Marrs v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 13 March 1925 |
| Docket Number | (No. 3022.) |
| Citation | 270 S.W. 586 |
| Parties | MARRS, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al. v. MATTHEWS.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Hopkins County; Newman Phillips, Judge.
Suit by F. E. Matthews against S. M. N. Marrs, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and others. From an order overruling a motion to dissolve temporary writ of injunction, defendants appeal. Reversed and rendered.
Dan Moody, Atty. Gen., and Weaver Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.
Ramey & Davidson and Allen & Sellers, all of Sulphur Springs, for appellee.
This appeal is from an order overruling a motion to dissolve a temporary writ of injunction. In October, 1924, the appellee filed his original petition in the court below, alleging, in substance, as follows: He was at the time the holder of a permanent teacher's certificate issued by the state superintendent of public instruction and duly registered as required by law. By virtue of that certificate he was authorized to teach in the public schools of the state, and had a contract to teach in such schools in Hopkins county, Tex. The appellant Marrs, as state superintendent, was threatening and attempting to cancel that certificate on the ground that the appellee had participated in a fraudulent scheme for issuing teachers' certificates at examinations conducted in Hopkins county. Marrs was claiming to act under the provisions of article 2814 of the Revised Civil Statutes, which authorizes the state superintendent to cancel the certificate of any person who is unworthy to instruct the youth of the state. The validity of that statute is attacked upon the ground that the language used in describing the offense for which a certificate may be canceled is too vague and indefinite, and, further, because the statute attempts to confer judicial powers upon an executive department of the state government. The prayer of the petition was that a temporary injunction issue restraining Marrs, as state superintendent, and B. F. Vanderslice, county superintendent, from canceling the certificate, or in any manner interfering with the plaintiff's right to teach in the public schools.
Upon the presentation of that petition the trial court issued a temporary writ granting the relief prayed for.
Appellants Marrs and Vanderslice answered with a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and alleged that Marrs was not threatening to cancel the certificate until after an opportunity for hearing had been granted to the appellee as provided for in article 2814 of the Revised Civil Statutes; that some time before appellee's petition was filed, Marrs had notified appellee to appear before him as state superintendent of public instruction and show cause why the certificate theretofore issued should not be canceled on account of appellee having participated in fraudulent methods for obtaining teachers' certificates at examinations in Hopkins county. Before the date fixed for that hearing, the appellee through his attorney filed his application for this writ of injunction. All the pleadings involved were sworn to in legal form.
At a preliminary hearing upon the pleadings alone, the court overruled the motion to dissolve and continued the restraining order theretofore issued. No legal conclusions are found in the record, but we gather from the briefs and oral argument of counsel that the judgment of the trial court was based upon the conclusion that the statute was invalid for the reasons stated in the original petition and brief of counsel for appellee.
In the oral argument made in this court, it is not denied that Marrs, as state superintendent, is proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 2814 of the Revised Civil Statutes, which is as follows:
"Any certificate may be canceled for cause by the authority issuing it; and the state superintendent of public instruction shall have power to cancel any certificate upon satisfactory evidence that the holder thereof is conducting his school in violation of the laws of the state or is a person unworthy to instruct the youth of this state; provided, if any teacher holding a certificate to teach in the public schools of this state, shall enter into a written contract with any board of trustees to teach in any public school of this state, and shall, after making such contract and without the consent of the trustees, abandon said contract, except for good cause, such abandonment shall be considered sufficient grounds for the cancellation of said teacher's certificate, and the same may be canceled upon the complaint of said trustees, or either of them; provided, that before any certificate shall be canceled, the holder thereof shall be notified, and shall have an opportunity to be heard, and he shall have the right of appeal from such decision to the state superintendent, and the state board of education; provided, that when the state superintendent shall have canceled the certificate, the appeal shall be to the state board of education; and provided further that the state superintendent shall have the authority, upon satisfactory evidence being presented, to reinstate any teacher's certificate theretofore canceled under the provisions of this article, and upon a refusal of the superintendent to so reinstate such certificate, the applicant shall have the right of appeal to the state board of education."
This statute mentions more than one cause for which a teacher's certificate may be canceled, but it is conceded that in this instance the state superintendent is acting under that portion of the article which authorizes the cancellation of a certificate because the holder "is a person unworthy to instruct the youth of this state." It is not claimed that the offense with which the appellee was charged by Marrs is not one which might evidence unworthiness to teach in the public schools as the term "unworthy" is used in the statute. It is conceded that if the language above quoted is sufficiently definite in stating what shall constitute a disqualification for holding a teacher's certificate, the court erred in refusing to dissolve the temporary writ theretofore issued. On the other hand, if the language is not sufficiently definite, the court correctly overruled the motion to dissolve, notwithstanding the particular offense presented against the appellee might evidence an unworthiness to hold a teacher's certificate.
The public free school system in this state is largely the creature of the statute. While the Constitution directs its establishment, and makes provision for its support and maintenance, the organic details of the system are left mainly to the Legislature. To that body is committed the power to provide where public schools shall be located, how they shall be controlled and managed, the selection of subjects that shall be taught in them, and to fix the qualifications of those who may teach. While any citizen may have the inherent right to teach a private school for the instruction of the young, no one may claim an inherent right to teach in the public free schools. Since the state supplies...
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..."The word 'unworthiness,' in the context here, signifies a lack of those ethical qualities that befit the vocation. Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W. 586 (Tex.Civ.App.1925); cf. Woodstown National Bank & Trust Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J.Eq. 62, 40 A.2d 222 (Ch.1944); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 5......
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...The word 'unworthiness,' in the context here, signifies a lack of those ethical qualities that befit the vocation. Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W. 586 (Tex.Civ.App.1925); cf. Woodstown National Bank & Trust Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J.Eq. 62, 40 A.2d 222 (Ch.1944); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59......
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Division of New Jersey Real Estate Commission, State Dept. of Banking and Insurance v. Ponsi
...'unworthiness' to signify in its statutory context 'a lack of those ethical qualities that befit the vocation.' See, also, Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W. 586, 588 (Tex.Ct. of Civ.App.1925). Noticeable is the circumstance that the appellant in the Goodley case also occupied the role of presiden......
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Texas Register, Volume 48, Number 09, March 3, 2023
...or competency that may be worthy of inclusion because, as the Texas Court of Civil Appeals for Texarkana concluded in Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W. 586, at 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1925, writ Different minds might reach different conclusions as to what qualities of character should rende......
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Texas Register, Volume 41, Number 27, July 1, 2016
...and standards of conduct of pub- lic school educators." As a Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled in the seminal case of Marrs v. Matthews, 270 S.W. 586 (1925), "unworthy to instruct" "means the lack of 'worth'; the absence of those moral and mental qualities which are required to enable one ......