Marshall v. State

• Citation: 992 So.2d 762
• Decision Date: 31 August 2007
• Docket Number: CR-05-1035.
• Parties: William Bruce MARSHALL v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

992 So.2d 762

William Bruce MARSHALL v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-05-1035.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

August 31, 2007.

Rehearing Denied December 14, 2007.

Certiorari Denied April 25, 2008 Alabama Supreme Court 1070461.

William M. Dawson, Jr., Birmingham; and Stephen Cochran Wallace, Birmingham, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Kevin W. Blackburn, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

WELCH, Judge.

William Bruce Marshall was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the killing of Alicia Nicole Bentley: one count of murder made capital because it occurred during a burglary, § 13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975, and one count of murder made capital because it occurred while Marshall, who was over the age of 19 years, sexually abused or attempted to sexually abuse Alicia, who was between the ages of 12 and 16 years,¹ § 13A-5-40(a)(8), Ala.Code 1975. The jury did not convict Marshall of having raped Alicia, as was also alleged in the indictment. By a vote of 11 to 1, the jury recommended that Marshall be sentenced to death. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Marshall to death.

Marshall did not deny that he killed 15-year-old Alicia. Indeed, while in police custody he confessed to the killing and eventually led police to Alicia's body. His attorneys, however, presented a defense in which Marshall attempted to call into question the allegation that he had had any kind of sexual contact with Alicia.

The evidence adduced at trial tended to show the following facts. On December 28, 2004, Tonya Bentley called the Vestavia Hills Police Department to report that her daughter, Alicia, was missing from their apartment. Tonya Bentley and Marshall had separated in early December 2004. Tonya, Alicia, and Tonya's newborn son had moved from the apartment they had shared with Marshall into an apartment in a different complex. Tonya still had personal belongings at Marshall's, and her name was on the lease for that apartment.

Tonya told police that she believed that Marshall may have known of Alicia's whereabouts. She based her belief on the fact that she had discovered a videocassette recorder, or VCR, that Alicia had left at the old apartment in a chair in the new apartment when she got home. Tonya was positive that the VCR had not been in the apartment when she left for work that morning. When Tonya called Marshall to ask whether he had seen Alicia that day, however, he denied having come to the apartment.

Further, Tonya and Marshall had spoken earlier that day about the possibility of Marshall bringing Tonya the washer and dryer. Tonya said that Marshall asked her when she would be home so that he could bring the appliances over. He also said he was going to rent an appliance dolly to make the move easier.

After speaking with Tonya, police alerted other law-enforcement agencies to be on the lookout for Alicia. Police went to Marshall's apartment, where they could hear the dryer running inside, but no one answered the door when they knocked. Marshall's truck was parked outside the apartment, and neighbors said that they had seen him go into the apartment but had not seen him come back out. Police attempted to call Marshall and have neighbors call Marshall, but no one answered the telephone inside the apartment.

Tonya attempted to open the front door with her key, but the lock had been changed. The manager of the apartment complex also attempted to open the lock with the master key, but that key did not work, either. After receiving permission from Tonya to enter the apartment, police simultaneously broke down the front and back doors to the apartment and found Marshall inside.

Detective Mike O'Connor of the Vestavia Hills Police Department testified that, as police searched the apartment, Marshall was handcuffed both for his safety and for the safety of the police. Alicia was not found in Marshall's apartment, and O'Connor asked Marshall to come to city hall with him. Marshall agreed and the police took him to city hall. O'Connor said that he told Marshall that he was not under arrest at that time and removed the handcuffs from him before he got into the car.

O'Connor said that even though Marshall had not been arrested at that point, he was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), while they were still at the apartment. O'Connor said that he advised Marshall of his rights again once they reached his office. Marshall signed a waiver-of-rights form and initially denied knowing anything about Alicia's whereabouts. O'Connor said that he explained to Marshall that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave, but because the doors were broken at the apartment, Marshall chose to stay at city hall. O'Connor testified that the only place he had for Marshall to stay was in a cell, but that Marshall only had to ask to leave and he would have been free to go that night.

Police continued to investigate Alicia's disappearance throughout the night of December 28 and into the morning hours of December 29, 2004. During their investigation, they discovered clothes, shoes, a purse and a comforter identified as Alicia's in a dumpster at an apartment complex next to the apartment complex where Marshall lived. Their investigation also showed that Marshall left work and was unaccounted for during several hours the afternoon of December 28.

On the morning of December 29, after finding the comforter, clothes, and purse, police got an arrest warrant for Marshall based on kidnapping. In addition, law— enforcement officials discovered Alicia's driver's license and her library card in a dumpster at Marshall's job site. Once police obtained the kidnapping warrant, O'Connor said, Marshall was arrested, and he was no longer free to leave. Marshall was not questioned again until about 1:00 p.m. on the afternoon of December 29.

Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") assisted the Vestavia Hills Police Department in questioning Marshall. When FBI agents interrogated Marshall, they also advised him of his Miranda rights. Marshall signed a form indicating that he understood his rights. While the agents were questioning Marshall the evening of December 29, one day after Alicia had been reported missing, Marshall admitted that he "had done a terrible thing." (R. 444.) Agent Scott Keeler of the FBI said that Marshall told him he "had gotten into a verbal argument with Alicia that had become violent and he had struck her in the head with his fist." (R. 444.) He said he was not sure whether she was okay and that he had taken her out in the country and dropped her off.

Marshall rode with law-enforcement officials to an area outside Columbiana. After searching off various side roads, Marshall was finally able to lead authorities to Alicia's body. She was nude, except for a pair of white socks.

Dr. Art Shores, a forensic pathologist with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that he performed an autopsy on the body, which revealed that Alicia had been strangled to death. Dr. Shores also testified that Alicia had a small vaginal mucosal tear. The tear probably occurred within 24 to 48 hours of Dr. Shores's examination of the body, which was conducted on December 30, 2004.

I.

Marshall contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to offer his confession and other evidence obtained as a result of what he alleges was an illegal arrest. Specifically, Marshall contends that police had no probable cause to arrest him when they first took him from the apartment to the Vestavia Hills Police Department. Because, he says, his arrest was illegal, Marshall asserts that the confession he gave to law-enforcement officials was due to be suppressed.

The State argues that Marshall was not under arrest when he left the apartment with Detective O'Connor. The State points to the facts that Marshall voluntarily agreed to accompany O'Connor to city hall, that the handcuffs were removed before Marshall got into the police car, and that he was free to leave city hall at any time the night of December 28, 2004. It was not until after the kidnapping warrant was issued that Marshall was placed under arrest.

"This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in dispute." State v. Skaggs, 903 So.2d 180, 181 (Ala.Crim.App.2004). "A trial court's ultimate legal conclusion on a motion to suppress based on a given set of facts is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal." State v. Hargett, 935 So.2d 1200, 1204 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).

Detective O'Connor testified that Marshall was not under arrest when he agreed to accompany officers to city hall or when he voluntarily spent the night in a cell because the doors to his apartment had been broken down. In cases such as this one where there has not been a formal arrest, "`an objective test is used to determine whether the suspect's freedom of action has been restricted by the police in any significant manner.'" Barksdale v. State, 788 So.2d 898, 903 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000) quoting Hooks v. State, 534 So.2d 329, 348 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). "`"The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his position."'" Id., quoting Hooks, 534 So.2d at 348, quoting in turn United States v. Jonas, 786 F.2d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir.1986). The United States Supreme Court has long held that "a person has been `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). A person's decision to voluntarily accompany officers to the police station to answer questions about a missing person does not support a conclusion that that person is under arrest. Smith v. State, 797...