Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. Los
| Decision Date | 07 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | 2:14-cv-1728 |
| Parties | MARS AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. C. L., by and through his parent and natural guardian, K.B., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Pending before the Court is APPELLEES' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS, filed by C.L., by and through his parent and natural guardian, K.B. (referred to herein solely as "K.B."). ECF No. 33. K.B. has also filed a brief in support of her motion. ECF No. 35. Also attached are the affidavits of Attorney John P. Corcoran, Jr., and his office manager, Daryl D. Scott; Attorney Corcoran's time sheets related to the administrative proceedings and this action; a copy of a "stay-put" motion filed by Attorney Corcoran prior to the expedited due process hearing; the curriculum vitae of Samuel K. Schachner, Ph.D., LPC; and a billing invoice from Dr. Schachner's office. ECF Nos. 35-1, 35-2. Mars Area School District has filed a RESPONSE TO APPELLEES' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. ECF No. 39. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for disposition.
The parties are familiar with the background of this case, so the Court will not recount it at length. Put briefly, the School District expelled C.L., at the time a seven-year old first grader at Mars Primary School, following a series of alleged disciplinary infractions in September and October 2014. Prior to doing so, the School District conducted a manifestation determination hearing, as required by the IDEA, after which it concluded that the conduct for which C.L. was to be expelled was not a manifestation of his disability. K.B. disagreed with the School District's manifestation determination, so she requested an expedited due process hearing to address whether the District's decision was correct. Following that hearing, the Hearing Officer concluded that the conduct for which C.L. was expelled was a manifestation of his disability. As a result, the Hearing Officer ordered the School District to, inter alia, reinstate C.L. and develop an appropriate IEP for him. The School District, however, was unable to implement the Hearing Officer's order because sometime after it was issued, K.B. enrolled C.L. in a private school.
Nevertheless, the School District appealed the Hearing Officer's decision to this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), seeking to have it reversed. After the parties filed competing dispositive motions, the Court ordered the School District to show cause why its appeal was not rendered moot by C.L.'s transfer. After additional briefing, the Court concluded - over the protestations of both parties - that this case was indeed moot "since meaningful relief could no longer be granted to the School District[.]"1 ECF No. 32 at 8. Therefore, by Memorandum Opinion and Order of Court dated October 16, 2015, the Court dismissed the appeal and vacated the Hearing Officer's decision. At the same time, the Court retained jurisdiction so as to allow K.B. to petition for attorney's fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) "for work done during the due process hearing."2 ECF No. 32 at 14.
Under the IDEA, "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability."3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). "Although the statute expressly refers to a district court's discretion, it is well settled that a prevailing plaintiff should recover an award of attorney's fees absent special circumstances." Cnty. of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). Still, "[t]he party seeking attorney's fees has the burden to prove that its request for attorney's fees is reasonable." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). To that end, the party seeking fees must come forward with evidence "supporting the hours worked and rates claimed." Id. The opposing party then "has the burden to challenge the reasonableness of the requested fee." McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 459 (3d Cir. 2009). To do so, the opposing party must "generally identify the type of work being challenged and" then "specifically state" its "grounds for contending that the hours claimed in that area are unreasonable." Bell v. United Princeton Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 720 (3d Cir. 1989). That being so, the district court "may not reduce an award sua sponte; rather, it can only do so in response to specific objections made by the opposing party." Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Nov. 10, 2005). "[O]nce the opposing party has made a specific objection, the burden is on the prevailing party to justify the size of its request." Id.
The School District argues, initially, that K.B. is not entitled to recover any fees or costs because she was not the prevailing party at the expedited due process hearing. Withoutconceding that K.B. has established prevailing party status, the School District goes on to raise a few objections to certain aspects of K.B.'s fee petition. The Court will address these issues seriatim.
"[N]o fee award is permissible until the plaintiff has crossed the 'statutory threshold' of prevailing party status." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). A party crosses that threshold "' if [it] succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit.'" P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 855 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Apr. 27, 2006), as amended (May 16, 2006) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433) (emphasis in original). "'[A]t a minimum, . . . the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Garland, 489 U.S. at 792). That occurs only when the resolution "'modif[ies] the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.'" Id. (quoting Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1999)). To make that showing, "[t]he plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought . . . or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (citations omitted); see also El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 591 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 2009) ().
Moreover, "the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114. "The relevant inquiry is whether plaintiffs' success was significant." Clementon, 442 F.3d at 856. "Regardless of how substantial their success, ifplaintiffs succeeded on a significant issue they are entitled to prevailing party status." Id. "'[T]he degree of the plaintiff's overall success[,]" does, however, "bear on the propriety of fees awarded[.]" Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114.
In this case, it certainly looks, at first blush at least, like K.B. was the prevailing party. The critical issue before the Hearing Officer was whether "the School District accurately and appropriately determine[d] that [the] behaviors in which [C.L.] engaged on October 27, 2014 were not a manifestation of [C.L.'s] disability?" ECF No. 1-2 at 3. K.B. prevailed on that issue, inasmuch as the Hearing Officer determined "[t]hat the District's manifestation determination conclusion was erroneous . . . and that the expulsion proceedings were designed to achieve a change of [C.L.'s] educational placement prior to an IDEA eligibility determination that would give Parents the right to object to, and would likely foreclose, immediate transfer to that alternative educational setting that the District believes will better serve [C.L.'s] needs." Id. at 2. The relief ordered - reinstatement to the educational setting from which C.L. was expelled, development of an appropriate IEP, etc. - gave K.B. some (if not all) of what she initially sought in filing the due process complaint and changed the legal relationship between the parties. As a result of the decision, the School District could not impose a unilateral change in C.L.'s educational setting. To be sure, as the School District points out, the Hearing Officer did deny and dismiss "any claims not specifically addressed by [her] decision[.]" (It is not clear what those claims were.) But K.B's failure to obtain relief on those ancillary claims (whatever they were) does not detract from the fact that K.B. prevailed on the most significant issue that the Hearing Officer considered: whether the School District's manifestation determination decision was correct.
Upon closer inspection, however, things are not quite so simple. The Court must alsoconsider what effect, if any, K.B.'s decision to withdraw C.L. from the School District and enroll him in a private school had on her status as the prevailing party. K.B. has not addressed this issue, but, as the School District views it, K.B.'s decision to transfer C.L. effectively deprived K.B. of her right to collect attorney's fees.
This "is a question of some difficulty," which the Supreme Court has not resolved. Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 483 (1990). Difficult though it may be, every court that has wrestled with the question has come down against the School District's argument. See, e.g., Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett, 767 F.3d 533, 552 (6th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); Kirk v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 644 F.3d 134, 139 n.4 (2d Cir. 2011) (same). As former Supreme Justice Souter, sitting by designation with the First Circuit Court...
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