Marshall v. State

• Decision Date: 12 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC00-1186.,SC00-1186.
• Citation: 854 So.2d 1235
• Parties: Matthew MARSHALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

854 So.2d 1235

Matthew MARSHALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC00-1186.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 12, 2003.

Rehearing Denied September 8, 2003.

Melissa Minsk Donoho, Special Assistant CCRC-South, and Leor Veleanu, Staff Attorney, CCRC-South, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Debra Rescigno, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Matthew Marshall, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on one issue, but affirm the trial court's order denying Marshall postconviction relief on all the other issues raised herein.

BACKGROUND

Matthew Marshall was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1988 murder of Jeffrey Henry. This Court previously summarized the facts in this case as follows:

Marshall and the victim, Jeffrey Henry, were both incarcerated at the Martin Correction Institute on November 1, 1988, when witnesses heard muffled screams and moans emanating from Henry's cell and observed Marshall exiting the cell with what appeared to be blood on his chest and arms. Within a few minutes, Marshall reentered the cell, and similar noises were heard. After the cell became quiet, Marshall again emerged with blood on his person. Henry was found dead, lying in his cell facedown with his hands bound behind his back and his sweat pants pulled down around his ankles to restrain his legs. Death was caused by blows to the back of his head.

Marshall was charged with first-degree murder. His defense at trial was that he killed Henry in self-defense. Marshall claimed that Henry was a "muscle man" for several inmates who operated a football pool. When Marshall tried to collect his winnings from the inmates, they told him to get the money from Henry. Marshall claims he entered Henry's cell only to collect his winnings but that Henry refused to pay, and that Henry then attacked him, so he fought back.

See Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799, 802 (Fla.1992). The jury found Marshall guilty of first-degree murder and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court, however, rejected the jury's recommendation and imposed a sentence of death. In so doing, the trial court concluded that facts supporting a conclusion that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances were "so clear and convincing that no reasonable person could differ." ¹ This Court, in a four-to-three opinion, affirmed the jury override on appeal. See id. at 805-06. The United States Supreme Court denied Marshall's petition for writ of certiorari on May 17, 1993. See Marshall v. Florida, 508 U.S. 915, 113 S.Ct. 2355, 124 L.Ed.2d 263 (1993).

Marshall filed his initial 3.850 motion in August of 1994. On January 29, 1999, Marshall filed his final amended 3.850 motion, raising twenty-seven claims.² Following a Huff³ hearing, the trial court entered an order granting an evidentiary hearing on claims (3), (11), (17), and (23) of Marshall's amended motion, and summarily denying Marshall's remaining claims. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on August 23-26, 1999. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order denying all relief. This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

Marshall raises five issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on Marshall's claim of juror misconduct; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Marshall's claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Marshall's claim that the State withheld exculpatory information; (4) whether the trial court failed to conduct an adequate cumulative error analysis; (5) whether the trial court erred by summarily denying meritorious claims. We will discuss them in turn.

Juror Misconduct

First, Marshall argues that the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim of juror misconduct. In his postconviction motion, Marshall alleged that racial remarks and jokes and the jury's consideration of non-record materials deprived him of a fair and impartial jury. To support his claim, Marshall attached three sworn affidavits to his postconviction motion. Two of the affidavits were from jurors in Marshall's trial, and the other affidavit was from an attorney, Ronald Smith. The trial court summarily denied this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

According to Mr. Smith's affidavit, he received a telephone call from a woman who claimed that she had served on the jury in Marshall's case.⁴ During the phone conversation with Mr. Smith, the woman purportedly indicated that (1) some jurors decided Marshall was guilty before the trial was over; (2) some jurors told racial jokes about Marshall; (3) some jurors announced during the guilt phase that they were going to vote for a guilty verdict and life sentence because they wanted Marshall to return to prison to kill more black inmates; and (4) some jurors, despite the trial judge's orders forbidding it, read and discussed articles concerning the trial. Mr. Smith, however, was unable to recall the name of the woman who called his office.

By contrast, the two juror affidavits discussed matters pertaining to the jury's deliberations. In her affidavit, juror Bachmann indicated that during the course of the guilt phase deliberations there were some jurors who did not want to vote for first-degree murder, and there was a concern that there might be a hung jury. She noted that a verdict finding Marshall guilty of first-degree murder was reached once there was an understanding that the jury would vote unanimously for a life sentence, although some jurors apparently felt Marshall should be sentenced to death. Juror Cunningham stated in her affidavit that during the course of the guilt phase deliberations she informed the other jurors that she did not believe the State had satisfied its burden of proof for first-degree murder, and she was not sure Marshall was guilty as charged. She noted that she compromised her true feelings regarding the case because other jurors did not want a hung jury. She indicated that she voted for guilty of first-degree murder once it was agreed that the jury would recommend a life sentence.

It is a well-settled rule that a verdict cannot be subsequently impeached by conduct which inheres in the verdict. See, e.g., McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 123 So.2d 339, 344 (Fla.1959); Russ v. State, 95 So.2d 594, 600 (Fla.1957). In Marks v. State Road Department, 69 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1954), this Court established guidelines with respect to the propriety of inquiry into matters occurring in the jury room. In particular, this Court explained

[t]hat affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that a juror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney; that witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was determined by aggregation and average or by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper manner; but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any matter which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the Court; the statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow-jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other matter resting alone in the juror's breast.

Id. at 774-75 (quoting Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866)) (emphasis omitted); see also Devoney v. State, 717 So.2d 501, 502 (Fla. 1998); McAllister Hotel, Inc., 123 So.2d at 344.

In considering claims of juror misconduct, a court must initially determine whether the facts alleged are matters that inhere in the verdict and are subjective in nature, or are extrinsic to the verdict and objective. See Devoney, 717 So.2d at 502. A juror is not competent to testify about matters inhering in the verdict, such as jurors' emotions, mental processes, or mistaken beliefs. See Baptist Hosp. v. Maler, 579 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1991); State v. Hamilton, 574 So.2d 124, 128 (Fla.1991); see also § 90.607(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999).⁵ However, jurors may testify as to "overt acts which might have prejudicially affected the jury in reaching their own verdict." Hamilton, 574 So.2d at 128; see also Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 354, 356 (Fla.1995) (holding that racial statements alleged to have been made during deliberations by some members of an all-white jury about black plaintiffs constituted sufficient overt acts which might have prejudicially affected jury in reaching its verdict).

As noted above, Mr. Smith's affidavit states that the woman who called his office indicated among other things that some jurors told racial jokes about Marshall and that some jurors announced during the guilt phase that they were going to vote for a guilty verdict and life sentence because they wanted Marshall to return to prison to kill more black inmates. The alleged juror misconduct set forth in Mr. Smith's affidavit does not appear to inhere in the verdict. In Powell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 652 So.2d 354 (Fla.1995), this Court also addressed a claim of racial or ethnic bias as allegedly reflected in statements made by jurors concerning the litigants involved in a case, and whether those statements constituted overt juror misconduct which could be the subject of...