Marshall v. Cnty. of Cook

• Decision Date: 01 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1–14–2864.,1–14–2864.
• Citation: 401 Ill.Dec. 834,51 N.E.3d 27
• Parties: Steven MARSHALL, as a Representative of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. The COUNTY OF COOK, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

51 N.E.3d 27

401 Ill.Dec. 834

Steven MARSHALL, as a Representative of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.The COUNTY OF COOK, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 1–14–2864.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

March 1, 2016.

Steven J. Seidman, of Seidman Margulis & Fairman, LLP, of Chicago, and David A. Novoselsky, of Novoselsky Law Offices, P.C., of Waukegan, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Donald J. Pechous, Sisavanh Baker, and James Beligratis, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

¶ 1 Steven Marshall sued Cook County alleging the county misused funds collected from litigation fees by failing to use them for the purposes stated in the enabling statutes. The trial court dismissed Marshall's third-amended complaint with prejudice under section 2–619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2012) ) on the ground that Marshall lacked standing-only the Cook County State's Attorney could bring the claim. Marshall contends: (i) as a taxpayer, he has standing to sue the county to recover any funds not spent for authorized purposes under the statute; and (ii) he should have been permitted to file a fourth-amended complaint and proceed on a mandamus action. We reject both contentions and affirm. The enabling statutes do not provide for a private cause of action and in the absence of evidence of Marshall's personal liability to replenish public revenues depleted by the alleged misuse, he lacks standing to bring a taxpayer lawsuit. Further, after the circuit court dismissed his complaint with prejudice, Marshall had no statutory right to amend, and the court correctly denied him leave to amend his complaint

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 2010, Steven Marshall filed a complaint against Cook County alleging improper diversion of fees that were to be used for providing security in Cook County circuit courts, seeking a declaration that the county's conduct was unlawful and an order that the fees be returned to those who paid them, placed in a fund under the control of the chief judge of the circuit court, or by order of the supreme court, be used exclusively for the benefit of the judicial branch.

¶ 4 Marshall filed two amended complaints in 2010 and then in September 2013, filed a third-amended complaint, which was styled as a class action. The complaint alleged that he, and others similarly situated, paid statutory fees when filing a first pleading, paper, or other appearance in the circuit court of Cook County to: (1) defray the cost of court security (55 ILCS 5/5–1103 (West 2012) ), (2) establish and maintain automated record keeping systems in circuit court clerks' offices in Illinois (705 ILCS 105/27.3a (West 2012) ), and (3) establish and maintain a document storage system in the circuit court clerks' offices (705 ILCS 105/27.3 (West 2012) ). Marshall alleged that the county refused to use the fees for the specific purposes set out in the enabling statutes and instead uses them for discretionary general revenue. He also alleged that without any statutory authority the county improperly diverts 9% from a series of court funds for “Cook County Administration” which is designated as “Fund 883.”

¶ 5 In count I, Marshall alleged an unauthorized taking of property in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving the county's use of the statutory fees as general revenue rather than for the purposes authorized by statute. He asked for compensatory and exemplary damages and attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). In counts II and III, Marshall asked that the county be compelled to use the fees for their statutory purposes or return them to him and other litigants who paid them. Count IV alleged the fees are a general tax and violate the Uniformity Clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. IX, § 4 (a)) and asks that the fees be returned to him and other litigants or placed in a fund under the control of the chief judge of the circuit court to be used for the exclusive benefit of the judicial branch.

¶ 6 The county filed a combined motion to dismiss under section 2–619.1 of the Code asking the court to strike that part of Marshall's complaint referring to a represented class and any request for class certification, because Marshall was never granted leave to request class certification. 735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2012). The county also asked that the complaint be dismissed under section 2–615 of the Code on the ground that the enabling statutes do not provide for a private right of action nor is plaintiffs' alleged injury one in which the statutes were designed to prevent and thus plaintiffs have alleged no injury for which relief could be granted. 735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2012). The county further argued under section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code that plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims because the enabling statute does not recognize a private right of action by a taxpayer and that because the county is the real party in interest, only the State's Attorney has the power to bring these claims on behalf of the county. 735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2012).

