Marriage of Quint, Matter of

• Decision Date: 08 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 72441,72441
• Citation: 907 P.2d 818,258 Kan. 666
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Kim Rene (Quint) PFEIFER, Appellee, and Carl A. QUINT, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 818

907 P.2d 818

258 Kan. 666

In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Kim Rene (Quint) PFEIFER, Appellee and Carl A. QUINT, Appellant.

No. 72441.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 8, 1995.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. As such, this court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of review.

2. Maintenance payments automatically cease upon the payee's remarriage when the judgment awarding maintenance so provides, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary and subject to the payee showing the alleged remarriage is void.

John T. Bird, of Glassman, Bird & Braun, Hays, was on the brief, for appellant.

Paula D. Hofaker, of Jones & Weller, P.A., Hill City, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.

ABBOTT, Justice:

The issue before us is whether court-ordered spousal maintenance automatically ceases upon the recipient spouse's remarriage.

The Quints were divorced in June 1991. Mr. Quint was ordered to pay spousal maintenance in the amount of $125 per month for a period of 30 months, "so long as the petitioner [did] not remarry or cohabitate with a member of the opposite sex." On December 31, 1991, the petitioner remarried and became Mrs. Pfeifer.

Quint filed a completed, but uncertified, copy of Pfeifer's marriage license with the trial court that granted the divorce. No court action was requested or taken as a result of the remarriage or the filing of the executed marriage license. Quint did not file a motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. Quint did not pay any maintenance to Pfeifer after her remarriage, contending her remarriage had automatically terminated his maintenance obligation. At this time, Pfeifer did not file a motion to compel Quint to pay spousal maintenance.

On June 21, 1994, some 2 1/2 years after her remarriage, Pfeifer obtained a garnishment to recover unpaid spousal maintenance. Quint filed a motion to set aside the garnishment, contending that his spousal maintenance obligation had automatically terminated upon his ex-wife's remarriage. Pfeifer asserted that the maintenance obligation had not terminated because Quint did not file a motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance upon her remarriage.

The district court found Quint's spousal maintenance obligation automatically terminated upon Pfeifer's remarriage on December 31, 1991. Thus, the district court held that all spousal maintenance payments due after Pfeifer's December 1991 remarriage were void.

Pfeifer appealed and, relying on Herzmark v. Herzmark, 199 Kan. 48, 427 P.2d 465 (1967), (a 4 to 3 decision) the Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion filed April 21, 1995, and remanded the case to the district court. In Herzmark, the divorce decree stated the maintenance would continue "until the further order of the court." 199 Kan. at 49, 427 P.2d 465. Upon the payee's remarriage, Herzmark stated that this occurrence established a prima facie case for termination of maintenance. However, under Herzmark, the maintenance obligation did not terminate automatically upon the payee's remarriage. If it had, the court reasoned, then the court would not have an opportunity to inquire into the validity of the remarriage. The Court of Appeals asserted that neither the district court nor the payor could escape the Herzmark rule simply by including a statement in the journal entry which states that maintenance terminates upon the payee's remarriage. According to the Court of Appeals, Quint should have filed a motion to terminate or modify maintenance upon Pfeifer's remarriage. Since he did not, the Court of Appeals found that all of Quint's maintenance payments were due and owing.

K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(2) allows a district court to include conditions for the termination of maintenance in a divorce decree. The decree at issue specifically states that Pfeifer's remarriage is a condition for termination of maintenance. The question we must answer is whether maintenance automatically terminates uponthe occurrence of this condition. To answer this question, we must interpret K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(2) and the divorce decree. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. As such, this court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of review. Foulk v. Colonial Terrace, 20 Kan.App.2d 277, Syl. p 1, 887 P.2d 140 (1994).

Pfeifer contends that the automatic termination of a payor's maintenance obligation upon the payee's remarriage is improper for two reasons. First, she contends that the remarriage may be invalid. Relying on Johnston v. Johnston, 3 Kan.App.2d 208, 592 P.2d 132 (1979), Pfeifer points out that a marriage license alone is not enough to prove that a payee is validly remarried. The payor's maintenance obligation is not necessarily terminated upon the payee's apparent remarriage. Thus, the payor should be required to bring a motion and prove the payee is validly remarried. In response to this motion, the payee should have an opportunity to offer a defense, such as the invalidity of the marriage or the existence of special circumstances, before the maintenance is terminated. Pfeifer contends this opportunity for a defense would not exist if the payor's maintenance obligation automatically terminated upon the payee's remarriage.

