Marsh v. Hawkins
Decision Date | 28 February 1968 |
Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 1,1 |
Citation | 7 Ariz.App. 226,437 P.2d 978 |
Parties | , 31 A.L.R.3d 1383 Clyde William MARSH, Sr., and Anna Christine Marsh, his wife, Appellants, v. R. B. HAWKINS and E. M. Hawkins also known as E. M. Campbell, individually and as Partners of Hawkins & Campbell and Hawkins and Campbell, a partnership, Appellees. 517. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
James E. Flynn, Phoenix, for appellees.
This is an action brought by Clyde William Marsh, Sr. and Anna Christine Marsh, his wife, against R. B. Hawkins and E. M. Hawkins, also known as E. M. Campbell, and the partnership known as Hawkins and Campbell. Defendants are licensed process servers under the provisions of A.R.S. § 11--445, as amended. It is alleged that defendants made a false return of service of summons upon the plaintiffs herein in Case No. 147716, Maricopa County, whereby they suffered damages.
Judgment was rendered against plaintiffs after motion to dismiss their amended complaint, in three counts, was granted. For the purposes of this appeal the allegations of the amended complaint must therefore be taken as true.
CONTRACT THEORY (COUNT I)
The first count is based on the theory that by reason of the duties imposed upon persons who accept the license as private process servers, a contractual relationship exists between such process servers and the defendant whom they certify they have served process upon, and that such defendants are third-party beneficiaries. This theory is unsound because no contractual relationship exists. A.R.S. § 11--445, subsec. F provides as follows:
This statute does not purport to create a contractual relationship between the process server and the individual served. The appellants have cited no decision supporting this theory of their complaint and their arguments are not convincing. We hold that the trial court properly dismissed count one for failure to state a claim.
The second count alleges that the process server's affidavit was 'erroneous, untrue, and the said defendant was mistaken in making the said AFFIDAVIT.' It is to be noted that it is not charged that the process server was negligent in any respect; this count is predicated on a species of strict liability.
The third count alleges that the process server knew the affidavit 'to be false and contain false statements or she was ignorant of the validity of the said affidavit and the truth of the content (sic) thereof.' The appellants argue that this count sounds in 'fraud.'
It is alleged in both of these counts that an affidavit of personal service as to the plaintiffs was filed by the defendant in Case No. 147716 on or about March 15, 1963, but that in truth and in fact they were never served in the action and that the plaintiffs did not learn the truth regarding such false return of service until September of 1965. This action was filed on April 6, 1966, and the defendants raise the statute of limitations as a defense.
The original action in which the false return was allegedly filed went to default judgment against the plaintiffs herein, but on their motion, showing that they had never been served with summons, the judgment was vacated. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the action of the trial court was upheld. Review by the Supreme Court was denied. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 5 Ariz.App. 74, 423 P.2d 150 (1967) (review denied March 14, 1967).
We first must consider whether counts two and/or three state a cause of action and in order to do so we must determine to what standard of liability a private process server is to be held.
We agree with the appellee that we are not here concerned with the action of fraud, as that common law action has been structuralized in this state. Moore v. Meyers, 31 Ariz. 347, 253 P. 626 (1927). We are, however, concerned with a claim of false service of process, an action not unknown to the commonl law. While a private process server is a recent arrival on the scene, he is under our statute 'an officer of the court.' A.R.S. § 11--445, subsec. F. As such, we believe he is subject to substantially the same liability as imposed by the common law upon a sheriff or constable when performing similar functions.
At common law, we find a broad spectrum of case law, establishing a minimum standard for a process server ranging from strict liability to a requirement that the plaintiff must show that the server acted willfully. 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables § 114, at 322--324. An 'intention to defraud' has been held necessary to sustain an action of false return in the early case of Sutherland v. Cunningham, 1 Stew. 438 (Ala. 1828). David v. Larochelle, 296 Mass. 302, 5 N.E.2d 571 (1936) held the action proper where the return was unintentionally false in that only a blank form and not a true copy of summons had been served. State ex rel Moore v. Morant, 266 S.W.2d 723 (Mo.App.1954) establishes strict liability for a mistaken return. The court in Morant said:
(Emphasis added) 266 S.W.2d at 726.
The reason given by the Missouri court for holding a process server to such strict accountability, an erroneous return of process is conclusive on the parties, is not the law in Arizona. In this state, the return may be impeached by a party if clear and convincing evidence of the return's falsity is presented to the court. This was done in the instant case. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Calif. v. March, 5 Ariz.App 74, 423 P.2d 150 (1967). We decline to hold a process server an absolute insurer of the truth of the return. The process server should be held to a degree of liability commensurate with his responsibility and he is liable for negligence in making a false return as well as for the willful making of such return.
Therefore, Count 3 states sufficient facts to permit recovery but Count 2 as filed does not.
The rule in Arizona is that after the reversal of the judgment and remand of the case for further proceedings, either party may amend. Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 1 Ariz.App. 315, 402 P.2d 436 (1965); and, see Temp-Rite Engineering Co. v. Chesin Construction Co., 3 Ariz.App. 229, 413 P.2d 288 (1966).
The scope of permissible amendment is set forth in Rule 15(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.
The defendants argue that the applicable statute of limitations is A.R.S. § 12--542, which reads in pertinent part:
'There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions:
The plaintiffs contend that the applicable statute is A.R.S. § 12--543(3) reading:
'There shall be commenced and prosecuted within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions:
At common law, an action for false return was considered an action in trespass on the case Whitaker v. Summer, 7 Ackering 551, 19 Am.Dec. 298 (Mass.1929). Both our venue and limitation statutes have come to us from Texas. Pride v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 157, 161, 348 P.2d 924 (1960); Hagenauer v. Detroit Copper Mining Co., 14 Ariz. 74, 92, 124 P. 803 (1912). In connection with our venue statute, we have followed Texas decisions which have held that the word 'trespass' includes action known at common law as trepass on the case. Pride v. Superior Court, supra, at 161, 348 P.2d 924. By analogy we reach the same result...
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