¶ 7 After a hearing, the trial court granted the county's motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court found that “this is [not] a taxpayer case,” that Marshall did not have standing, and that any claim, if there is one, would need to be brought by the Cook County State's Attorney. Marshall filed a motion to reconsider, in which he also asked the circuit court to hear his motion to disqualify the State's Attorney and to grant him leave to file a fourth-amended complaint so that the case could proceed as a mandamus action. The court denied the motion to reconsider, reiterating that there is no private cause of action under the enabling statutes and that Marshall lacked standing. The court also denied Marshall's motion to disqualify the State's Attorney.

¶ 8 Marshall now argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that he did not have standing and that only the Cook County State's Attorney could bring a lawsuit challenging the county's use of court fees; and (2) denying him leave to file a fourth-amended complaint so that he could proceed with a mandamus action. The county asks us to affirm the dismissal of Marshall's complaint and find that the circuit court did not err in refusing to grant Marshall leave to file a fourth-amended complaint or his request that the State's Attorney be disqualified. Marshall did not file a reply brief.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Standing

¶ 11 Marshall contends the trial court should have found that he, not the State's Attorney, had standing. He asserts that the circuit court erred in finding that the absence of a private right of action under the statutes to be grounds for dismissal because as a taxpayer, he has standing to file a claim objecting to the misuse of public funds.

¶ 12 The Illinois Supreme Court has propounded a four-part test to determine if a statute implies a private right of action. The following elements must be satisfied: (1) the plaintiff belongs to the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) the plaintiff's injury is one the statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for the statute's violation. Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 455, 460, 243 Ill.Dec. 46, 722 N.E.2d 1115 (1999). See also Givot v. Orr, 321 Ill.App.3d 78, 87, 254 Ill.Dec. 53, 746 N.E.2d 810 (2001) (finding that cause of action was not implied by statute where third and fourth elements not shown).

¶ 13 Marshall is not a member of the class intended to be benefited by the statutes—the statutes are intended to benefit counties that want to reduce court security costs or establish and maintain document storage or automated recordkeeping systems. Further, a private right of action is inconsistent with that underlying purpose and not necessary to provide an adequate remedy, as the circuit court noted, since the Cook County State's Attorney can bring an action for any alleged violations. Thus, the circuit court correctly ruled that no private right of action exists under the enabling statutes.

¶ 14 The doctrine of standing ensures that issues are raised only by parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill.2d 18, 23, 284 Ill.Dec. 294, 809 N.E.2d 1240 (2004). To have the requisite standing to maintain an action, a plaintiff must complain of some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill.2d 462, 492, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988). The alleged injury must be: (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the requested relief. Id. at 492–93, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561. The plaintiff need not “allege facts establishing that he [or she] has standing to proceed” but “[r]ather it is the defendant's burden to plead and prove lack of standing.” Wexler, 211 Ill.2d at 22, 284 Ill.Dec. 294, 809 N.E.2d 1240. “A complaint may be involuntarily dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to section 2–619(a)(9) of the Code.”

Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill.2d 529, 534, 269 Ill.Dec. 374, 780 N.E.2d 1098 (2002). Dismissal is mandated where a plaintiff lacks standing, because that deficiency negates the very cause of action. Wexler, 211 Ill.2d at 22, 284 Ill.Dec. 294, 809 N.E.2d 1240. We review an order dismissing a complaint for lack of standing de novo (In re Estate of Schlenker, 209 Ill.2d 456, 461, 283 Ill.Dec. 707, 808 N.E.2d 995 (2004) ) and may affirm on any basis present in the record regardless of the basis relied on by the trial court. Wofford v. Tracy, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 27, 400 Ill.Dec. 669, 48 N.E.3d 1109.

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