Marriage of Coffin, In re

• Decision Date: 26 October 1976
• Citation: 63 Cal.App.3d 139,133 Cal.Rptr. 583
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Harold F. and Lois A. COFFIN. Harold F. COFFIN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Lois A. COFFIN, Respondent and Appellee. Civ. 48600.

Page 583

133 Cal.Rptr. 583

63 Cal.App.3d 139

In re MARRIAGE OF Harold F. and Lois A. COFFIN Harold F. COFFIN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Lois A. COFFIN, Respondent and Appellee.

Civ. 48600.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Oct. 26, 1976.

Sepulveda & Metzinger, and Victor Sepulveda, Encino, for petitioner and appellant.

Calabro, Calabro, Calabro & Calabro, and A. J. Calabro, Glendale, for respondent and appellee.

POTTER, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Harold F. Coffin Appeals from an order vacating and setting aside that portion of an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage (rendered after an uncontested hearing upon the default of respondent Lois A. Coffin) 'which relates to the award or distribution of community property . . .'

The petition for dissolution was filed by petitioner on September 4, 1974. ¹ An appropriate form was checked indicating that '(a)ll property otherwise subject to disposition by the court in this proceeding has been disposed of by written agreement of the parties.' No response was filed in behalf of respondent who was served with a summons and a copy of the petition, and respondent's default was entered on October 23, 1974. The request to enter default recited that '(a) completed FINANCIAL DECLARATION in the form prescribed by Rule 1285.50 is attached' and the declaration of mailing declared that such request 'including any attachments' had been served by first class mail upon petitioner. So far as it is pertinent to this appeal, petitioner's financial declaration included the following:

Petitioner's declaration did not disclose the existence of any obligation secured by the real estate other than by setting forth '(r)ent or mortgage payments (residence)' of $260 per month.

At the uncontested trial of the dissolution on November 14, 1974, the court received in evidence a marital settlement agreement executed September 30, 1974, between petitioner and respondent. It was also signed by petitioner's attorney. The agreement as prepared had a blank for the signature of 'Attorney for Wife' but no such signature appeared thereon. Said agreement recited in paragraph II, subparagraph 4:

'Our purpose is to make an integrated agreement to effect a final and complete settlement of our respective rights in our relation to each other, our respective property rights, our obligations, to provide for the future custody of our minor children, DANA S. COFFIN GENE H. COFFIN and DON J. COFFIN.'

The agreement contained the following provisions relating to the respective rights of the parties to property:

'V

'It is agreed that HUSBAND shall have as his sole and separate property the real property and improvements thereon located at 10200 Wheatland Avenue, Sunland, California, and WIFE agrees to execute any and all necessary papers, documents, deeds and instruments to convey title to HUSBAND of said real property. However, by this agreement HUSBAND covenants that on the sale of the family residence he will place one-half of the net proceeds of the sale in trust for said children at the estimated value at the date of this agreement with HUSBAND acting as trustee. Each child of the parties born from this marriage shall receive their pro rata share of said trust upon reaching their twenty-first birthday. Said trust will terminate in any event on June 14, 1981, after the twenty-first birthday has been attained by DON J. COFFIN and his receipt of his pro rata share of said trust. At that time any and all remaining funds in the trust account shall be divided equally among the four children of this marriage.

'It is further agreed that HUSBAND shall have as his sole and separate property any and all furniture, furnishings and personal effects presently in his possession. Further, HUSBAND shall have as his sole and separate property the 1964 Chevrolet Pick-up Truck/Camper, California License No. N 87348 and WIFE agrees to execute any and all necessary papers, documents and other instruments to transfer title of said vehicle to HUSBAND.

'VI

'It is agreed that WIFE shall have as her sole and separate property any and all furniture and furnishings presently in her possession. It is agreed that WIFE shall have the 1969 Ford Mustang automobile, California License No. 6 and HUSBAND shall execute any and all necessary documents and other instruments to transfer title of said vehicle to WIFE.

