Mars v. Mars
| Decision Date | 02 August 2001 |
| Citation | 286 A.D.2d 201,729 N.Y.S.2d 20 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
| Parties | ARNOLD J. MARS, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>ANDREA R. MARS, Respondent. |
The parties were married on November 19, 1992, when plaintiff was 43 and defendant was 36. The marriage produced two children: Jonah, born July 24, 1993, and Lily, born July 22, 1995. The parties separated in August 1997, and this action, in which each party sought a judgment of divorce, was commenced the same month.
Prior to the marriage, the parties entered into a September 1992 "Agreement in Contemplation of Marriage," which provides, inter alia, as pertinent to this appeal that the "only monies, assets or things of value" defendant would receive from plaintiff would be a payment comprising $30,000 for the first year of marriage and an additional $10,000 for each subsequent year or part of a year thereafter.
The agreement also required plaintiff to deposit the monies to be paid to defendant (i.e., the $30,000 plus $10,000 for each additional year of marriage) into a savings bank account, payable on plaintiff's death to defendant and requiring both parties' signatures for withdrawals prior to his death, according to the following schedule: (1) $30,000 within one month after the first day of the marriage; and (2) $10,000 per year thereafter for the duration of the marriage.
The parties dispute whether plaintiff has made the payments (totaling $70,000, based on the duration of the marriage) required by the pre-nuptial agreement. However, since plaintiff failed to document his alleged payments and the issue was purely one of credibility, there is no occasion to second guess the trial court's finding that plaintiff "has not proven that any of that amount has been satisfied" or its award to defendant of "the full amount, pursuant to the formula."
Also, since defendant is, by her own account, a full-time mother who has no plans to return to the workforce, and Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (the Child Support Standards Act [CSSA]) authorizes an award for child care only where the custodial parent is working or receiving work-related education or training (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [4]) or seeking work (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [6]), the award for child care expenses, apparently for a full-time nanny, is vacated.
The court also vested all decision-making authority in defendant based on its view that plaintiff "is abusive, controlling and has no decent respect" for defendant's opinions or judgment. While this statement appears to have support in the record, the same could be said of defendant's attitude toward plaintiff. As attested to by the court-appointed psychiatric expert and the children's guardian ad litem, both parties are "impulsive," "have poor judgment," and "each is so centered on obtaining goals or advantages for himself or herself, that all their supposed concern for the best interests of their children may disappear when it conflicts with their own needs."
It is undisputed that each parent takes an active interest in the children's lives and that it is in the children's best interest that both parents remain involved with them, notwithstanding the parents' present intolerance for each other. Under these circumstances, the trial court should not have vested all decision-making authority in one parent in a situation where it appears that neither parent...
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