Marsal v. East Carolina Univ.
| Decision Date | 08 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:09-CV-126-FL,4:09-CV-126-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | DR. ELIZABETH GAIL MARSAL, Plaintiff, v. EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY, a constituent institution of the University of North Carolina; DR. JAMES F. ANDERSON, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MADHAVA BODAPATI, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MARGIE GALLAGHER, in her individual and official capacity; DR. MARILYN SHEERER, in her individual and official capacity; and DR. STEVE BALLARD, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants. |
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff's motions for attorney's fees and costs and for declaratory judgment or to alter or amend the judgment (DE # 147,155). Defendants responded in opposition as to both motions, and plaintiff filed reply in support of the motion for attorney's fees. In this posture, the issues raised now are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motions are granted in part and denied in part.
On July 22, 2009, plaintiff commenced this action by filing complaint with this court. Plaintiff allegied that defendant East Carolina University ("ECU") discriminated against her onaccount of her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., when it denied her tenure and terminated her employment. Plaintiff further alleged that ECU violated the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq., by requiring her to work while on leave and basing its tenure decision in part on the quality of such work. Finally, plaintiff alleged that various ECU employees involved in the decision not to award her tenure, specifically defendants James F. Anderson ("Anderson"), Madhava Bodapati ("Bodapati"), Margie Gallagher ("Gallagher"), Marilyn Sheerer ("Sheerer"), and Steven Ballard ("Ballard"), deprived her of her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On October 22, 2009, defendants answered the complaint, denying liability. Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on December 15, 2010, as to all claims. The court granted defendants' motion as to plaintiff's § 1983 claims against individual defendants Bodapati, Gallagher, Sheerer, and Ballard. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the Title VII claims against ECU, denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's § 1983 claim against defendant Anderson, and ordered supplemental briefing on the FMLA claims against ECU. Defendants filed supplemental briefs, in which defendant ECU stated that it no longer believed it was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA claim based on the undisputed facts before the court. As such, the court denied as moot defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's FMLA claim.
Trial commenced in this matter on January 24, 2012. On February 1, 2012, the jury returned verdict finding that: (1) sex was a motivating factor in defendant ECU's decision to deny plaintiff tenure and promotion; (2) defendant ECU proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it wouldhave denied plaintiff tenure and promotion even if it had not considered sex; (3) Dr. Anderson did not intentionally discriminate against plaintiff because of her sex when he decided not to recommend her for tenure an promotion; (4) the exercise of plaintiff's rights under the FMLA was a motivating factor in defendant ECU's decision to deny her tenure and promotion; and (6) that defendant ECU would have denied plaintiff tenure and promotion even if it had not considered her exercise of her FMLA rights. Based on these determinations, the jury awarded plaintiff no damages.
On February 15, 2012, plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney's fees and costs. On March 16, 2012, before the motion for attorney's fees was ripe, plaintiff filed motion for declaratory relief or to alter the judgment.
Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees exceeding $75,000.00 for work done on this case, which spanned approximately four years and included a week long trial. Plaintiff's desired figure represents a twenty-five (25) percent decrease from the total amount of costs incurred, in recognition of the fact that plaintiff only achieved a favorable verdict as to some of her claims, and that the jury found defendants would have made the same decisions regardless of defendant ECU's consideration of plaintiff's sex or exercise of her FMLA rights. Defendants argue that the court should exercise its discretion not to allow the attorney's fees, and if the fees are awarded, that the hourly rate for plaintiff's counsel be reduced significantly.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
As both parties acknowledge, the Fourth Circuit has addressed the issue of attorney's fees under this subsection of Title VII in Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center. Inc., 88 F.3d 1332 (4th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit set forth various standards applicable to fee requests in mixed motive cases such as this one under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
By definition, an illicit factor will have played some role in cases subject to § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)... But within that category of cases, there are large differences. Some mixed-motive cases will evidence a widespread or intolerable animus on the part of a defendant; others will illustrate primary the plaintiff's unacceptable conduct which, by definition, will have justified the action taken by the defendant. The statute allows the district court to distinguish among cases that in reality are quite different.
Id. at 336. Sheppard counsels that the court can consider the relationship between the fees and the degree of plaintiff's success, specifically based on the factors as outlined by the Supreme Court in in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1992). Those factors, cited by the Fourth Circuit in Mercer v. Duke University, 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005), are as follows: the extent of relief, the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served by the litigation. Mercer. 401 F.3d at 204 (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 122).
As the parties acknowledge, the extent of plaintiff's relief in the instant dispute was limited. Plaintiff prevailed on her Title VII and FMLA claims to the extent the jury found that sex andplaintiff's exercise of her FMLA rights were motivating factors in defendant ECU's decision not to grant plaintiff tenure. However, the jury found that defendant ECU proved the same decision would have been made regardless of the consideration of the impermissible factors. Thus plaintiff enjoyed a limited victory establishing ECU's violation of Title VII and the FMLA, but did not achieve this victory as to defendant Anderson, and was not awarded any damages. As Sheppard counsels, however, lack of success as measured simply by the amount of damages a plaintiff is awarded is not the appropriate standard. 88 F.3d at 1336. Instead, courts, "in appropriate cases," should consider the reasons why injunctive relief was or was not granted, and the extent and nature of any declaratory relief. Id.
As set forth below, declaratory relief in this case is granted to the limited extent plaintiff has requested it. Defendants have lodged no argument that the same should not be granted. However, the court's entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff does not weight heavily in favor of an award of attorney's fees. The declaratory judgment does little more than ratify the jury's verdict. See Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 502, 503 (D. Md. 1996) (). Additionally, though requested by plaintiff in the complaint, no injunctive relief was granted in this case.1
The next Farrar factor is the "significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed." Mercer. 401 F.3d at 206 (citation omitted). Neither party has offered significant argument on this particular issue. While plaintiff's limited success is not to be discounted, nor does the court demeanthe significance of the jury's finding that defendant ECU violated Title VII and the FMLA, the legal issue presented here was not novel, nor did it "[give] rise to a first-of-its-kind liability determination." Mercer, 401 F.3d at 207. To the contrary, in its order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motions for summary judgment, the court noted the body of law in this circuit considering judicial review of professorial decisions. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Univ. of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 313 (4th Cir. 1980). While every case is different, the instant one was not novel, and as such, this factor does not weigh in favor of attorney's fees.
The final factor to be considered under Farrar is whether the litigation served a public purpose, as opposed to simply vindicating the plaintiff's individual rights. When describing this factor in Sheppard, the Fourth Circuit cited Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Farrar, See 506 U.S. at...
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