Marsh v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor
| Decision Date | 20 June 1889 |
| Citation | 149 Mass. 512,21 N.E. 1070 |
| Parties | MARSH v. SUPREME COUNCIL AMERICAN LEGION OF HONOR et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
W.C. Coggswell, for plaintiff.
Stearns & Butler, for Supreme Council.
Williard Howland, for defendant, Marsh.
The principal defendant is a beneficiary corporation formed under the general laws of the commonwealth as they existed in 1879 which are found in Pub.St. c. 115, § 8. In 1880, Walter H. Marsh became a member and received a benefit certificate in the sum of $2,000, payable to his sister, which was afterwards changed so as to be payable to his wife, Mrs. Emeline S. Marsh. In 1887 he sought to substitute his mother, Mrs. Luthera Marsh, as beneficiary of this fund. The questions presented by the report are whether he was entitled thus to substitute his mother as beneficiary of the fund, and whether, in view of the steps taken by him in order to make this substitution, and of the fact that it was not actually effected by reason of the conduct and acts of Emeline S. Marsh which prevented the issuance of a new certificate, the plaintiff is entitled to the same benefit as if the substitution had been made. The corporation admits its liability and is ready to pay the amount of the benefit to any one who may be held lawfully entitled thereto. It carries on its business principally through what are called subordinate councils, to whom applications for membership are made, through whom assessments are levied to provide the necessary funds for its operations. The by-laws require that the name of the beneficiary shall be entered upon the benefit certificate by the supreme secretary of the corporation, subject to the future disposal of the benefit by the member. This is done after petition to the supreme secretary, signed by the member desiring to make the change, attested by the secretary of the subordinate council to which he belongs, with the seal attached, and accompanied by a certain fee. The change is effected by the surrender of the membership certificate and the issue of a new one, payable to the beneficiary. The corporation had authority by the statute as it existed when it was formed, to establish a fund "for the purpose of assisting the widows, orphans, or other persons dependent upon deceased members." The statute of 1882, c. 195, enlarged the powers of such associations by adding to the persons therein described "other relations of deceased members." The constitution and by-laws of the defendant corporation have been republished since the act of 1882, without alluding to or noticing that statute, and whether with any alterations therein does not appear. This statute did not require formal adoption by a beneficiary corporation, and it was therefore held that where after its passage such an association accepted the application of a person, with a designation of a beneficiary that could only lawfully be made by virtue of the later statute, it could not be said by it, or any claimant of the fund, that it was exercising, and was only authorized to exercise, the more limited powers which it had under the earlier statute. Order of Foresters v. Callahan, 146 Mass. 393, 16 N.E. 14.
In the case at bar, the certificate was issued to the member, and thus the contract made with him previous to the statute of 1882. With the assent of the member and the corporation, there is no reason why the class of beneficiaries from whom he might select should not be extended to all mentioned in that statute. Even if the corporation might have refused to allow the wider designation thus permitted, it is found that it did not, and was ready, had the formalities required by it been complied with, to accept Mrs. Luthera Marsh, the mother of the member, as the beneficiary. Although not dependent upon the member, she was within the larger class of beneficiaries contemplated by the statute of 1882. No person named as beneficiary among the large class for whose benefit the earlier statute allowed provision to be made had any such interest in the fund that he or she could object to any change in the disposal thereof in favor of one of the additional class whom the latter statute had enumerated, if the member so desired, and if the corporation was prepared to assent to it. In an ordinary life-policy made payable to a person named, the rights of the beneficiary are fixed by the terms of the policy, and are vested when the policy is issued. In the certificates of a beneficiary association which are issued to a holder, and which authorize him to designate another beneficiary than the one originally named, the holder may make such changes as the law of the association permits, within the limits of those classes for whom by statute such association may provide. All that a beneficiary has during the life-time of the member who holds the certificate is a mere expectancy, which gives no vested right in the anticipated benefit, and is not property, as, owing to his right of revocation, it is dependent on the will and pleasure of the holder. Richmond v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 447, 10 N.W. 596. As the beneficiary has only an expectancy, it would seem that a law changing the persons to whom benefits might be designated, and enlarging their number, would apply to certificates issued before it took effect, as well as to those subsequently issued. Society v. Burkhart, 110 Ind. 189, 10 N.E. 79, and 11 N.E. 449.
When the constitution of a society which originally provided that a benefit should be paid only to a widow or children had been legally amended, so as to allow the amount to be paid to any one designated in his lifetime by the holder, the person so designated was held entitled to the exclusion of the widow. Durian v. Central Verein, 7 Daly, 168. The defendant Emeline relies much on the case of Elsey v Association, 142 Mass. 224, 7 N.E. 844. In this case, a member of the association in his application for membership designated his wife as the person to whom the benefit was to be paid at his death. A by-law provided that the benefit should be paid "to the person or persons designated by the member in his application for membership or last legal assignment, provided such persons are heirs or members of the decedent's family." The member afterwards attempted to change the designation from his wife to his mother, who was not living with him, but who was living with her husband, in another town and county. It was held that the attempted designation was invalid; that the original designation to the wife remained in force; and that she was entitled to the fund. An examination of the papers in the case shows that the attempted change of designation was after the statute of 1882, but no notice of this statute which allowed the designation of the relatives of deceased members other than their children is taken in the argument, nor does it seem to...
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