Marriage of Gunn, In re
| Decision Date | 27 August 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-91-0056,5-91-0056 |
| Citation | 174 Ill.Dec. 381,233 Ill.App.3d 165,598 N.E.2d 1013 |
| Parties | , 174 Ill.Dec. 381 In re MARRIAGE OF Johanna L. GUNN, Petitioner-Appellee, and John B. Gunn, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John B. Gunn, Walker and Williams, P.C., Belleville, for respondent-appellant.
Harry J. Sterling, Harry J. Sterling, P.C., Fairview Heights, for petitioner-appellee.
A judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered by the circuit court in St. Clair County on April 7, 1988, dissolving the The trial court awarded joint custody of the minor children to the parties, with Johanna designated as primary physical custodian; ordered John to pay child support, maintenance, post-secondary education for the children, attorney fees, and marital debts; and placed a fair market value on, and divided, the marital property.
[174 Ill.Dec. 384] marriage of the petitioner, Johanna L. Gunn, and the respondent, John B. Gunn.
Both parties filed post-trial motions which were denied by the trial court.
John alleges in his appeal that the trial court erred by:
(1) awarding permanent maintenance to Johanna in the sum of $4,000 per month;
(2) failing to impose upon Johanna an affirmative obligation to encourage financial independence;
(3) valuing John's 20 shares of stock in the law firm of Walker & Williams, a professional corporation, in the sum of $100,000; and
(4) creating an ambiguity in the judgment order relating to deferred compensation.
John and Johanna were married on September 4, 1965. At the time of the dissolution (April 7, 1988), John was 55 years of age and Johanna approximately 44. The parties had four children, Jodi, born June 9, 1967; Sheri, June 13, 1969; Jeff, October 21, 1970; and Lori, May 29, 1974.
Johanna attended high school and upon graduation worked as a bookkeeper at a bank for two years, then as a receptionist at a law firm until married. After her marriage she was a full-time wife, mother and homemaker. In July 1986, she started part-time as a sales clerk at Famous-Barr. She worked 14 hours a week at $4.00 per hour, plus 2% commission, and averaged around $100.00 net per week. In 1987, Johanna enrolled at the Forest Park Community College studying phlebotomy.
John received his license to practice law prior to his marriage to Johanna. On July 1, 1973, he began working for the Belleville defense firm of Walker & Williams and was made a partner within a year or so. In addition to John's trial practice, he is also actively involved with administrative matters of the firm. Between 1980 and 1985, John billed out a low of 2,831 to a high of 3,400 hours per year. The trial court found in its judgment "[t]hat the economic contributions of the defendant are significant and substantial and the work habits of the defendant are extraordinary * * *."
Neither are in perfect health. John has high blood pressure, had a left hip prosthesis, may need one on the right hip, and may require a knee replacement.
Johanna had surgery on her arms with the residual effect of numbness in the fingers of her hands, has inflammation of the nerves in her right eye, ulcers, and gall bladder difficulties, and underwent a hysterectomy. John testified that he thought Johanna would have difficulty in obtaining health insurance due to her preexisting medical problems unless she was able to obtain insurance through a group plan.
Johanna knew little or nothing about the family finances. John paid most of the bills and invested without consulting her.
John does not object to Johanna's award of maintenance but argues that the award of permanent maintenance in the sum of $4,000 per month is excessive in duration and amount, that it exceeds her reasonable needs, and that it fails to take into consideration her freedom from debt.
On February 10, 1987, in a hearing on temporary matters, the court awarded temporary maintenance to Johanna in the monthly sum of $1,300. However, in the final judgment, the court increased maintenance to $4,000 per month until John retired or Johanna reached the age of 60, whichever came first. The judgment provided that "[s]hould the defendant retire from the full-practice of law and not draw any benefits from his deferred compensation program for a period of 60 days, the Court shall entertain a motion to determine what support, if any, shall be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff." (Emphasis in the original.) The judgment also provided, by formula, the amount Johanna was to receive from John's deferred compensation program "if and when received" by him.
Prior to an award of maintenance, if any, the trial court must first determine the disposition of marital property since both are inextricably related. After the property has been distributed in "just proportions", the court then reviews the award of maintenance on the record as a whole. In re Marriage of Amato (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 395, 35 Ill.Dec. 729, 399 N.E.2d 1018; see also Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 40, par. 504(a)(1).
(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having custody of the children;
* * * * * *
(7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
(8) the custodial provisions for any children;
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and
(11) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties." Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 40, par. 503(d).
