: In response, the judge, explicitly relying on Florida Standard Jury Instruction 14.1—which concerns charges of criminal theft, not criminal mischief—provided the following instruction to the jury:
If you find the defendant guilty of criminal mischief, you must make a determination of the value of the property damaged. Your verdict with regard to the value must be for the highest amount which was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the exact value of the property damage cannot be ascertained, you should attempt to determine a minimum value. If you cannot determine the minimum value, then you must find the value is less than two hundred dollars.
A few minutes after the judge provided the supplemental instruction to the jury, the jury found Marrero guilty of criminal mischief. The jury explicitly found that "the property was one thousand dollars or more." In her final ruling on the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge stated:
What I'm going to do is that I am going to deny it at this time, but I want you, if you are going to be filing a motion for new trial, I think that it is something that both sides need to brief, all right. I am not going to schedule it because I will let you file it. You have ten days to file a motion for new trial and, you know, I do have a concern about the value and the jury expressed their concern for the value. That one case that I pointed out... suggests that there has to be someevidence for them to base it on. I think you all should look at the case law on whatever it is you're going to file. You might want to begin researching since you know what the issue is.
On appeal, the Third District recognized that, "as a general rule, it will be necessary for the State to present evidence of the cost of repair or replacement in a criminal mischief case, if the State wishes to convict the defendant of mischief exceeding either the $200 or $1000 threshold." Marrero, 22 So. 3d at 823 (citing § 806.13(1)(b)2.-3., Fla. Stat. (2006)). However, the Third District continued that "a trial court may conclude that certain repairs are so self-evident that the fact-finder could conclude based on life experience that the statutory damage threshold has been met." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). The district court ultimately applied a "life experience" exception to this case and concluded:
This Court granted review of the decision below based on express and direct conflict with decisions of this Court and other district courts of appeal. First, the decision below is in conflict with Carnley v. State, 89 So. 808 (Fla. 1921), andNegron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), receded from on other grounds by Butterworth v. Fluellen, 359 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980), which hold that essential elements of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot be left to inference or conjecture. Further, the decision below is in conflict with Miller v. State, 667 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Wingfield v. State, 751 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), remanded on other grounds, 799 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2001), which hold that an adjudication of guilt of a third-degree felony or first-degree misdemeanor charge of criminal mischief, both of which require a specific monetary amount of damage to be established, must be reversed if no evidence of the amount of damage to the property is presented during trial. Finally, the decision below is in conflict with T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), A.D. v. State, 866 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), S.P. v. State, 884 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Clark v. State, 746 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved on other grounds, 783 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2001), each of which provides limitations on any "life experience" exceptions that are not recognized by the decision below.
Due process guarantees that the State must prove each essential element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 519(Fla. 2005) (citing Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001)). Section 806.13, Florida Statutes (2006), provides, in part:
(Emphasis supplied.) Surprisingly, there is some conflict among our district courts as to whether the amount of damage is an essential element of a felony criminal mischief charge. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has...
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