Marriage of Dawley, In re

• Citation: 17 Cal.3d 342,551 P.2d 323,131 Cal.Rptr. 3
• Decision Date: 29 June 1976
• Docket Number: S.F. 23418
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 551 P.2d 323 In re the MARRIAGE OF Betty J. and James R. DAWLEY. James R. DAWLEY, Respondent, v. Betty J. DAWLEY, Appellant.

Page 3

131 Cal.Rptr. 3

17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323

In re the MARRIAGE OF Betty J. and James R. DAWLEY James R. DAWLEY, Respondent, v. Betty J. DAWLEY, Appellant.

S.F. 23418.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

June 29, 1976.

Bourhis & Bourhis, Barbara Lawless Bourhis, San Jose, and Randall D. Reedy, Monte Sereno, for appellant.

Larry A. Ramsey, San Jose, for respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

The present case involves the validity of an antenuptial contract in which the parties agreed that their earnings and other property acquired during the marriage would be held as separate property. At the time they entered the agreement, the parties anticipated the early dissolution of their marriage. Relying on In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476, 110 Cal.Rptr. 897, 516 P.2d 289, which stated in dictum that an antenuptial agreement 'must be made in contemplation that the marriage relationship will continue until the parties are separated by death' (p. 485, 110 Cal.Rptr. p. 903, 516 P.2d p. 295), the wife contends that the agreement violates public policy.

We shall point out that the quoted language from Higgason does not accurately state California law. Our decisions, including Higgason itself, do not hold an agreement void if the parties contemplated dissolution; they hold it void only insofar as the terms of the agreement itself promote the dissolution of the marriage. The test of the validity of the contract thus does not turn on the subjective contemplation of the parties--a standard which would make it impossible to rely on any antenuptial agreement--but upon the objective language of the contract itself. Applying that test, we conclude that the agreement at bar, which provides that the parties will hold their earnings as separate property, does not offend public policy.

We reject also the wife's other contentions. We shall explain that substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that the agreement was not procured by undue influence; that the conduct of the parties negates her claim that they rescinded the antenuptial agreement; and that, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, a boat, for which the husband paid the downpayment but both spouses signed a loan for the balance of the price, is the separate property of the husband.

1. Summary of facts.

Betty Johnson, a tenured elementary school teacher, and James Dawley, an engineer, met in 1961 and maintained an intimate relationship until March of 1964. On May 11, 1964, Betty went to James' residence to pick up her belongings, but following a long and emotional discussion they agreed to resume their relationship. Two weeks later Betty discovered that she was pregnant.

Betty told James that she feared a nonmarital pregnancy would result in her losing her teaching job. An acrimonious exchange ensued, during which Betty claims James refused to help her, and James claims she threatened him with a paternity suit accompanied by publicity intended to imperil James' employment. Finally, both agreed to a temporary marriage as a solution to their dilemma.

James insisted on an antenuptial agreement to protect his property and earnings from Betty's claims; she insisted that he agree to support Carolyn, her daughter from a previous relationship, and herself for the period of her pregnancy and thereafter until she could resume teaching duties. James and Betty agreed to ask Michael diLeonardo, James' attorney, to draft the agreement. Betty reviewed the contract with her attorney, and accepted its provisions. They signed the agreement on June 11, 1964, and married two days later.

The antenuptial agreement, the complete text of which appears in footnote, ¹ provided in paragraphs V and VI that all property, including earnings, belonging to either spouse at the commencement of marriage or acquired by him through purchase, gift or inheritance during marriage would be owned by that spouse as his separate property. Each spouse disclaimed all rights, including community property rights, in the property of the other spouse. James agreed in paragraph VIII to support Betty and Carolyn 'for the minimum period of fourteen calendar months following said marriage, in order that (Betty) may take a leave of absence from the teaching profession for said period'; in paragraph IX he agreed to support any child born to Betty in the next ten months until the child reached majority. ²

Lisa Dawley, the parties' daughter, was born in January of 1965. The 14-month period mentioned in the agreement expired in September of 1965 when Betty resumed her teaching duties. The parties, however, did not separate at that time, but continued to live together until July of 1972. ³

In April of 1973, James filed for dissolution of the marriage. The trial court granted the dissolution, and awarded Betty spousal support of $1 per year, custody of Lisa with support of $300 per month, and $1,000 in attorney's fees. Relying on the antenuptial agreement, the court found no community property subject to division in the dissolution action, and awarded James all property purchased with his separate income. Betty appeals from the court's failure to find the existence of and to divide community property. ⁴

2. The antenuptial agreement does not offend the policy against contracts which encourage or promote the dissolution of a marriage.

