Marriage of Maples, In re, 17252-6-II

• Decision Date: 28 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 17252-6-II,17252-6-II
• Citation: 899 P.2d 1,78 Wn.App. 696
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14748B In re the MARRIAGE OF Noris I. MAPLES, Respondent, v. James K. MAPLES, Appellant.

Page 696

78 Wn.App. 696

899 P.2d 1, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14748B

In re the MARRIAGE OF

Noris I. MAPLES, Respondent, v. James K. MAPLES, Appellant.

No. 17252-6-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 2.

July 28, 1995.

Clifford Randolph Kuhn, Longview, for appellant.

Noris I. Maples, Longview, pro se.

WIGGINS, Judge.

James K. Maples appeals a Cowlitz County Superior Court order that modified his previous child support obligation. Maples receives worker's compensation disability income and social security disability income and his children also receive direct payments from these two sources. We must decide whether the direct payments to the children should be considered part of James's income for purposes of computing child support under the statutory support table, or whether the direct payments should be considered income to the children which may justify a deviation from the support set forth in the table. The Superior Court adopted the latter interpretation, and ordered James to pay higher support than the amount in the table. Reading the statutory scheme as a whole in light of the legislative history, we hold that the payments should be considered part of James's income. Our holding results in higher child support than the deviation ordered by the Superior Court and the support order is reversed.

FACTS

James Maples and his wife Noris were divorced sometime before 1991. Noris has primary custody of their two children, Joshua (born in 1979) and Sabrina (born in 1980). The dissolution decree apparently required James to pay child support for each child in the amount of $269.28 per James worked for the City of Longview until failing eyesight disabled him, when he went on disability leave. James began receiving disability payments from two sources: (1) social security in the amount of $939 per month; and (2) the Gates-McDonald Company, the City's worker's compensation disability insurer, in the amount of $740.32. Besides paying those benefits to him, both social security and Gates-McDonald began paying his children directly on account of his disability, in the amounts of $482 and $85.44 per month respectively.

month, for a total of $538.56. He paid that amount until 1991.

In March of 1993, James moved for relief from his child support payments. James argued that because the social security payments are "not counted as income for the purpose of calculating child support", his sole income for calculating support was the worker's compensation payment of $740.32. James calculated his combined support obligation for both children at $315 per month. In light of his children's receipt of disability payments totaling $567.44, James asked the Superior Court to give further credit for those payments and to relieve him completely of his support obligation.

Noris Maples appeared pro se below (she has not filed a brief in this appeal) and asked the court to deny James's motion. Noris argued that James's combined disability income, from social security as well as Gates-McDonald, was $1,679.32, and that her own income had declined from the time of the original decree.

In resolving James's petition, the Superior Court counted both of James's disability payments as income, for a total of $1,679.32; gave him credit for the direct disability payments to the children, pursuant to RCW 26.18.190; accepted Noris's net income statement of $671.05 per month; and, based on these figures, calculated James's standard support obligation at $128 per month. The court deviated from the standard support obligation, ordering James to pay $175 per month for both children.

The trial court entered the following finding in support of the deviation:

The Court considers the amount of money paid directly to the children, related to father's disability, income of father and a higher support amount is therefore justified.

ANALYSIS

James first argues that the trial court erred by converting his petition for credit into a proceeding to modify the child support provisions of the parties' decree. He contends that the parties' entire finances were not properly before the court, as they would be in a true modification proceeding brought under RCW 26.09.175. We disagree. James invited the court's consideration of the parties' finances. His motion for credit not only detailed his own "current total income" of $1,679.32, but it compared that figure with his ex-wife's 1991 gross income of $934 and incorporated standard worksheets setting forth the parties' respective support obligations based on those income figures. James invited the court to consider the parties' overall finances and cannot complain that the court accepted his invitation. See Bellevue v. Kravik, 69 Wash.App. 735, 850 P.2d 559 (1993); Shanlian v. Faulk, 68 Wash.App. 320, 843 P.2d 535 (1992).