In Johnston v. Johnston, 3 Kan.App.2d at 209, 592 P.2d 132, the divorce decree ordered the payor to pay maintenance to the payee "continuing until such time as [the payee] remarries. In case [the payee] remarries prior to the time these alimony payments commence, she will not be entitled to receive any of the alimony award." Subsequently, the payee remarried in Colorado. The payor did not make any maintenance payments because the payee had remarried before the first maintenance payment became due. 3 Kan.App.2d at 210, 592 P.2d 132. Later, the Colorado court declared the payee's remarriage invalid due to the payee's mental incapacity to enter into a marriage. 3 Kan.App.2d at 209, 592 P.2d 132. Consequently, the payee commenced a contempt proceeding against the payor to enforce payment of the maintenance obligation. The payee contended that her remarriage did not terminate the payor's maintenance obligation under the divorce decree because in Kansas a marriage by a mentally incompetent person is void. As a void marriage, it never existed and therefore never terminated the payor's maintenance obligation. On the other hand, the payor contended that Colorado, the state which found the payee's remarriage to be invalid due to her mental incompetence, considered a marriage by a mentally incompetent person only to be voidable, not void. 3 Kan.App.2d at 210, 592 P.2d 132. The Court of Appeals held that the Colorado marriage was void and therefore never existed. Thus, the payee's remarriage never occurred, and the payor's maintenance obligation was never terminated. 3 Kan.App.2d at 211, 592 P.2d 132. Pfeifer points to Johnston in order to demonstrate the importance of allowing a payee the opportunity to present a defense before the maintenance is automatically terminated upon the payee's remarriage.

Quint does not attempt to distinguish Johnston. Rather, he relies on Johnston for two of his own arguments. First, Quint points to Johnston 's distinction between void and voidable remarriages. The Court of Appeals held that a void marriage did not terminate the payor's maintenance obligation, yet if "the marriage was merely voidable, ... the [maintenance] payments could be terminated." 3 Kan.App.2d at 211, 592 P.2d 132. Relying on this language, Quint contends that the payee's remarriage, even if voidable, automatically terminates the payor's maintenance obligation, unless the payee can prove her remarriage is void.

Next, Quint asserts the payee's use of contempt proceedings in Johnston illustrates that a payee will still have an opportunity to present a defense if maintenance is automatically terminated upon the payee's remarriage. Once the payee remarries and the maintenance automatically terminates, the payee can bring a motion to reinstate maintenance and present his or her defense in this manner. Thus, according to Quint, the automatic termination of maintenance upon the payee's remarriage does not deprive the payee of the opportunity to present a defense. It simply forces the payee to initiate the court action should there be a legitimate question as to the validity of the payee's remarriage.

Furthermore, Quint points to K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(2), which states:

"The decree may award to either party an allowance for future support denominated as maintenance, in an amount the court finds to be fair, just and equitable under all of the circumstances. The decree may make the future payments modifiable or terminable under circumstances prescribed in the decree. The court may make a modification of maintenance retroactive to a date at least one month after the date that the motion to modify was filed with the court. In any event, the court may not award maintenance for a period of time in excess of 121 months. If the original court decree reserves the power of the court to hear subsequent motions for reinstatement of maintenance and such a motion is filed prior to the expiration of the stated period of time for maintenance payments, the court shall have jurisdiction to hear a motion by the recipient of the maintenance to reinstate the maintenance payments. Upon motion and hearing, the court may reinstate the payments in whole or in part for a period of time, conditioned upon any modifying or terminating circumstances prescribed by the court, but the reinstatement shall be limited to a period of time not exceeding 121 months. The recipient may file subsequent motions for reinstatement of maintenance prior to the expiration of subsequent periods of time for maintenance payments to be made, but no single period of reinstatement ordered by the court may exceed 121 months. Maintenance may be in a lump sum, in periodic payments, on a percentage of...