Pursuant to Civil Code sections 5133 through 5137, '(p)arties contemplating marriage may validly contract as to their property rights, both as to property then owned by them and as to property, including earnings, which may be acquired by them after marriage.' (In re Marriage of Higgason, supra, 10 Cal.3d 476, 486, 110 Cal.Rptr. 897, 903, 516 P.2d 289, 295, quoting Barker v. Barker (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 206, 212, 293 P.2d 85.) Betty concedes that the agreement between James and herself conforms to the statutory requirements governing antenuptial agreements.

Betty contends, however, that the agreement is entirely invalid because un contradicted evidence shows that it was not entered into in contemplation of a marriage to last until death. She relies for this proposition upon a sentence taken from our opinion in Marriage of Higgason, supra, in which we stated that an antenuptial agreement 'must be made in contemplation that the marriage relation will continue until the parties are separated by death.' (10 Cal.3d 476, 485, 110 Cal.Rptr. 897, 903, 516 P.2d 289, 295.) We shall explain, however, that the quoted language from Higgason does not accurately reflect California law. Enforcement of the state policy to foster and protect marriage (see Hill v. Hill (1943) 23 Cal.2d 82, 93, 142 P.2d 417) does not require the invalidation of entire agreements based upon the subjective contemplation of the parties; it requires only that the courts refuse to enforce specific contractual provisions which by their terms seek to promote the dissolution of a marriage.

From Loveren v. Loveren (1895), 106 Cal. 509, 39 P. 801 to the most recent decision of this court on the matter, Glickman v. Collins (1975), 13 Cal.3d 852, 120 Cal.Rptr. 76, 533 P.2d 204, California courts have uniformly held that contracts offend the state policy favoring marriage only insofar as the terms of the contract 'facilitate,' 'encourage,' or 'promote' divorce or dissolution. ⁵

Apart from Higgason, no case has distinguished, in terms of the policy favoring marriage, between antenuptial agreements and those executed during a viable marriage, ⁶ and none have asserted that only agreements made in contemplation of a lifelong marriage are valid. The cases have uniformly directed their inquiry not to the subjective contemplation of the parties, but to the objective terms of the contract, and the effect of those terms in promoting the dissolution of the marriage.

Indeed Higgason itself exemplifies this objective approach to ascertaining the validity of agreements. In Higgason a wealthy 73-year old woman married a man, age 48, without financial resources. Prior to the marriage they executed an agreement under which each waived all interest in the property of the other and all right to support. In the subsequent dissolution action the husband challenged the validity of the agreement.

Although our opinion in Higgason asserted that a valid antenuptial agreement must be made in contemplation of a marriage lasting until death, we did not attempt to determine what the parties actually contemplated at the time of the execution of the agreement. Instead, the opinion proceeds directly to examine the Terms of the contract. Upholding the husband's waiver of property rights, we stated that 'Insofar as an antenuptial agreement relates to the disposition of the property of the respective parties, and does not seek to alter support obligations imposed by law, it will be upheld. (Citations.) Accordingly, the provisions relating to property rights in the antenuptial agreement entered into between the husband and the wife herein are valid.' (10 Cal.3d 476, 485, 110 Cal.Rptr. 897, 903, 516 P.2d 289, 295.) Relying, however, on decisions invalidating a wife's waiver of support rights because it promoted divorce, we held the same principle barred enforcement of the husband's waiver of support rights.

Turning to the cases preceding Higgason, we find no decision which struck down a contract which merely provided that the earnings and accumulations of each spouse will be held as separate property. On two occasions courts held invalid as promotive of divorce provisions which waived or limited rights of spousal support, yet enforced property divisions contained in the same agreement. (Barham v. Barham, supra, 33 Cal.2d 416, 428, 202 P.2d 289; Whiting v. Whiting, supra, 62 Cal.App. 157, 216 P. 92; see discussion in Barker v. Barker, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d 206, 212, 293 P.2d 85.) The few decisions striking down property provisions have all involved contracts in which those provisions were inseverably linked to...