James argues that the disability payments to his children cannot be considered as his income, and should not be factored into the calculation of child support. Since 1988, child support in Washington has been computed under the child support schedule incorporated into a statutory scheme. The court must adhere to the following procedure in setting support: compute the total income of the parents, RCW 26.19.071; determine the standard child support level from the economic table, RCW 26.19.020; decide whether to deviate from the standard calculation based on specific statutory factors, RCW 26.19.075; and allocate the support obligation to each parent based on each parent's share of the combined net income. RCW 26.19.080. The court may deviate from the standard calculation by setting forth specific reasons for deviation in written findings of fact, which must be supported by the evidence. In re Marriage of Sacco, 114 Wash.2d 1, 4, 784 P.2d 1266 (1990). In this case, the court entered the required findings of fact.

The disability payments to James are clearly income to James, because RCW 26.19.071(3) defines "income" in this context as "income from any source, including: (a) Salaries; (b) Wages; ... (s) Social security benefits; and (t) Disability insurance benefits." This case requires us to determine the proper treatment of the direct payments to James's children. The Social Security Administration makes payments directly to the minor, dependent child of a person entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). See Clayborne v. Califano, 603 F.2d 372 (2nd Cir., 1979). State worker's compensation benefits are paid similarly to the dependent children of a disabled worker. ¹ RCW 51.32. The disability payments to the children can be interpreted either to be income to James, or else income to the children themselves. If income to the children themselves, then the payments are not counted in computing James's standard child support, but they would be "extraordinary income" of a child which could be a basis for the trial court to deviate from the standard child support obligation.

We interpret the statute consistent with the legislative intent:

The goal of statutory construction is, of course, to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Where the meaning of the statute is clear from the language of the statute alone, there is no room for judicial interpretation. If the language of the statute is amenable to more than one construction, however, resort to legislative history and other aids to construction is appropriate.

(Footnotes omitted.) Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dept., 119 Wash.2d 178, 185, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992). Where the Governor has vetoed part of a statute, the Governor has acted as part of the Legislature and we consider gubernatorial intent as well. State ex rel. Royal v. Yakima Cy. Comm'rs, 123 Wash.2d 451, 462-63, 869 P.2d 56 (1994).

We conclude that the child support statutes are unclear whether the disability payments to the children are income to James or income to the children, and we look therefore to the legislative history. The 1988 legislation enacting the child support schedule did not specify the resources to be included in income. The 1988 act simply directed that, "[a]ll income and resources of each parent's household shall be disclosed and shall be considered by the court or administrative law judge when the child support obligation of each parent is determined." Laws of 1988, ch. 275, § 3(3). The 1988 act also provided that the trial court could deviate from the support calculated under the schedule, specifying several reasons for deviation, including "extraordinarily high income of a child." Laws of 1988, ch. 275, § 3(6). The ground for deviation survives in the current RCW 26.19.075(1)(a)(vii) as "[e]xtraordinary income of a child".

In 1990 the Legislature enacted RCW 26.18.190, dealing with workers' compensation disability payments and social security disability payments which are made directly to the child. Section 190 provides that such disability payments "shall be treated for all purposes as if the disabled person paid the compensation toward satisfaction of the disabled person's child support obligation." RCW 26.180.190. This section applies to the payments to James's children.

In 1990 and 1991, the Legislature passed several amendments to the child support schedule. These bills more specifically defined "income". 1990 H.B. 2888, § 8; 1991 E.S.S.B. 5120, § 29. Governor Gardner vetoed both the 1990 and 1991 definitions of income because they were too restrictive. Gov. Gardner stated in his 1990 veto message [The definition of "income"] removes a wide array of items from the calculation of gross income, and shifts the burden of proof for deviations to custodial parents even in situations where the income is actually much higher than "gross income" as defined in this section. This section could substantially lower support for children, when no data exists to justify this change.

Veto Message, H.B. 2888, House Journal, 51st Leg., 1st Sp.Sess., at 1789 (Mar. 26, 1990). Governor Gardner again stated in his 1991 veto...