Marshall v. Commonwealth
Decision Date | 02 November 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 863 F.R. 2015,No. 50 F.R. 2016,863 F.R. 2015,50 F.R. 2016 |
Citation | 197 A.3d 294 |
Parties | Robert J. MARSHALL, Jr., Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Robert J. Marshall, Jr., Respondent |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Joseph C. Bright, Philadelphia, for petitioner Robert J. Marshall, Jr.
Matthew S. Salkowski, Deputy Attorney General, Harrisburg, for respondent Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge, HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
This personal income tax (PIT) matter returns to us following remand to the Board of Finance and Revenue (Board) for recalculation of the amount of Pennsylvania PIT owed by Petitioner Robert J. Marshall, Jr. (Taxpayer or Marshall). See Marshall v. Commonwealth , 41 A.3d 67 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (en banc) ( Marshall I ), exceptions overruled , 50 A.3d 287 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc) ( Marshall II ), aff'd sub nom. Wirth v. Commonwealth , 626 Pa. 124, 95 A.3d 822 (2014) ( Wirth ), cert. denied sub nom. Houssels v. Pennsylvania , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1405, 191 L.Ed.2d 362 (2015). On remand, the Board reassessed Taxpayer's PIT liability at "$102,620.00, plus appropriate penalties and interest, less any payments and credits on his account."1 Both Taxpayer and the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (Department or Revenue) challenge aspects of the Board's reassessment on remand. We affirm.
Taxpayer, a resident of the State of Texas, invested as a limited partner in 600 Grant Street Associates Limited Partnership (Partnership), a Connecticut limited partnership, which owned a building in the City of Pittsburgh (Property) that went into foreclosure in 2005. In 2008, the Department assessed Taxpayer for his pass-through share of the Partnership's income2 realized from the foreclosure of the Property. As we noted in Marshall I , Section 303 of the Code3 sets forth eight separate classes of income subject to the PIT. The class of taxable income at issue here is "[n]et gains or income from disposition of property." Section 303(a)(3) of the Code.4
In Marshall I , we summarized the details of the financial arrangement giving rise to the foreclosure and the assessed PIT liability therefrom:
Marshall I , 41 A.3d at 70-72 (footnotes omitted) (record citations omitted).
Taxpayer appealed the Board's December 16, 2008 determination to this Court. In his appeal, Taxpayer first questioned whether any PIT could be imposed where neither the Partnership nor the individual partners received cash or other property upon foreclosure. Taxpayer also contended Commonwealth v. Rigling , 48 Pa.Cmwlth. 303, 409 A.2d 936 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Columbia Steel & Shafting Co. , 83 Pa. D. & C. 326 (Dauphin 1951), exceptions dismissed , 62 Dauph. 296 (C.P. Pa. 1952), prohibit the imposition of an income tax on a taxpayer, like himself, who actually derived no income from his investment. Taxpayer also raised a disparate treatment argument, claiming he was being treated differently from the partners who resided in Pennsylvania. Taxpayer further claimed that the tax benefit rule should be applied to reduce his PIT liability. Finally, Taxpayer argued that imposition of the PIT on him, a nonresident, would violate the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.5 Marshall I , 41 A.3d at 72-73.
In Marshall I , we analyzed and ultimately rejected each of Taxpayer's challenges. Taking them out of order, we first held that Taxpayer waived his Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 73. We also rejected Taxpayer's due process/minimum contacts challenge, finding that Taxpayer purposefully availed himself of the opportunity to invest in Pennsylvania real estate through the Partnership, establishing "sufficient minimum contacts for the imposition of a tax on Marshall and his fellow partners upon disposition by the Partnership of the Property." Id. at 74.
With respect to Taxpayer's claim, in essence, that the foreclosure of the Property did not yield a taxable event because neither he nor the Partnership received any cash or property (or income from investment), this Court sided with the Department's interpretation of Section 303(a)(3) of the Code and the related regulation, 61 Pa. Code § 103.13. We noted the similarities between the language in the Code and regulation to that found in the federal counterpart, Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 1001. We also observed Taxpayer's accurate concession that for federal income tax purposes, a foreclosure on a nonrecourse mortgage6 is treated as a sale or exchange for an amount equal to the outstanding balance of the mortgage. Marshall I , 41 A.3d at 78 (citing Cox v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 68 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1995) ). Accordingly, we affirmed the Department's construction and application of the Code and the regulation to real property foreclosures, "even when the mortgagor does not receive any cash or other property (i.e. , proceeds) upon...
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