Marrero–Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan

• Decision Date: 07 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1195.,11–1195.
• Citation: 677 F.3d 497
• Parties: Norma MARRERO–RODRÍGUEZ, individually and in representation of her children C.L.M. and A.L.M.; C.L.M., minor; A.L.M., minor, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN; Hon. Jorge Santini–Padilla, in his official capacity as the elected mayor of the Municipality of San Juan; Angel A. Pacheco–Orta, Individually and as Lieutenant of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Hilton Cordero, individually and as Commissioner of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Adam Adorno, individually and as the Operational Field Chief of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Félix Vega, individually and as Operational Field Sub–Director of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Helder Hadock, individually and as the Commanding Officer of Specialized Units of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Janet Matos, individually and as the Administrative Director of Police Training in the Municipality of San Juan; Harry Hernández–Mulero, individually and as Captain of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Sherly Alejandro, individually and as Officer of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Julio A. Santiago–Rodríguez, individually and as Officer of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Insurance Company XYZ; John Doe; Jane Doe, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

677 F.3d 497

Norma MARRERO–RODRÍGUEZ, individually and in representation of her children C.L.M. and A.L.M.; C.L.M., minor; A.L.M., minor, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN; Hon. Jorge Santini–Padilla, in his official capacity as the elected mayor of the Municipality of San Juan; Angel A. Pacheco–Orta, Individually and as Lieutenant of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Hilton Cordero, individually and as Commissioner of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Adam Adorno, individually and as the Operational Field Chief of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Félix Vega, individually and as Operational Field Sub–Director of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Helder Hadock, individually and as the Commanding Officer of Specialized Units of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Janet Matos, individually and as the Administrative Director of Police Training in the Municipality of San Juan; Harry Hernández–Mulero, individually and as Captain of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Sherly Alejandro, individually and as Officer of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Julio A. Santiago–Rodríguez, individually and as Officer of the Municipal Police of San Juan; Insurance Company XYZ; John Doe; Jane Doe, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 11–1195.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 7, 2012.Decided May 7, 2012.

William Santiago–Sastre, with whom Alberto de Diego Collar and Meléndez–Pérez, De Diego & Jiménez were on brief, for appellants.

Francisco J. Amundaray–Rodríguez for appellees Municipality of San Juan, Jorge Santini–Padilla, and Hilton Cordero.

Michael Craig McCall, with whom Ivan M. Castro Ortiz and Aldarondo & López Bras, P.S.C. were on brief, for appellee Angel A. Pacheco–Orta.Angel A. Valencia–Aponte for appellee Julio A. Santiago–Rodríguez.Jorge R. Quintana–Lajara and Antonio Montalvo–Nazario on brief for appellees Adam Adorno, Helder Hadock, Harry Hernández–Mulero, and Sherly Alejandro.Miriam González Olivencia on brief for appellees Félix Vega and Janet Matos.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SELYA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Chief Judge.

This civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed for failure to meet the pleading standards under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). As to the Fourteenth Amendment claims, we affirm the dismissal of the claims against the Municipality of San Juan and the Mayor, and we reverse the dismissal of these claims as to the remaining individual defendants who were directly involved or had responsibility for the training which resulted in the death of an officer. The Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims were properly dismissed as to all defendants.

The basic standards under Iqbal are taken from our recent opinion in Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.2011):

The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” [ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937] (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This is not a “probability requirement,” but it does require “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id.

All well-pleaded facts are to be taken as true and we draw all reasonable inferences from the complaint in plaintiffs' favor. Field v. Napolitano, 663 F.3d 505, 508 (1st Cir.2011). The facts pled, and those inferences, are these. Carlos Lozada–Vergara, a sergeant in the San Juan Municipal Police force, underwent training at the police headquarters around 10:00 p.m. on April 1, 2009. This training simulated the arrest of a suspect who did not speak Spanish. Sgt. Lozada played the role of the arrested suspect.

