MARRIAGE OF WEBER
Decision Date | 27 May 2004 |
Citation | 91 P.3d 706,337 Or. 55 |
Parties | In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Larry WEBER, Petitioner on Review, and Marilyn Weber, Respondent on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
J. Michael Alexander, of Swanson, Lathen, Alexander & McCann, PC, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
Gary Zimmer, of Zimmer & Bunch, LLC, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs was Cecil Reniche-Smith.
Before, CARSON, Chief Justice, and GILLETTE, DURHAM, RIGGS, De MUNIZ, and BALMER, Justices.1
De MUNIZ, J.
The issue in this marriage dissolution case is whether, under ORS 107.135, a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's annual income is a substantial change in economic circumstance that permits the reconsideration of a payor spouse's support obligation. Husband, the payor in this case, is a physician. In the months preceding the parties' 1994 marriage dissolution, husband's income had declined significantly due to changes in the medical profession. The parties resolved their divorce by stipulated dissolution judgment. That judgment presumed that husband's reduced income level would continue indefinitely and calculated wife's spousal support based on that amount. Within three years of the parties' marriage dissolution, however, husband's income had returned to the level that husband and wife had enjoyed before husband's income began to decline. In 1999, wife moved to modify the award of spousal support based on husband's increased income, and the trial court granted that motion.
Husband appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Weber and Weber, 184 Or. App. 190, 56 P.3d 406 (2002). This court allowed husband's petition for review. We limit our review to questions of law, ORS 19.415(4) and, on review, we hold that the post-dissolution increase in husband's income is not a substantial change in economic circumstance under ORS 107.135 that permitted the reconsideration of husband's spousal support obligation. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.
We state the facts as they were presented in the Court of Appeals' opinion below:
184 Or.App. at 192-94, 56 P.3d 406.
The trial court granted wife's motion for increased support. In a written decision, the trial court reasoned that it was proper to increase support because an increase would permit wife to enjoy a standard of living not overly disproportionate to the parties' marital standard. In that regard, the trial court wrote:
"" 2 Id. at 194, 56 P.3d 406.
A majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.3 In its opinion, the majority acknowledged that, in Feves v. Feves, 198 Or. 151, 254 P.2d 694 (1953), this court had held that a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income ordinarily does not constitute changed circumstances warranting an attendant increase in spousal support. However, the Court of Appeals majority determined:
Id. Ultimately, the majority concluded that the trial court did not err in increasing wife's spousal support based on husband's increased post-dissolution income.
Instead of focusing on the modification statute, ORS 107.135, the parties have focused, as did the majority and the dissent in the Court of Appeals, exclusively on the application of this court's decision in Feves.4 Although we ultimately conclude that the Feves decision contributes to our understanding of ORS 107.135 and, therefore, is important to the resolution of this case, we consider it important to highlight the position that Feves and other decisions of this court occupy within the hierarchical order of family law. To the extent that the legislature...
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