In its judgment, the trial court awarded John two duplexes which he purchased "strictly as a tax situation", with the trial court setting negative values of $16,000 on one and $356 on the other. It awarded Johanna's IRA to her ($2,500) and John's IRA to him ($15,826); the marital home at No. 69 Country Club Acres to Johanna ($121,164); household furnishings to Johanna ($9,000) and to John ($2,500); two cars to Johanna (total value $10,000) and two cars to John (total value $18,000); from John's portion of the Walker & Williams profit-sharing plan, part to Johanna ($75,000) and the balance to John ($201,838); and 20 shares of Walker & Williams stock to John ($100,000). The court valued as "speculative" the Walker & Williams deferred compensation plan.
In the total division of marital property, John was awarded $335,335 (including a deduction of $16,356 for the negative value of the duplexes), and Johanna was awarded $231,928, a difference favoring John of $103,407. John was, however, directed to pay all of the marital debts in the sum of $87,775.40, which included money he had borrowed from the profit-sharing plan of Walker & Williams ($50,000). A house owned by the parties in Mesa, Arizona, was ordered sold. It was given no value by the court, and part of the debt assigned to John ($12,736.40) was a Federal income tax recapture on the house.
It was appropriate that Johanna was awarded the marital home, together with most of its furnishings, since she had the physical custody of the children. However, along with any house comes the inevitable expenses of maintenance, repair, tax, utilities, and insurance. John was properly awarded the two duplexes he purchased as a tax shelter. Johanna was awarded 27.1% ($75,000) of John's $276.838 profit-sharing plan, leaving the bulk to John.
Little, if any, of the parties' marital property has income-producing capabilities. In some dissolutions, there is sufficient income-producing property to provide for the reasonable needs of each party--in the case before us, there is not. John's potential for producing income as a partner in a good law firm is the major asset of the marriage and must be considered by the court when dividing the marital property. The court, in balancing the respective interests of the parties, must fairly divide the assets to provide for the reasonable needs of each within the bounds of the property to be distributed and the ability of both to produce income.
It is obvious Johanna has no means of paying marital debts, and the trial court correctly assigned these to John. The home in Mesa, Arizona, was properly ordered sold with the proceeds to apply to the debt. A review of the trial court's judgment and the record shows a careful consideration by the trial court in the distribution of the marital assets and debts. John concedes that he has a greater ability to acquire future assets than Johanna, and the record more than bears that out. We find that the trial court followed the statutory guidelines in distributing the marital property and that such distribution was equitable and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
After the trial court has distributed marital property, before an award of maintenance can be granted, the court must find that two factors exist--that the spouse seeking maintenance:
"(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, and
(2) is unable to support himself through...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Liszka
... 2016 IL App (3d) 150238 77 N.E.3d 1000 In re MARRIAGE OF Kathleen LISZKA, PetitionerAppellee, and Michael Liszka, RespondentAppellant. No. 3150238. Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District. Opinion ... weight given to each of them, and their expertise in the particular area of valuation; and then determine fair market value." In re Marriage of Gunn, 233 Ill.App.3d 165, 183, 174 Ill.Dec. 381, 598 N.E.2d 1013 (1992). 42 Here, the trial court barred Michael's expert from testifying and prohibited ... ...
-
In re Brunke
... 2019 IL App (2d) 190201 141 N.E.3d 1186 436 Ill.Dec. 90 IN RE MARRIAGE OF Judith E. BRUNKE, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and John W. Brunke, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. No. 2-19-0201 Appellate ... In re Marriage of Gunn , 233 Ill. App. 3d 165, 179, 174 Ill.Dec. 381, 598 N.E.2d 1013 (1992). Judith testified that she had difficulty finding a job even in retail because ... ...
-
Marriage of Minear, In re
... ... 606, 610, 667 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1996); see also In re Marriage of Gunn, 233 Ill.App.3d 165, 174-75, 174 Ill.Dec. 381, 388, 598 N.E.2d 1013, 1020 (1992); In re Marriage of Simmons, 87 Ill.App.3d 651, 661, 42 Ill.Dec. 706, 713, 409 N.E.2d 321, 328 (1980). As to Robert's claim the trial court failed to consider Melissa's upcoming college expenses, no evidence was ... ...
-
In Re The Marriage Of Daniel A. Nord
... ... 502, 814 N.E.2d at 157. The trial court is in a better position to determine whether permanent or rehabilitative maintenance was more appropriate. In re Marriage of Golden, 358 Ill.App.3d 464, 469, 294 Ill.Dec. 852, 831 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (2005), citing In re Marriage of Gunn, 233 Ill.App.3d 165, 179, 174 Ill.Dec. 381, 598 N.E.2d 1013, 1022 (1992). The court's decision to award permanent or rehabilitative maintenance will not be overturned unless the court abused its discretion. Walker, 386 Ill.App.3d at 1044, 326 Ill.Dec. 446, 899 N.E.2d at 1105. We ... ...