Marriage of Kramer, In re

• Citation: 625 N.E.2d 808,253 Ill.App.3d 923,192 Ill.Dec. 653
• Decision Date: 27 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 4-93-0079,4-93-0079
• Parties: , 192 Ill.Dec. 653 In re the MARRIAGE OF Paula Sue KRAMER, Petitioner-Appellee, and Ronald J. Kramer, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 808

625 N.E.2d 808

253 Ill.App.3d 923, 192 Ill.Dec. 653

In re the MARRIAGE OF Paula Sue KRAMER, Petitioner-Appellee,

and Ronald J. Kramer, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 4-93-0079.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Argued July 20, 1993.

Decided Nov. 30, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1994.

Randall P. Ray (argued), Sebat, Swanson, Banks, Garman & Townsley, Danville, for respondent-appellant.

Thomas M. Goodwin (argued), Dougherty, Hofmann & Goodwin, P.C., Danville, for petitioner-appellee.

Presiding Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from an attempt by petitioner, Paula Sue Kramer, to enforce the terms of a 1974 divorce decree and recover arrearages in child support. In April 1992, Paula filed a petition in the circuit court of Vermilion County, pursuant to section 12-603 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 12-603), seeking the registration of the 1974 Nebraska divorce decree. The divorce decree ordered respondent, Ronald J. Kramer, to pay Paula $100 per month in child support. After the divorce decree had been registered, Paula filed a petition for money judgment seeking the arrearages in child support. The trial court subsequently ordered Ronald to pay her $25,382.27 in back child support and interest. Ronald appeals, arguing that (1) the statute of limitations barred the collection of that portion of the arrearages accruing prior to September 9, 1986, as a matter of law; (2) Paula's action was barred under a theory of laches; and (3) he complied with a California Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) child support order, which modified the 1974 Nebraska order, and no arrearages existed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties married in South Dakota in January 1971. One child, Melinda Anne Kramer, was born to the marriage in June 1971. In October 1972, the parties moved to California, where they resided until they separated in August 1973. Paula then moved to Nebraska, where she was granted a dissolution of marriage in January 1974. The divorce decree awarded her custody of Melinda and ordered Ronald to pay her $100 per month in child support beginning on October 15, 1973, until Melinda married, reached 19 years of age, died, or became self-supporting after leaving Paula's household.

Later in 1974, Paula brought an action in the Nebraska courts under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 42-762 through 42-7,104 (1988)) to compel Ronald's performance under the divorce decree in California, where he then resided. In July 1974, the superior court of Sacramento County, California, entered an order reducing Ronald's child support obligation to $50 per month, with payments to cease when the child attained 18 years of age. In the ensuing years, Ronald fully complied with the California order. He discontinued support payments when he received a letter (dated July 14, 1989) from the Sacramento County District Attorney, Office of Family Support, indicating that it was returning his case file to him because the child was emancipated.

While the Nebraska child support record noted that the California order reduced the child support payments, it also noted that the original Nebraska order was never modified to reflect the reduction in child support. The payments made under the reciprocal support order were, however, credited against the amount accruing under the original Nebraska judgment. The principal difference between the support due and accruing under the Nebraska decree and the money actually paid in compliance with the California order was $11,150.

In response to a request by Paula, the county attorney of Dawes County, Nebraska, was appointed in December 1983 to commence child support proceedings against Ronald to collect the reported arrearages. Although Ronald's address was listed on the order as being in California, he moved to Illinois in 1976 or 1977 and has continually resided here since. Proceedings to collect the arrearages, including attempting to register the foreign support order in California, continued until 1986 when Paula failed to complete an affidavit concerning information on direct payments. In 1988, the case was turned over to the Nebraska Department of Social Service, Child Support Intercept System. The record before us contains no other evidence regarding the collection of the arrearages.

