White-Nathan v. Nathan
| Citation | 181 Ariz. 112,888 P.2d 237 |
| Decision Date | 27 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | WHITE-NATHA,No. 1,P,CA-CV,1 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Caroletitioner-Appellee, v. Frederick Reid NATHAN, Respondent-Appellant. 93-0046. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
Frederick Reid Nathan ("Nathan") appeals from the trial court's judgment on the grounds that it fails to give full faith and credit to a California Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ("RURESA") order. We affirm.
Pursuant to a 1989 Arizona decree of dissolution, Carol White-Nathan ("White") was awarded custody of the couple's son, and Nathan was ordered to pay $2,200 per month child support from August 1989 through May 1994, then $1,500 per month commencing in June 1994, until their child became eighteen or was sooner emancipated. In June 1989, Nathan moved to California. In March 1990, White and the child moved to Massachusetts.
In 1991, White petitioned for assistance in recovering child support under Massachusetts' version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 1 and the petition was forwarded to California.
In January 1992, the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles filed a citation on White's behalf requiring Nathan to appear in the California Superior Court and show cause why he should not be directed to pay child support in a sum to be determined by the court. On March 30, 1992, the California Superior Court issued a minute entry finding that Nathan owed a duty of support to his son. Pursuant to California's version of RURESA, the court ordered Nathan pay child support in the amount of $1,000 per month through the Office of the Los Angeles County Court Trustee commencing April 15 1992, plus an additional $400 per month to be applied against an $18,200 child support arrearage. The court used a multipurpose order form that contained the language "the order of _____ is modified in the following respects," but the court did not fill in the blank or mark the box that would have indicated it was selecting that provision.
On May 14, 1992, in Arizona, Nathan filed a request to modify the Arizona child support order. Among other things, he requested that the Arizona court give full faith and credit to the California RURESA order. In response, White petitioned for a contempt order against Nathan for his failure to pay child support, and for other appropriate relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court declined to give full faith and credit to the California RURESA order, holding that it did not modify the Arizona support order and, further, did not limit the Arizona court's jurisdiction to enforce its own order. The trial court also denied Nathan's request to modify the child support order; granted judgment to White for arrearages in the amount of $47,947, together with interest accrued thereon; found Nathan to be in contempt of court; and directed that a wage assignment issue in the monthly amount of $2,700, which included $500 per month toward the arrearages. Nathan filed a timely notice of appeal. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (A.R.S.) section 12-2101(E).
Nathan's sole argument is that the trial court erred in failing to give full faith and credit to the California RURESA order. 2 He argues that our supreme court in Ibach v. Ibach, 123 Ariz. 507, 600 P.2d 1370 (1979), held that RURESA conferred jurisdiction on sister state courts to modify support provisions in Arizona marital dissolution decrees, and that such modifications are entitled to full faith and credit in Arizona. While we agree with Nathan's characterization of Ibach, we disagree with his proposed application.
In 1970, the Arizona Legislature enacted a version of RURESA as A.R.S. sections 12-1651 through 1691. 1970 Ariz.Sess.Laws Ch. 90, § 3. RURESA has been adopted in thirty-one other states, including California. See 4(A) A.R.S. at 387.
Under RURESA, either an individual obligee of a duty of support, or the state or political subdivision that furnishes support to such an obligee, may file a complaint seeking a support order in the appropriate court of the state in which the obligee resides. RURESA §§ 2, 8-13; 9(B) UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED at 402-457 (1987). If the court in which the complaint is filed (the "initiating" court) finds that the complaint sets forth facts from which it may be determined that the obligor owes a duty of support and that a court in the state of the obligor's residence (the "responding" court) may obtain jurisdiction of the obligor or his property, the initiating court must so certify and forward the certification and three copies of the complaint to either the responding court or the designated "information agency" of the responding state for prosecution of the claim. RURESA §§ 14, 17-23.
If the responding court finds a duty of support, it may order the obligor to furnish present support and/or to reimburse for unpaid past support, and may subject the property of the obligor to the support order. RURESA § 24. The responding court then must transmit to the initiating court any payments made by the obligor. RURESA § 28. The initiating court receives such payments and disburses them to the obligee. RURESA § 29.
As an alternative to the foregoing procedure, RURESA sections 35 through 40 () permit an obligee to register a foreign support order with the responding court. Within twenty days of service, the obligor may ask the responding court to vacate the registration. If the obligor does not do so, the registered support order is confirmed and becomes enforceable in the responding state. RURESA section 40(a) provides:
Upon registration the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this state. It has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a support order of this State and may be enforced and satisfied in like manner.