'VII

'HUSBAND agrees that he will pay any and obligations which are due and outstanding and owing by the community and further that he will hold WIFE harmless from any and all obligations which have been incurred by HUSBAND or WIFE prior to the time of the execution of this document. Further, HUSBAND agrees that if any claim, action or proceeding shall hereafter be brought seeking to hold her liable for any of their debts, liabilities, acts or omissions, he shall, at his sole expense, defend WIFE against any such claim or demand (whether or not well-founded) and that he shall hold her free and harmless therefrom.'

Petitioner was granted an interlocutory judgment of dissolution which included the following provisions disposing of property:

'2. Petitioner (Harold F. Coffin) shall have as his sole and separate property the real property and improvements located at 10200 Wheatland Avenue, Sunland, CA and Respondent (Lois A. Coffin) agrees to execute any and all necessary papers, documents, deeds and instruments to convey title to Petitioner of said real property. Petitioner shall on the sale of the family residence place one-half on the net proceeds in trust for said children at the estimated value at the date of this agreement with Petitioner acting as Trustee.

'3. Petitioner shall have as his sole and separate property any and all furniture, furnishings and personal effects presently in his possession. Petitioner shall have as his sole and separate property the 1964 Chevrolet Pick-up Truck/camper, California License No. N 87348 and Respondent agrees to execute any and all necessary papers, documents and other instruments to transfer title of said vehicle to Petitioner.

'4. Respondent shall have as her sole and separate property any and all furniture and furnishings presently in her possession. Respondent shall have the 1969 Ford Mustang automobile California License No. Unknown and Petitioner shall execute any and all necessary documents and other instruments to transfer title of said vehicle to Respondent.'

The interlocutory judgment was entered on November 18, 1974, and a final judgment of dissolution was filed and entered on May 23, 1975, based thereon.

On August 1, 1975, respondent filed a notice of motion to set aside her default and the interlocutory judgment and to file a response to the petition. The motion attacked only that portion of the interlocutory judgment of dissolution which related to the award or distribution of community property. The motion was addressed to the court, 'acting as a Court of equity' to 'allow the Respondent to have her day in court.' It was supported by the declaration of respondent which set forth the basis of her claim that it 'is grossly unfair that the Respondent should at the termination of a marriage exceeding 21 years and 9 months walk away from that relationship with only a 1969 Mustang automobile and to lose all rights or benefits that she has to the equity in the real property which at the time of the separation respondent estimates to be approximately $10,000.00 and to also lose all the accrued rights that she had in and to the pension or profit sharing benefits that have accrued to the account of the petitioner during the 16 years that he was a member of the Teamsters' Union.' Respondent's declaration stated: 'That Petitioner didn't even mention to the Respondent that there was any such asset in existence and that such benefits could be extremely valuable' (referring to the pension benefits). Respondent's declarations also set forth the facts concerning the community interest in the family residence which was acquired at a cost of $41,000. She stated in this connection that an $8,000 down payment came from the sale of a former family residence and was community property, that payments of $250 to $275 per month had been made monthly from March 1973, and that all of said payments up to the date of separation were community property.

With respect to the property settlement agreement, respondent declared that she had no legal advice concerning it; that it had been prepared by petitioner's attorney, forwarded to him, and presented to respondent for signature; that whenever it was discussed, 'the parties would get into an argument and out of desperation and just to end the arguments the respondent finally signed the agreement.'

Respondent's declaration further alleged that she had sought legal advice for the first time on March 26, 1975, but deferred taking action with respect to her rights until May in view of the impending marriage of the oldest child of the parties; that negotiations for a medification of the decree were initiated in May 1975 until they terminated by petitioner's counsel formally refusing on May 22, 1975, to enter into any modification.

In opposition to respondent's motion, petitioner filed his declaration. In petitioner's declaration he declared that at the time of the separation, and prior to the signing of the property settlement agreement, 'respondent had knowledge' of the property described in her declaration, including the 'retirement and pension fund available to me as a member of the Teamsters Union.' The declaration referred in this connection to paragraph (f) of the financial declaration quoted above. It also stated that upon inquiry subsequent to the filing of his financial declaration, petitioner ascertained that as of June 30, 1974, he had vested retirement benefits which entitled him to at least 'a cash termination benefit of approximately $1,435.00.'

Petitioner's declaration further alleged that...