At some point not reflected in the record, Paula returned to South Dakota. In August 1990, supplemental proceedings were instituted against Ronald in South Dakota. In September 1990, after Melinda had reached 19 years of age, Paula filed an action there for the unpaid portion of the child support payments under the original Nebraska support decree. Ronald was served with the South Dakota petition and process, but he filed no pleading in response. A default judgment was thereafter entered against Ronald, and no appeal was taken therefrom. In April 1991, Paula filed a petition in the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Illinois to register the foreign judgment. Ronald opposed the registration on the basis that the South Dakota court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court agreed, and on appeal, this court affirmed. See In re Marriage of Kramer (1992), 226 Ill.App.3d 815, 168 Ill.Dec. 551, 589 N.E.2d 951.

Because Paula could not register the South Dakota judgment, she petitioned to register the original Nebraska judgment of dissolution. In July 1992, she filed a petition for money judgment seeking sums due her for the unpaid child support arising from the original divorce decree. In December 1992, the court filed a memorandum opinion rejecting Ronald's defenses and finding in favor of Paula in the amount of $25,382.27 plus interest on the sum of $11,150 from May 14, 1992, until the sum was paid. Ronald thereafter filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.

In June 1989, Melinda visited Ronald in Illinois shortly before her eighteenth birthday--the first time Ronald had seen her since he left California, although they had exchanged phone calls and letters beginning around 1987. When she visited him, Melinda indicated that she had graduated from high school and was going to New York for approximately one year to be a nanny. Ronald continued to correspond with her in New York.

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Prior to September 1991, section 12-602 of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act stated the following: "On application made within the time allowed for bringing an action on a foreign judgment in this State, any person entitled to bring such action may have a foreign judgment registered in any court of this State having jurisdiction of such an action." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 12-602, repealed by Pub. Act 87-358, eff. Sept. 9, 1991 (1991 Ill.Laws 1921).) Under this section, an action to commence the registration of a foreign judgment was considered civil in nature, and because no specific statute of limitations covered such an action, the general five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13-205 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-205) applied. See Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos (1990), 195 Ill.App.3d 610, 617, 142 Ill.Dec. 352, 357, 552 N.E.2d 1093, 1098; Haughton v. Haughton (1979), 76 Ill.2d 439, 447, 31 Ill.Dec. 183, 398, 394 N.E.2d 385, 389.

In 1991, the legislature repealed sections 12-601 through 12-617 of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act and enacted sections 12-627 through 12-634 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Foreign Judgments Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, pars. 12-627 through 12-634). (Pub. Act 87-358, § 1, eff. Sept. 9, 1991 (1991 Ill.Laws 1921, 1921-22).) As applied to foreign judgments, section 12-628 of the Foreign Judgments Act provides:

"A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the acts of Congress or the statutes of this State may be filed in the office of the circuit clerk for any county of this State. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court for any county of this State. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court for any county of this State and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 12-628.

Illinois courts have consistently held that an Illinois divorce decree ordering payment of child support is a money judgment subject to the 20-year limitation for enforcement of judgments contained in section 13-218 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-218), instead of the five-year statute of limitations contained in section 13-205 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 110, par. 13-205). Therefore, a parent is not limited in the collection of child support arrearages to those amounts accrued during the five-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. People ex rel. Wray v. Brassard (1992), 226 Ill.App.3d 1007, 1013-14, 168 Ill.Dec. 612, 616, 589 N.E.2d 1012, 1016; In re Marriage of Yakubec (1987), 154 Ill.App.3d 540, 544, 107 Ill.Dec. 453, 457, 507 N.E.2d 117, 120.

The trial court held that when the instant action was brought in April 1992, the 20-year statute of limitations was in effect and applied to the present case as a result of the enactment of section 12-628 of the Foreign Judgments Act. It therefore held that all of Paula's claims for arrearages in child support were timely filed and not barred by the five-year statute of limitations.

On appeal, Ronald argues that Paula's claims had expired and were barred by the five-year statute of limitations prior to the effective date of the new provisions of the Foreign Judgments Act. Although he acknowledges that section 13-218 of the Code (...