The standard RURESA action is an independent proceeding to determine and then enforce a duty of support. Wornkey v. Wornkey, 12 Kan.App.2d 506, 749 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1988). Its purpose is to provide an additional and separate means for obligees to enforce child support obligations. In re Marriage of Gifford, 122 Ill.2d 34, 118 Ill.Dec. 452, 453-454, 521 N.E.2d 929, 930-931 (1988). The vast majority of courts hold that, in a RURESA action to enforce the support provisions of a decree issued by a court of another state, the responding court may enter its own support order prospectively raising or lowering the amount of the support obligation, if the circumstances before it warrant such a change. Thompson v. Thompson, 366 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D.1985).
RURESA section 30 provides that, under certain circumstances, the responding court must conform its support order to the amount allowed in another state's proceeding. This section has been held to apply only when the proceeding that generated the original support order and the RURESA action are contemporaneous, or nearly so, and the RURESA complaint makes a demand for the support awarded in the prior proceeding. Wornkey, 749 P.2d at 1048-49; Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213, 216 (Wyo.1985). When the proceedings are not contemporaneous and a period of time has passed between entry of the original support order and the commencement of the RURESA action, the responding court need not conform its RURESA order to the original support order. Bjugan, 710 P.2d at 216.
In an action in which RURESA section 30 does not apply, the responding court may require the RURESA respondent pay a greater or lesser amount of child support than that imposed by the underlying dissolution decree or support order. Hodgins v. Hodgins, 814 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Mo.App.1991); Thompson, 366 N.W.2d at 847. However, RURESA section 31 provides:
A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this act does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court of this state pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of any other state pursuant to a substantially similar act or any other law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless otherwise specifically provided by the court. Amounts paid for a particular period pursuant to any support order made by a court of another state shall be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under any support order made by a court of this state.
See former Calif.Civil Proc.Code § 1689, now Calif.Fam.Code § 4840. 3 Thus, unless the responding court specifies otherwise, the RURESA support order does not supersede the underlying support order. Accordingly, a variation between the support amount provided in the RURESA order and that in the underlying support order does not in itself alter or modify the underlying support order. See e.g., McConnell v. Attorney General of Texas, 878 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.App.1994); In re Marriage of Kramer, 253 Ill.App.3d 923, 192 Ill.Dec. 653, 625 N.E.2d 808 (1993); Rimsans v. Rimsans, 261 N.J.Super. 214, 618 A.2d 854 (App.Div.1992); State v. Borchers, 805 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.1991); Bjugan, 710 P.2d at 216; Matter of Custody of Gulick, 100 Nev. 125, 676 P.2d 801 (1984); Nomer v. Kossman, 100 Idaho 898, 606 P.2d 1002 (1980); In re Marriage of Gifford, 118 Ill.Dec. at 454, 521 N.E.2d at 931; Hodgins, 814 S.W.2d at 711; Thompson, 366 N.W.2d at 847-48; In re Marriage of Straeck, 156 Cal.App.3d 617, 203 Cal.Rptr. 69 (1984); State v. McKenna, 253 Ga. 6, 315 S.E.2d 885 (1984); Campbell v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Marriage of Gerkin
...... 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 . the original support decree, but instead provided an additional, supplementary, or cumulative remedy"]; White-Nathan v. Nathan (1994) 181 Ariz. 112, 115-117, 888 P.2d 237 [facts identical to those in this case, with Arizona as the initiating state and California as ......
-
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
...... At least one of the purposes of A.R.S. section 25-324 "is to award fees and costs to the party least able to pay." White-Nathan v. Nathan, 181 Ariz. 112, 118, 888 P.2d 237, 243 (App.1994). Throughout the trial, Adelita was the party least able to pay. See Kelsey v. Kelsey, ......
-
Mothershed v. Greenen
...his home. Under A.R.S. § 25-324, the court must consider the relative financial resources of the parties. White-Nathan v. Nathan, 181 Ariz. 112, 118, 888 P.2d 237, 243 (App. 1994). Although the information before the court did not provide exact data about the parties' finances, it did repre......
-
Department of Human Services ex rel. Pavlovich v. Pavlovich
...... Mullis, 669 P.2d at 764. In White-Nathan v. Nathan, 181 Ariz. 112, 115, 888 P.2d 237, 240 (Ariz.Ct.App.1994), the court observed that the vast majority of courts hold that under these ......