Marriage of Norton, In re

Decision Date24 September 1976
Docket NumberNo. 2456,2456
Citation71 Cal.App.3d 537,139 Cal.Rptr. 728
PartiesIn re the Marriage of Betty J. and Charles V. NORTON. Betty J. NORTON, Appellant, v. Charles V. NORTON, Respondent. Civ.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION

GARGANO, Associate Justice.

Appellant, Betty J. Norton, and respondent, Charles V. Norton, were married on May 22, 1954, in Dallas, Texas. There were four children of the marriage: Valerie Stephen, Vicki and Max. The parties separated on October 27, 1972; at that time Valerie was 17 years old, Stephen was 15 years old, Vicki was 14 years old, and Max was 5 years old.

In December of the same year, appellant petitioned the Superior Court of Fresno County for a dissolution of the marriage and for a division of the community property; she also prayed for the custody of the children, for child and spousal support, and for attorney's fees and costs.

On April 8, 1974, an interlocutory judgment was entered dissolving the marriage and dividing the community property of the parties; respondent was ordered to assume all of the community obligations. The court also awarded appellant spousal support and the custody of the two minor children, Stephen and Max; the oldest child, Valerie, has turned 18, and the daughter, Vicki, had married and left home. The court fixed the spousal support at $70 a month and the child support at $125 a month for each child; it then ordered that a rehearing on the issues of spousal and child support be held on May 17, 1974.

At the rehearing, appellant testified that she was having a difficult time in 'making ends meet' on the support payments she had been receiving before and after the interlocutory judgment was entered. Appellant stated that often before she received a support payment there was hardly any food in the house and that due to the heavy indebtedness, her brother took possession of the family home; appellant was paying her brother $125 a month as rent. She also stated that she had been unable to find permenent employment and had been working as a babysitter earning about $80 a month; however, the babysitting job was to terminate within a few days, and appellant said that commencing in June 1974 she was going to work in the packing houses during the summer season. It is undisputed that appellant, who was 41 years old, had very little work experience; she had not finished school and had been a homemaker during most of her marriage.

Respondent testified that he was employed as a bus driver for the Greyhound Bus Company; he admitted that he had a substantial earning capacity when he took advantage of the overtime available during the summer season. He said that during 1973 he was hospitalized several months with infectious hepatitis and that due to the lingering side-effects of the illness, it was doubtful that he would be working overtime during the 1974 summer season. Respondent reported that his gross income for the first 4 months of 1974 was $5,188.04 and that his income over that period was indicative of what his gross income would be for the year. Respondent related that he was living with a woman in Oakland and that his share of the monthly rental was $135; he said he spent between $80 and $90 a month on food and that he had purchased a new compact automobile on credit and was making payments on the car. Respondent, who had assumed all of the community obligations, stated that he was having difficulty meeting those obligations.

On June 11, 1974, the trial judge entered an order modifying the preexisting order relating to child custody, child support and spousal support. In accordance with the stipulation of the parties, the judge awarded custody of the eldest son, Stephen, to respondent; he terminated the child support for Stephen, but ordered respondent to continue paying appellant the sum of $125 a month for the child, Max. In addition, the court awarded appellant $80 a month for a period of 6 months and, without reserving jurisdiction over the issue, ordered the spousal support payments to terminate at the end of the 6-month period.

Appellant has appealed solely from that part of the court's order pertaining to the issue of spousal support. She asserts that the court abused its discretion in fixing the spousal support at only $80 a month and in limiting the monthly payments to a period of 6 months. She also asserts that the court abused its discretion in terminating spousal support at the end of six months without reserving jurisdiction to make further modifications at that time if necessary. (See Civ.Code, § 4801, subd. (d).)

In making an award of spousal support, the trial court has broad discretion; the court may consider such factors as the need for...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT