Marsh v. Government of Virgin Islands
Decision Date | 09 May 1977 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76/15. |
Citation | 431 F. Supp. 800 |
Parties | John D. MARSH, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT OF the VIRGIN ISLANDS, and Leroy Quinn, as Commissioner of the Department of Finance of the Virgin Islands Government, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
James & Resnick by Jeffrey L. Resnick, St. Croix, Christiansted, V. I., for plaintiff John D. Marsh.
James William Silver, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I., for defendants.
GARTH, Circuit Judge1 (assigned to serve temporarily as a Judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1614(a)):
Plaintiff, John D. Marsh, a former judge of the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands, in an action brought against the Government of the Virgin Islands and its Commissioner of Finance on January 9, 1976, seeks an accounting (predicated on a declaratory judgment) to determine the amount of money to which Marsh claims he is entitled as a lump sum payment for unused, annual leave accumulated by him at the time when he left office.2 The determination of the amount of annual leave compensation which the Government owes Marsh depends upon an interpretation of the annual leave provisions of the Virgin Islands Code, 3 V.I.C. 581-82.3
The parties have agreed that there are no disputed issues of fact and have crossmoved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. (See part IV infra). The motions were submitted for decision on April 22, 1977.
It is best to set forth the relevant statutory provisions at the outset. Section 587(a) of Title 3 of the Virgin Islands Code, 3 V.I.C. 587(a), provides:
Whenever any civilian officer or employee of the government . . . entitled to leave under sections 581-584 of this title is separated from the Service . . he shall be paid compensation in a lump sum for all accumulated and current accrued annual or vacation leave to which he is entitled under existing law. Such lump-sum payment shall equal the compensation that such officer or employee would have received had he remained in the Service until the expiration of the period of such annual or vacation leave.
According to section 581(a):
Subject to the provisions of section 582 of this title all officers and employees of the Government of the Virgin Islands, . . shall be entitled to 26 days annual leave, each calendar year exclusive of Sundays and holidays. The part unused in any year shall be accumulated for succeeding years until it totals not exceeding 60 days. . . . (Emphasis added.)
Section 582, enacted as Act No. 2311 in June, 1968, provides:
As may be observed, section 582 provides for less annual leave than section 581(a) and, by its terms, is applicable to "employees" who enter government service after June 30, 1968.
Marsh served as a judge of the Virgin Islands Municipal Court for a term of four years, from November 5, 1971 through November 4, 1975. Due to the demands of his office, Marsh utilized only a small portion of his annual leave. When Marsh left government service in 1975, he was paid, pursuant to section 587(a), a lump sum for accrued, unused annual leave calculated under the formula set forth in section 582. Under that formula, Marsh was compensated for 36 days and 3 hours accumulated leave.
Marsh contends that his annual leave should be determined under section 581(a) and that, therefore, he is entitled to compensation for 60 days accrued, annual leave. In support of this contention, Marsh claims that, as a Municipal Court Judge, he was an "officer" rather than an "employee" of the Virgin Islands. He further observes that section 581(a), by its terms, is applicable to "officers and employees" whereas section 582 refers only to "employees." Attaching significance to the Legislature's omission of the word "officers" from the provisions of section 582, Marsh argues that section 582 applies only to "employees" who enter government service after June 30, 1968 and that section 581(a) continues to apply to "officers" regardless of the date upon which they enter government service. Thus, Marsh, an "officer" who entered government service after June 30, 1968, submits that he is entitled to accrued leave of 60 days as determined under section 581(a).
In response, the Government maintains that the term "employees" as used in section 582 includes "officers" within its meaning. Therefore, it is urged that Marsh was properly compensated for annual leave under the provisions of section 582. This ambiguity requires that I determine whether or not the word "employees" as used in section 582 includes "officers." In resolving this issue, the function of this court is to construe the statutory language so as to give effect to the intent of the Virgin Islands Legislature. See United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). As the Supreme Court has stated:
"In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Our objective in a case such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will.
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975).
In the instant case, the statutory language of section 582 offers little guidance as to the meaning of "employees." Therefore, I must look to all aids which shed light on the legislative intent and proper construction of section 582, "to history and analogy and practice . . .." United Shoe Workers of America v. Bedell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 506 F.2d 174, 179 (1974), quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 317, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933).
In 1975, the Virgin Islands Legislature amended section 582 in Act No. 3683, V.I. Session Laws (1975), in an effort to clarify the meaning of the term "employees" as used in that statute. The amendment, which attempted to express the legislative intent as of the date when section 582 was enacted, specified that "officers" were included within the term and meaning of "employees." The amendment to section 582 which appears in Act No. 3683 reads in relevant part:
There can be no doubt that this amendment to section 582 is highly relevant here. It is well settled that "subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); accord, Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 343 (5th Cir. 1975); Sioux Valley Empire Electric Ass'n v. Butz, 504 F.2d 168, 173 (8th Cir. 1974).
In addition, it appears that the word "employees" is used in numerous other provisions of the Virgin Islands Code in a general sense so as to include "officers." See Revised Organic Act, section 29 (1954); 3 V.I.C. 562, 583, 632-37. The language of these provisions is strikingly similar to the language used in sections 581(a) and 582.
For example, sections 583-83a of Title 3 of the Virgin Islands Code, 3 V.I.C. 583-83a, concerning the accrual of sick leave, provide:
The statutes providing for Government health insurance, 3 V.I.C. 632-36, make similar use of the terms "officers" and "employees":
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