Defendant Lt. Angel A. Pacheco–Orta was a training supervisor. Defendant Officer Julio A. Santiago–Rodríguez, Lt. Pacheco's subordinate, was initially in charge of this training. Neither he nor Lt. Pacheco were certified instructors, nor were any certified instructors present.

The police facility in San Juan in which the training took place is a place where all who entered were supposed to discharge their weapons into a sandbox. This would ensure that all the weapons were empty before they were carried into the facility. But this requirement was not enforced. Further, in this facility, when “firearms” were needed for training, only “dummy guns,” not real firearms, were to be used. This particular training was supposed to have been conducted without firearms.

Santiago initially was the highest-ranked officer involved and gave the order that bulletproof jackets not be worn during the exercise. Lt. Pacheco was not present when the exercises involving Lozada started, but he came in while the training was going on and took over. Lt. Pacheco entered the training facility with a weapon but without discharging the bullets in his firearm into the sandbox. Santiago permitted Lt. Pacheco to enter the training area with a gun and a loaded gun at that.

Higher level police training officials who should have been present that day were not. Nor did any of them take any steps to prevent shootings from happening during such exercises, either in writing or orally, through protocols, training, or appropriate cautionary measures.

Lozada, who continued to play the role of a suspect, had been subdued; in fact, he was flat on the ground, face down, while another officer held him down by his back. Lt. Pacheco, having just arrived, said the training was not being done “properly.” The other officer holding down Lozada got up and Lt. Pacheco positioned himself on Lozada's back to do the training “properly.” Lt. Pacheco had Lozada completely under control, on the ground face down; Lozada was motionless and obedient.

Without any form of warning and as part of “proper” training, Lt. Pacheco pulled out his weapon, put the barrel to Lozada's back, and pulled the trigger. The weapon was not empty. The bullet pierced Lozada's back and came out through his chest. Lozada was taken to a hospital where he died five days later from his bullet wound.

Lozada left his wife, Norma Marrero–Rodríguez, and two young sons, who are the plaintiffs. They make claims under the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well as under Puerto Rico law. Lt. Pacheco and Santiago, who were directly involved, of course, are the first group of defendants. The complaint names a second group, supervisory police officials who had some form of responsibility for the training. There is a third group, the Mayor and the Municipality.

Plaintiffs do not assert that Lt. Pacheco murdered Lozada. They do claim that the actions and inactions of the police around this exercise and the use of a loaded firearm in these circumstances shock the conscience, and that the defendants were callously and recklessly deficient in the lack of any care for the safety of Lozada. These claims meet the pleading standards as to certain claims against certain defendants.

Plaintiff's purported Fourth Amendment claim fails to meet the pleading standards of Iqbal. It was not even pled as a claim, but only mentioned on the first page of the complaint. See Feliciano–Hernández v. Pereira–Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 533–34 (1st Cir.2011). As to the Eighth Amendment claim, we agree with the district court that the elements of such a claim are not present here; this case does not involve a formal adjudication of guilt or a criminal prosecution against Lozada. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983).

However, many of the elements of a § 1983 claim alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations are unquestionably present as to some defendants. There is no doubt that the defendants were acting under color of Puerto Rico law or authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is also no doubt that the life of Lozada is one of the interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

The individual defendants who held the positions of Lieutenant of the Municipal Police, Commissioner of the Municipal Police, Operational Field Chief, Operational Field Sub–Director, Commanding Officer of Specialized Units, Administrative Director of Police Training, Captain of the Municipal Police, and/or Instructors are all, on the pleadings, charged with responsibility for police training and the training that day. By contrast, the Municipality is pled to be liable merely because it employs the individual defendants and because it did not have sufficient training regulations in place, and the Mayor is said to be liable because he is Mayor.

As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, we have recognized there may be substantive due process theories of recovery which “turn on whether the alleged misconduct ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 272 (1st Cir.2009); see also Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.2009) (“The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action ‘when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.’ ” (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998))).

While it is true that “negligent conduct is ‘categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process,’ ” it is also true that “ ‘behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum,’ i.e., ‘conduct intended to injure...