Marsalis v. State
| Decision Date | 18 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47438 |
| Citation | 458 P.3d 203,166 Idaho 334 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jeffrey MARSALIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
Silvey Law Office, Ltd., Boise, for Appellant. Greg S. Silvey argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Jeffrey Marsalis appeals the Blaine County district court's decision summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 rape conviction. In his petition, Marsalis alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge the testimony of the State's expert witness regarding his and the victim's blood alcohol levels, (2) present favorable eyewitness testimony at trial, and (3) properly advise him of his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The district court summarily dismissed each of Marsalis's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. The State petitioned this Court for review, which we granted. For the reasons stated below, we reverse in part and affirm in part the district court's decision.
On October 8, 2005, Marsalis and K.G., who were acquainted through their work in Sun Valley, went out for drinks at a bar in Ketchum. Testimony from the bartender established that Marsalis ordered a total of twenty beers and four shots for the two of them, and that K.G. also ordered a few beers for herself. All of the drinks were placed on Marsalis's tab.
Following several hours of drinking, Marsalis and K.G. took a shuttle back to Marsalis's condominium in Sun Valley. The driver of the shuttle and a passenger both testified that K.G. was "drunk," almost passed out during the ride back to Sun Valley, and had difficulty walking while entering and exiting the shuttle. K.G. testified that she had no recollection of when she left the bar or how she ended up at Marsalis's residence. Upon waking later that morning, K.G. explained that she did not know where she was, but saw that Marsalis was in the bed next to her. K.G. also testified that she vomited several times that morning, experienced pain when urinating, and felt "bruised" in her vaginal area.
Later that night, K.G. reported to the Ketchum Police Department that she thought Marsalis had raped her. She also reported observing a grainy substance on the bottom of one of her shot glasses while at the bar with Marsalis. K.G. went to the hospital to have samples of her blood and urine taken. Marsalis was interviewed by the police and denied having sexual relations with K.G., but was nevertheless arrested for rape. The samples ultimately showed the presence of Marsalis's semen. However, later testing failed to show the presence of any foreign substances that could have incapacitated K.G., besides the alcohol she had consumed.
On April 21, 2006, a grand jury indicted Marsalis on one count of rape. The indictment alleged that the rape occurred:
While released on bail, Marsalis was convicted in Pennsylvania of a separate and unrelated sex offense. While he was housed in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the Blaine County prosecutor filed a request for temporary custody of Marsalis pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Marsalis was returned to Idaho on August 18, 2008, and appeared in court the next day.
After a few continuances and a change of venue to Ada County, the matter proceeded to trial on April 20, 2009. Marsalis's defense at trial was that K.G. consented to sexual intercourse with him on the night in question, but could not remember it because she had blacked out. A jury ultimately convicted Marsalis of rape. The district court sentenced Marsalis to an indeterminate life sentence with a mandatory minimum of fifteen years to run consecutive to the Pennsylvania sentence. Marsalis directly appealed his conviction, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See State v. Marsalis , 151 Idaho 872, 264 P.3d 979 (Ct. App. 2011).
Marsalis filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Marsalis alleged that he was denied the right to testify1 and the right to the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In his first sub-claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Marsalis alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the testimony of Dr. Marc LeBeau, the State's expert witness, regarding his and K.G.'s blood alcohol levels. In his second sub-claim, Marsalis alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a favorable eyewitness at trial. In his final sub-claim, Marsalis alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his speedy trial rights under the IAD.
The State moved for summary dismissal of Marsalis's petition, which the district court granted. Marsalis appealed the district court's summary dismissal of his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Marsalis's second sub-claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, i. e ., that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a favorable eyewitness. However, it reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of Marsalis's two remaining sub-claims, i.e., that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Dr. LeBeau's testimony and for failing to inform Marsalis of his speedy trial rights under the IAD. The State timely petitioned this Court for review, which we granted.
"When reviewing a case on petition for review from the Court of Appeals this Court gives due consideration to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of the trial court." State v. Chernobieff , 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (quoting State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839, 252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011) ). "This Court is not merely reviewing the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision; rather, this Court is hearing the matter as if the case were on direct appeal from the trial judge's decision." Gilpin-Grubb v. State , 138 Idaho 76, 79, 57 P.3d 787, 790 (2002).
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. "Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007). Yet unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, a petition for post-conviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Id. The petition "must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903 ).
Idaho Code section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, "either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own initiative." Id. "Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c) ).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
On appeal, all of Marsalis's claims involve allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. "The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution." Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280, 295, 360 P.3d 289, 304 (2015) (quoting Murray v. State , 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014) ). "[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Id. (quoting Murray, 156 Idaho at 164, 321 P.3d at 714 ). This Court analyzes claims for ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "To prevail under Strickland, the petitioner must show: (1) ‘that counsel's performance was deficient,’ and (2) ‘that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’ " Dunlap, 159 Idaho at 296, 360 P.3d at 305 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ).
For the first prong of the Strickland test, the petitioner must show that "counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). "[T]his Court does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for...
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Marsalis v. State
...166 Idaho 334458 P.3d 203Jeffrey MARSALIS, Petitioner-Appellant,v.STATE of Idaho, Respondent.Docket No. 47438Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2020 Term.Opinion filed: February 18, 2020Silvey Law Office, Ltd., Boise, for Appellant. Greg S. Silvey argued.Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorn......