Marriott In-Flite Services, Div. of Marriott Corp. v. Local 504, Air Transport Div., Transport Workers of America, AFL-CIO, IN-FLITE
| Decision Date | 24 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | A,IN-FLITE,D,No. 719,AFL-CI,719 |
| Citation | 557 F.2d 295 |
| Parties | 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2609, 81 Lab.Cas. P 13,250 MARRIOTTSERVICES, a Division of Marriott Corporation, Appellant, v. LOCAL 504, AIR TRANSPORT DIVISION, TRANSPORT WORKERS OF AMERICA,ppellee. ocket 76-7466. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Ivan H. Rich, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Andrew J. Wallace, Hicksville, N. Y. (Wallace & O'Haire, Hicksville, N. Y., of counsel), for appellee.
Before ANDERSON and MESKILL, Circuit Judges, and MARKEY, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. *
This case provides a graphic reminder of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition that the process of statutory construction cannot be reduced to "(t)he precision of a syllogism." 1
The case was begun in the Eastern District of New York by an employer seeking damages against a union for alleged unfair labor practices, as provided for in § 303(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). The sole question presented on this appeal is whether a union organized under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., is a "labor organization" subject to the secondary boycott provisions of NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). A literal reading of the cross references of the NLRA suggests that it is not, although the legislative history is clearly to the contrary. The district court held that the statute was clear on its face, and dismissed the complaint. 418 F.Supp. 609 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). We reverse.
This case has its origins in a labor dispute between KLM Royal Dutch Airlines ("KLM") and its employees who are represented by Local 504 of the Transport Workers of America ("Local 504"). The labor relations of KLM and Local 504 were, and are, governed by the RLA. 2 Prior to 1972, KLM prepared meals for its flights at its commissary at Kennedy Airport. During contract negotiations that year, KLM announced its intention to close the commissary and hire an independent contractor to prepare its meals. The bargaining reached an impasse, and Local 504 began a strike on October 27, 1972.
The National Mediation Board invoked the six-month "cooling off" period of the RLA, but the parties were unable to resolve their dispute. When the period ended in June, 1973, KLM dismissed all the commissary employees, and the strike resumed.
The sub-contractor chosen by KLM was Marriott In-Flite Services ("Marriott"). In addition to supplying meals for KLM flights, Marriott took over the KLM commissary. 3 The striking employees picketed there, allegedly preventing its use. Marriott then began this lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York, contending that Local 504's actions constituted illegal secondary picketing.
Before 1959, the NLRA did not ban secondary boycotts by RLA unions. The predecessor of § 8(b)(4)(B) then read:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9.
The National Labor Relations Board concluded that secondary activities by Railway Labor Act Unions were not covered under this section, because of the definitions of "employer," "employee" and "labor organization". See, e. g., International Bro. of Teamsters, 84 NLRB 360, 361 (1949).
"Labor organization" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), which reads as follows:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
"Employer" and "employee" are themselves defined in 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (3), as follows:
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time . . . .
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise . . . but shall not include . . . any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time . . . .
By tracing the cross-references of the NLRA, the basis for the exemption of RLA unions was clear. A railroad or airline was not an "employer" within the meaning of § 2(2), and RLA workers were not "employees" within the meaning of § 2(3). A union of RLA workers, therefore, was not a "labor organization" within § 2(5). Because the ban of § 8(b) applies only to "labor organizations," such a union was free to engage in secondary activity forbidden to an NLRA union. 4
When Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin amendments to the NLRA in 1959, it was aware of this exemption and sought to change it. Section 8(b)(4)(B) was amended to read as follows:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (b) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
(Emphasis added).
The parties agree, as the district court concluded, that the legislative intent to bring RLA unions within the secondary boycott ban by making the italicized changes is unequivocal. For example, the Senate Report on the bill states:
(3) Boycotts by railroad employees, agricultural workers, Government employees, and other groups now excluded from the secondary boycott ban of the Taft-Hartley Act. Under the definition section of the Taft-Hartley Act railroad employees, agricultural workers, and governmental employees are not employees within the meaning of the act. The Board has reached the conclusion that secondary boycotts by these exempt categories, and the inducement of such boycotts are not unfair labor practices. (See International Rice Milling, 84 N.L.R.B. 360, and Di Giorgio Wine, 87 N.L.R.B. No. 125.)
Secondary boycotts by these groups are just as much against the public interest as boycotts by anyone else.
The bill, S. 748, would extend the ban to these excluded categories by use of the words "any person" instead of the use of the words "employees of any employer" in section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii).
1959 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2384 (emphasis added).
Although the amendment appears on its face to carry out the Congressional intent, the definitions of "employee" and "employer," and hence "labor organization," were left unchanged. Thus, under a strict reading of the statute, RLA unions still were not within the Act. Literally interpreted, the statute makes it appear that Congress has created a right without a remedy. 5 While this statutory argument has a surface plausibility, we reject it.
The Landrum-Griffin amendments are hardly a model of clarity in statutory draftsmanship. The provision in dispute here is sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to its legislative history in any event. 6 However, assuming for the moment that the language is as clear as the district court and the appellee believe it to be, we would reach the same conclusion. There is no longer a "plain meaning rule" requiring a court to reach results completely at variance with the intent of the statute. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated in a celebrated passage:
It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.
Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48, 49 S.Ct. 52, 54, 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928). 7 This is as clear a case as any for looking beyond the words of a statute. In another case in which "(t)he contretemps arose through a cross-reference," Judge Friendly wrote:
Congress is free, within constitutional limitations, to legislate eccentrically if it should wish, but courts...
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