Marriage of Jamison, In re, KCD
Decision Date | 29 October 1979 |
Docket Number | No. KCD,KCD |
Citation | 592 S.W.2d 181 |
Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Willa Lea JAMISON, and Stanley Eugene Jamison. Willa Lea JAMISON, Petitioner, v. Stanley Eugene JAMISON, Respondent. 30514. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
P. Terence Crebs, Michael J. McKitrick, St. Louis (Gallop, Johnson, Godiner, Morganstern & Crebs, St. Louis, of counsel), for petitioner.
Robert F. Pyatt, Chillicothe, for respondent.
Before WASSERSTROM, C. J., and WELBORN and MASON, Special Judges.
The marriage of Willa and Stanley Jamison was dissolved by decree of the circuit court dated September 23, 1976, under which the court also awarded maintenance to Willa and approved an oral division of marital property. On November 1, 1976, Stanley died in a highway accident. No appeal from the decree of dissolution had been filed before the date of death, nor was any filed thereafter. Eighteen months later, on June 2, 1978, Willa filed a motion to dismiss the dissolution proceeding. The trial court denied that motion, from which Willa pursues the present appeal.
Willa's theory in the trial court for her motion to dismiss and that which she urges again in this appeal, rests on the following syllogism. The major premise is that a marriage can be dissolved by either death or a decree of dissolution, and if the death occurs first, then that leaves nothing upon which a court decree can operate. The minor premise is that Stanley's death occurred before the decree of dissolution became final. If those premises be sound, then the conclusion would have to follow logically that the dissolution decree was beyond the power of the circuit court and therefore should have been set aside.
No complaint can be made of the major premise stated above. See In re Marriage of Harms, 563 S.W.2d 781 (Mo.App.1978). However, the minor premise is faulty and cannot be accepted.
In justification of the minor premise that the decree never became final, Willa argues first that the property division improperly rested upon an oral agreement rather than a written one, citing Turpin v Turpin, 570 S.W.2d 831 (Mo.App.1978). 1 She argues secondly that the agreement and consequently the decree omitted part of the marital assets in that it failed to take into account and failed to distribute a bank account, certain insurance and Stanley's retirement pension. She insists that this failed to follow the mandate of Section 452.330 ( ), and makes the decree incomplete and prevents it from being a final judgment. In so arguing, Willa expressly embraces the proposition that a decree of dissolution is unitary and the dissolution portion cannot be separated from the balance of the decree.
That argument flies directly in the teeth of Section 452.360-1 which provides:
That statutory provision has been construed by this court in a manner which unequivocally refutes Willa's position. The opinion in State ex rel. Horridge v. Pratt, 563 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo.App.1978) holds:
The cases cited and relied upon by Willa (some of which are specifically referred to in the Horridge opinion) are not to the contrary. The cases so cited stand only for the proposition that where an attack is leveled at elements in a dissolution decree other than the dissolution itself, then the decree is not final for purposes of appeal if full distribution of marital property has not been made. None of those cases involve...
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