Marriage of Daley, In re, 32833-6-I
Decision Date | 27 December 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 32833-6-I,32833-6-I |
Citation | 77 Wn.App. 29,888 P.2d 1194 |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Linda R. DALEY, Respondent, and Dan L. Daley, Appellant. |
Helmut Kah, Bellevue, for appellant.
Dian Murray, Bellevue, for respondent.
Dan L. Daley, who failed to appear when Linda R. Daley's petition for dissolution was called to trial, appeals the trial court's order of default. Dan contends that the order of default is void and should have been vacated because he pleaded and appeared prior to trial. We reverse.
Dan and Linda Daley were married for 22 years. In January 1992, Linda filed a summons and petition for dissolution. Upon receipt, Dan filed an acceptance of service, notice of appearance, and a pro se response to the petition. Both of the parties subsequently appeared for a status conference. In a document from that conference, the court indicated that "the case is on track."
Neither party took further action on the petition until the date scheduled for trial, February 10, 1993. Linda appeared pro se. Dan apparently forgot that the trial was scheduled that day and failed to appear. After calling the docket twice, the trial court held that Dan was in default and that the findings of fact and final decree could be entered that day. The following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: ... That concludes the call of the calendar
* * * * (proceedings regarding other cases).
Pro Tem Judge Murray McLeod and Linda prepared the dissolution documents, which were signed the following day, February 11, 1993, by the presiding judge. No verbatim record was taken. Dan thereafter moved to vacate the default order and decree of dissolution. The trial court denied the motion. Dan appeals.
The sole issue that we are asked to decide on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Dan's motion to vacate the order of default. Dan contends that the trial court erred because, under CR 55, he had appeared and pleaded prior to trial. We agree.
CR 55 governs default judgments and provides as follows:
Motion. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by motion and affidavit, a motion for default may be made.
CR 55(a)(1). However, under this rule, a party who has appeared must be given 5 days written notice prior to a hearing on the motion. CR 55(a)(3). Here, it is clear that by filing an appearance, submitting responsive pleadings, and attending the status conference Dan "appeared" and "pleaded" under CR 55(a)(1). That being so, Dan was entitled to 5 days' notice prior to the entry of default. Because there is no dispute that Dan did not receive notice, the order of default is void and should have been vacated. 1
Linda nevertheless contends that default practice under CR 55 is affected by other procedural rules. In particular, relying on CR 40(a)(5) and CR 52(c), Linda argues that the trial court had discretion to enter findings, conclusions, and a judgment without prior notice to Dan. 2 We reject this contention and find that the rules Linda relies on do not apply under the facts of this case.
CR 40 governs the assignment of cases and provides that after notice of the trial has been given, either party may "proceed with his case" and receive a judgment despite the absence of the adverse party. CR 40(a)(5). CR 52 then addresses the trial court's entry of judgment and findings and conclusions "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts...." CR 52(a)(1). CR 52(c), in particular, provides that a defeated party who has failed to appear at the hearing or trial need not be given notice prior to the court's entry of findings and conclusions.
Despite Linda's arguments to the...
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